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In multi-issue automated negotiation, group of agents may have different preferences and expectations on 
different issues. To reach an optimal negotiation outcome efficiently and effectively among a group of 
agents by considering their different preferences is a challenging problem in multi-issue automated 
negotiation. Negotiation convergence is a crucial part of the multi-issue automated negotiation process. 
To improve the negotiation convergence process and to minimise multi-issue negotiation complexity an 
agenda based approach is proposed to build a new negotiation model. The agenda based model 
investigates the significance of the choice of the sequence in issue-by-issue negotiation and also analyses 
the appropriateness of applying a preference ordering technique to generate the choice of sequence of 
issues. This model improves an agent’s utility by providing efficient convergence and an effective 
equilibrium outcome. The main motivation is to construct a new model which is symmetric and Pareto-
optimal. The proposed automated negotiation approach deals with multiple issues in such a way that it 
helps to balance the efficiency and effectiveness of the outcome. 
 
The negotiation is an interactive and decision making process by which a joint consensus decision is 
made by two or more parties. An agenda based negotiation approach is proposed where agents are led to 
cooperate in order to achieve a global goal while trying to satisfy as best as possible individual 
preferences and objectives. In this model multiple agents have their own decision measure to evaluate an 
offer related with both independent and sequentially interlinked multiple issues. This proposed approach 
shows how an issue-by-issue agenda based negotiation affects the negotiation outcome and makes it easy 
for the agents to find a common zone. The impact of the agenda procedure along with the strategy on the 
outcome is illustrated by a case study. The agent’s preference order is used as a base case for providing 
the optimal agenda-procedure combination.  
 
In a multi-issue negotiation process, it is difficult to reach an optimal outcome when the group of agents' 
preferences and the relative importance of the issues are not known to each other. This research 
investigates the multi-issue fuzzy group decision making problem where preference information on issues 
associated with services or products is expressed in different formats by the agents. A fuzzy preference 
concept is used to order the issues in the pre-negotiation stage to improve the efficiency of the outcome. 
A dynamic and iterative group consensus process is developed to support the preference ordering process. 
Furthermore, the preferences of the decision-making agents are constructed using a multi-issue 
methodology allowing the agents’ to take into account the preference ordering that can be used in the 
negotiation process, in order to help in quickening the search of a consensus between the agents. 
Therefore, the proposed negotiation approach consists of a multi-criteria decision making process and a 
cooperation-based multi-agent multi-issue negotiation protocol. The proposed negotiation protocol and 
strategy reach a Pareto optimal agreement on multiple issues. Experimental results illustrate that the 
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Automated negotiation is an iterative process and represents a key form of interaction 
between autonomous agents in electronic markets. The autonomous agents play 
important roles in these electronic markets (Kurbel et al. 2004). The autonomous agents 
communicate and compromise to reach mutually beneficial agreements (Fatima et al. 
2004; Fatima et al. 2005). In recent years, due to rapid expansion and adoption of 
electronic environments a lot of research has emerged in the area of electronic 
commerce and autonomous mechanisms such as automated negotiation. There has been 
a potential benefit of automating negotiation process in e-commerce. Negotiation is a 
well-known approach for resolving conflicts in human and agent societies (Abedin et al. 
2009). The field of negotiation instigates from various disciplines including artificial 
intelligence, economics, social science, game theory and computer science. The 
complexity of automated negotiation has led researchers to use different theories in 
suggesting their automated negotiation models. With the rapid growth of e-commerce, 
research in group negotiation has become increasingly important and challenging since 
negotiations in such a context are characterised by complex negotiation search spaces, 
tough deadlines, very limited information about the opponents, and unpredictable 
negotiator preferences (Jennings et al. 2001; Lau et al. 2006; Abedin et al. 2009). This 
introductory chapter briefly reviews the state of the research area. It presents the 
problems of multi-issue negotiation, the motivations, goals and the main contributions 
of this thesis. Finally, the structure of the thesis is described. 
 
1.1 Background and Motivations 
 
Multi agent multi-issue decision-making problems arise in many real world negotiation 
situations since groups instead of individuals make more and more decisions in a fast 
changing world (Abedin et al. 2009). Researchers face numerous challenges in the 
design of an effective automated negotiation model, due to the complex nature of the 
situations in which it is to operate. There are number of assumptions that the researchers 
 
 




had to make in order to proceed with the mechanisms in this field. These assumptions 
limit the development of the existing automated negotiation for practical uses, and for 
meeting user requirements. Some key challenges are briefly stated below. 
 
Designing an appropriate negotiation process is a difficult task in multi-issue automated 
negotiation. An appropriate negotiation process allows the negotiation agents to follow 
a set of plausible rules during negotiation and reach a satisfactory result. In 
recommending a procedure of negotiation, it is essential to construct an initial choice for 
the scope of the situation of the negotiation process. The environment in which a 
negotiation occurs determines the options accessible for the negotiating agents (Chen et 
al. 2005). There are some factors that are essential in a multi-issue negotiation problem. 
These factors are: negotiation object, information, protocol and strategy (Lomuscio and 
Jennings 2003; Fatima et al. 2004). The negotiation object is the issues or alternatives 
related to the product or service that the agents are negotiating for. Agents may bargain 
over a single issue associated with the service or products, but negotiations often 
involve groups of agents and bargaining over multiple issues (Raiffa 1982; Abedin et al. 
2009). Agents need to come to agreements about products or services that are 
categorized by issues such as price, performance, quality, reliability, delivery time, 
penalties, terms and conditions, and so on. Negotiation information such as issue 
preferences and issue dependencies needs to be handled efficiently in order to deal with 
multiple issues. These issues are directly or indirectly interdependent through their 
evaluation functions which are also called utility functions. When utility functions need 
to manage a set of interdependent issues, the complexity increases. 
 
Multiple related negotiations can be performed sequentially, or simultaneously, or based 
on a hybrid procedure by combining these two aspects.  Sequential negotiation such as 
issue-by-issue procedure is computationally simpler and outcome is more traceable than 
simultaneous negotiation. The reason is in existing issue-by-issue negotiations the 
utility function can be calculated separately (Chen et al. 2005). But in real life the issues 
have linkages with each other. In addition, the negotiating agents cannot reveal their 
utility functions to the public. One major research issue is how to decide an appropriate 
 
 




and less complex procedure for the agents when multiple related negotiations need to be 
performed.  
A negotiation protocol and associated strategies need to be designed effectively so that a 
solution or agreement can be reached which will be agreed by the group (Abedin et al. 
2009). The channels of communication and the allowed protocols will provide 
constraints on the interactions and the strategies that can be adopted (Chen et al. 2005; 
Jiaxing et al. 2007). The protocol should be transparent and open to participating 
negotiators. The protocol can clarify the negotiation procedure during the negotiation 
and offer an opportunity for the negotiating agents to explore potential agreement 
spaces.  
The context must support sufficient exchanges of information to provide for an 
improvement process. It must be possible to progress towards an optimal agreement or 
maximise social welfare or utility from the interactions. The individual concern in a 
negotiation will be the choice of strategy within the agreed context. One view of the 
choice of strategy is that the aim is to resolve the conflict between maximising private 
payoffs and enlarging the common benefit (negotiators may give appropriate 
concessions that may increase common utility) (Chen et al. 2005; Jiaxing et al. 2007). 
Negotiators use their own private strategies to analyse the current situation during the 
sequential interactions. Assuming a context in which alternating offers and counter 
offers are made, the strategy must determine those offers and counter offers generated 
during the negotiation process. The problem is to design a strategy and protocol suitable 
for automation that will effectively explore the possible agreement space. For these 
reasons, careful design of the strategy and its contextual protocol is required (Chen et al. 
2005).  
This research aims to investigate these issues and to propose an effective automated 
negotiation model by considering these factors. A generic negotiation model should be 
designed to assist the group of agents with diverse preferences over multiple issues, and 
include negotiation protocol, which allows agents to cooperatively reach consensus. The 
negotiation strategies should be sophisticated enough to instruct agents to make 
reasonable concessions and offers-counteroffers. The protocol should be flexible so that 
 
 




the agents can set or change essential parameters in order to improve the outcome 
before the negotiation ends. Issue parameters may change in each round when 
interdependencies between the issues exist. The proposed model should consider these 
characteristics. By utilising selected negotiation strategies and agreed protocol, the 
agents should be able to maximise their own utilities as well as the joint welfare or total 
utility (Chen 2006).  
This research analyses an important aspect of multi-issue negotiation which influences 
the efficiency of the negotiation process. This aspect is the negotiation agenda. If 
multiple issues are involved, the agenda specifies the order in which the negotiation 
takes place. Negotiating over multiple issues produces complex situations and makes it 
difficult for the agents to reach an agreement during the negotiation phase (Abedin et al. 
2009). This research will suggest a model to reduce these difficulties.  
 
Most of the work in the multi-issue negotiation field has focused on the areas of 
protocol design, strategy adaptation and utility calculation in various negotiation 
models. However, no effort to date has been put into the problem of determining the 
agenda sequence of the issue preferences derived from a group preference ordering 
process and analysing its effect in a multi-issue negotiation group (Abedin et al. 2012). 
The main goal of this research is to determine how the agenda has an effective impact in 
multi-issue negotiation process. The effective negotiation outcome can be influenced by 
the two key factors: the agenda (i.e., the order of the set of issues under negotiation) and 
the negotiation procedure (i.e., how the issues on the agenda will be settled) (Abedin et 
al. 2009). So agenda based multi-issue negotiation model can play a vital role in 
automated negotiation if it is used effectively. 
 
Determining the agenda sequence can be one of the most important structural aspects of 
multi-issue negotiation as well as a significant determinant of negotiation power and 
influence (Abedin et al. 2009). Agenda sequence means once the issues are decided, 
they are then in order. Negotiation agenda sequence can have an impact on the outcome 
of the process. It can either be decided before or during the actual negotiation. In the 
 
 




proposed system a pre-negotiation strategy is produced where the agenda sequence is 
determined.  
 
Multiple issues normally generate a large and complex search space in a negotiation 
process. Uncertainty and conflicting preferences between the agents occur during the 
negotiation process which delay the negotiation timeline and maximise the search space. 
To improve this situation, I have used a preference ordering method which is based on a 
group decision-making process (Abedin et al. 2009). The proposed group decision- 
making process when used with issue-by-issue agenda based negotiation can reduce the 
negotiation delay time and the search space (Abedin et al. 2012). 
 
Negotiation requires the management of stated preferences regarding the multiple issues 
which need to be captured. So the approach of this work is to first present a pre-
negotiation protocol or strategy which deals with the different preference information 
expressed by the agents on the issues or attributes associated with the service or 
alternative. Each agent gives their own importance over the issues. The participating 
agents have no prior knowledge about the preferences over the issues of the other 
agents. This situation is common in e-commerce negotiations, where the number and 
diversity of agents is so large that an agent may not have any estimate about the 
preferences of any particular agent it is negotiating with (Saha and Sen 2006). This can 
end up with inefficient agreements. In this situation aggregated preference information 
can be used to reach agreements beneficial for both agents. Preference ordering methods 
are used to obtain the aggregated result (Abedin et al. 2009).  
 
The agents participating in the proposed negotiation process are initially divided into 
users and providers. They are not in the same side regarding the preferences but form a 
negotiation group to reach consensus. It is very unlikely that a group of agents will 
share the similar opinions, particularly in the case of multi-issue decision-making 
problem. A group of agents faced with multiple issues related with multiple alternatives 
may often have conflicting preferences and the method of finding a group consensus 
affects the efficiency of the negotiation outcome. In a multiple-issue negotiation process 
it is difficult to reach an optimal outcome when the two agents' preferences and the 
 
 




relative importance of the issues are not known to each other and are diverse in nature 
(Abedin et al. 2011; Abedin et al. 2012).  
 
A fuzzy group decision-making process can be designed to adopt the agents’ 
preferences, reach consensus and order the issues in the pre-negotiation stage to 
improve the efficiency of the outcome. This fuzzy group decision-making process is 
developed to facilitate the agenda based multi-issue negotiation environment (Abedin et 
al. 2011). This research first investigates the multi-issue decision-making problem 
where preference information on issues associated with services or products are 
expressed in different formats by the agents. A fuzzy preference concept is used to order 
the issues in the pre-negotiation stage to improve the efficiency of the negotiation 
outcome. This preference ordering is used in the proposed agenda based multi-issue 
negotiation process. Most work done on automated negotiation has been done in the 
areas of protocol design, strategy computation and user utility elicitation, in various 
negotiation models such as bilateral negotiation (single-issue and multi-issue) and 
auctioning (Buffett and Spencer 2007). However, less effort to date has been put into 
the problem of determining agenda sequence particularly in the area of multi-issue 
negotiation to minimise the search space which also affects the final negotiation strategy 
and outcomes.  
 
1.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
 
The aim of this research is to introduce a framework for an agenda based model which 
investigates the significance of the choice of the sequence in issue-by-issue negotiation. 
The process of choice of sequence to be used in negotiation is based on a preference 
ordering technique. Therefore, this research focuses on the following objectives: 
 
 To investigate a fuzzy preference ordering method in the pre-negotiation stage to 
determine the choice of sequence over multiple issues which helps a group of agents 









 To generate an efficient negotiation agenda for an issue-by-issue negotiation 
problem and investigate the impact of negotiation agenda on negotiation 
performance. 
 
 To design and build an agenda negotiation model which incorporates negotiation 
strategy and protocol with group decision-making process. 
 
 To analyse and evaluate the proposed model and identify its advantages.  
 
 To test the model for its efficiency and effectiveness in using different parameters. 
 
 
1.3 Expected Research Contributions 
 
The primary contribution of this research is to develop a model for automated multi-
issue negotiation by agents using a preference ordering process and to analyse its 
potential benefits in cooperative environments. In particular an agenda based approach 
which deals with agents’ preferences in such negotiation. The expected contributions of 
this work can be summarised as follows: 
 
 When using the issue-by-issue approach the most important question regarding 
multi-issue negotiation is selecting the negotiation agenda. The proposed agenda 
based multi-issue negotiation approach can improve the issue-by-issue negotiation 
convergence process; reduce the complexity and search space by taking advantage 
of using preference ordering method in issue-by-issue negotiation set up. Here 
improving the convergence process means shortening of the exchange of offers 
during the negotiation. 
 
 The agents, by using this approach, will be allowed to adequately express their 
preferences on relative importance and their perception of interdependence about 
the multiple issues related to the service or goods in the given domain so that they 
can: assist in offer generation; evaluate incoming offers, and, negotiate within a 
realistic search space.  
 
 





 The proposed model can use a group decision-making mechanism based on a 
preference ordering process which is explicit and facilitates to construct the base for 
developing an automated negotiation model. These preference ordering techniques 
can be applied to get a collective view of multiple issues to be used in negotiation. 
The preference ordering method will not only derive a common preference ranking 
from the preference information that the group of agents can provide but also 
generate a common position for the issues. This mechanism will help to maximise 
the consensus of the group preference by minimising the gap of negotiators’ 
individual and group preference in ordering the issues and determine the issue 
importance weight. 
 
 The main problem of the existing issue-by-issue negotiation models is the 
interdependency factor between the issues (Ito 2007; Lopez-Carmona et al. 2010; 
Marsa-Maestre et al. 2009; Robu et al. 2005). In the proposed model the 
dependencies between the issues will be measured to identify the influence the 
determined sequence has upon the issue-by-issue negotiation process.  
 
 Learning in automated multi-issue negotiation is usually unsupervised because the 
opponent’s utility is uncertain when the agent receives an offer (Jazayeriy et al. 
2011). The utility represents an agent’s level of satisfaction for a negotiation 
outcome in terms of issues. This uncertainty makes it very hard to explore the 
agents’ actual preferences. The proposed fuzzy preference approach will help to 
learn the opponent’s preferences and the significant choice of sequence will 
supervise the negotiator agents’ choice of initial combination of negotiation tactics 
which may help to solve the case of uncertainty. This model will increases group of 
agents’ opportunity for reaching a mutually beneficial agreement and will help to 
improve agent’s utility by providing an effective equilibrium outcome which is a 









1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is structured into 6 chapters. The first chapter gives an introduction to the 
research problems, motivation, aim, objectives and contributions of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive review of literature and background of automated 
negotiation. The first section describes the main negotiation theories and different 
negotiation mechanisms. Limitations of these theories are also stated. Existing 
approaches of automated negotiation followed by their advantages and disadvantages 
are discussed in the next section. This chapter also discusses the scope of agenda based 
negotiation approach in issue-by-issue negotiation. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the literature and background of multi-issue group decision-making 
process as it is relates to the proposed method. It describes the problems of the methods 
and the need of a solution concept that can be used in this research to deal with group 
decision-making problems in pre-negotiation phase. 
 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the proposed automated negotiation framework. The 
essential components and their interactions are also given. Details of each stage of the 
approach are described and explained in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 5 presents a case study on which the model is applied. A comprehensive 
evaluation is provided with experimental results and their analysis. Experimental results 
are presented to assess the performance and effectiveness of this approach. New 
opportunities and directions from the experimental results for the future research are 
also identified. 
 
Chapter 6 draws the summary and conclusion of the thesis by reviewing and discussing 
the characteristics of the proposed model. The contributions and limitations of the 










Background and Related Works for Automated Negotiation 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Automated negotiation has gained increasing attention among researchers in the last 
decades as it resolves the conflicts between the self-interested agents who attempt to 
maximise their benefits through the making of concessions or compromises. 
Autonomous agents can play important roles in e-commerce by negotiating on behalf of 
buyers/sellers, consumers/suppliers, client/server or even as a mediator. An agent 
should be able to generate offers and counter-offers that satisfies other agents and 
motivates to continue the negotiation (Jazayeriy et al. 2011). The automated negotiation 
models differ in the way they adopt the methods and implement them. Numerous real-
life negotiations do involve multiple issues, although most of the existing literature on 
cooperative and non-cooperative games focuses mostly on single issue negotiations 
(Rubinstein 1982; Lai et al. 2004). For multi-issue negotiation, different negotiation 
models apply different bargaining procedures such as the complete package process and 
the sequential process. Various approaches and methods like: game theory (Zlotkin and 
Rosenschein 1996; Jennings et al. 2001); argumentation (Sierra et al. 1997; Parsons et 
al. 2002; MrBurney et al. 2002; Rahwan et al. 2004), and, heuristic approaches (Faratin 
et al. 1998; Fatima et al. 2003; Lin 2003), can be applied to implement these procedures 
with the aim of facilitating automated negotiation in e-commerce (Abedin et al. 2012). 
All these approaches have their advantages and disadvantages.  
 
To design an effective and efficient automated negotiation process it is essential to take 
a number of elements into account. Negotiation protocols, negotiation strategies, 
negotiation tactics and negotiation objects are the important elements that have to be 
considered to deal with negotiation process (Jennings et al. 2001). In addition to these 
elements, the negotiator’s decision-making model, which comprises the negotiation 
properties such as utility functions, Pareto efficiency and equilibrium, is an important 
 




mechanism in the negotiation process, since it offers the negotiator the essential 
information for making decisions on whether to accept the offer or not. 
 
In this chapter, a review and evaluation on the related works for the elements of 
automated negotiation is presented as well as the scope of the proposed approach. This 
research wants to improve existing automated negotiation methods in order to assist the 
negotiation process conducted by a group of decision-making agents with different 
preferences over issues or services (Chao et al. 2003).  
 
Section 2.2 presents the different negotiation procedures and their implementations. 
Section 2.3 describes and analyses the various approaches to automated negotiation. 
Section 2.4 discusses the properties of negotiation process while Section 2.5 and 2.6 
addresses the limitation and scope of different negotiation procedures. The scope of 
issue-by-issue negotiation procedure in identified in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 discusses 
the related work of agenda based negotiation. Finally, the scope of agenda based 
negotiation will be dealt with in Section 2.9. A brief summary is given in Section 2.10. 
 
2.2 Negotiation Procedures 
 
The outcome of multiple-issue negotiation depends on not only strategies, but also the 
procedures by which the issues will be negotiated. Different procedures yield different 
outcomes (Dang and Huhns 2005). Agents need to decide two concerns before the 
negotiation: one is the kind of negotiation procedure (agenda) they will take and the 
other is the type of agreement implementation (Sycara and Dai 2010). The automated 
negotiation mechanisms can be classified into three procedures: package, separate and 
sequential (Inderst 2000; Gerding et al. 2000; Fatima et al. 2006). These three different 
negotiation procedures for multiple issue bargaining are shown in Figure 2.1 (Abedin et 
al. 2012). When all issues are negotiated at once then it is called package bargaining. In 
package procedure the agents negotiate a complete package or bundle all the issues and 
discuss them simultaneously (Busch and Horstmann 1997; Fatima et al. 2002; Fatima et 
al. 2004). This is used when the issues are interdependent. For a package deal, an offer 
includes a value for each issue under negotiation. For k issues, an offer is a package of k 
 




values. This allows tradeoffs to be made between issues. Agents are allowed to either 
accept a complete offer or reject a complete offer (Dang and Huhns 2005). Most of the 
time finding equilibrium strategies for package procedure is not computationally simple. 
In particular, when the agents’ utility functions are nonlinear, then equilibrium 
















The other procedure is known as separate bargaining where each issue is negotiated and 
implemented independently. Sequential negotiation is when the agents negotiate issues 
sequentially. Sequential bargaining can be subdivided according to the approach taken 
to implementation. The distinguishing rules of these approaches specify when to get 
benefits from the issues which have been agreed on. The simultaneous implementation 
rule the agents have to wait to get the benefit until agreement is reached on all the issues 
(Gerding et al. 2000; Abedin et al. 2012). On the contrary, with the independent 
implementation rule, an agreement on an individual issue takes effect immediately, that 
is, the agreed-upon issues are no longer taken into account (Abedin et al. 2012). In the 
existing literature there is another implementation approach which settles each issue 
sequentially and independently of all the other issues. This is described as ‘issue-by-
issue’ where an agreement can take place either on a subset of issues or on all of them 
Negotiation Procedures 
Package  Separate Sequential 
Simultaneous Independent Issue-by-Issue 








(Fershtman 1990; Inderst 2000; In and Serrano 2004; Dang and Huhns 2005). Although 
issue-by-issue negotiation minimises the complexity of the negotiation procedure, an 
important question that can arise is the order in which the issues are bargained (Fatima 
et al. 2006; Abedin et al. 2009; Fatima et al. 2006). The equilibrium result can strongly 
depend on the order in which the agreements are arrived at. This research focuses on 
issue-by-issue implementation approach which considers sequential negotiation 
procedure. The reason for choosing issue-by-issue sequential procedure is discussed in 
section 2.6.   
 
2.3 Approaches to Automated Negotiation 
Autonomous negotiating agents representing individuals or organizations and capable of 
reaching mutually beneficial agreements are becoming increasingly important (Lopes et 
al. 2008). Artificial intelligence (AI) researchers have paid some attention to automated 
negotiation over the last years and a number of models have been proposed in the 
literature (Lopes et al. 2008). The most important and most frequently applied concepts 
which support the implementation of a multi-issue negotiation process lead to their 
three-fold classification as: game theory approaches (Jennings et al. 2001; Kraus 2001; 
Fatima et al. 2006); argumentation approaches (Rahwan et al. 2004), and, heuristic 
approaches (Faratin et al. 1998; Fatima et al. 2002; Li et al. 2006). Game theory 
provides concepts for bargaining solutions based on mathematical analysis. However, it 
is restrictive in the designing of automated negotiation due to: the lack of dynamic 
theory; difficulty in equilibrium selection, and, the problem of hyper-rational players. 
An agenda based negotiation approach based on preference ordering has not been 
applied in an automated multi-issue group negotiation environment, though it could be 
useful and can be used like the other mainstream approaches if its applicability can be 
justified (Abedin et al. 2012).  
 
Next section presents various essential concepts to understand the automated 
negotiation problem. Section 2.3.1 discusses Game theory approaches in automated 
negotiation. Heuristic-based approaches are analysed in Section 2.3.2. An analytical 
discussion is presented on argumentation-based negotiation in Section 2.3.3.  
 
 




2.3.1 Game Theoretical Approaches in Automated Negotiation 
 
Game theory provides concepts for negotiation solutions based on mathematical and 
economical concepts. However, it is restrictive in some respects for the design of 
automated negotiation. The unavailability of complete information and the intractable 
full rationality of the players are obstacles to the use of classic game theory to make 
negotiations. Nevertheless, by using Artificial Intelligent (AI) techniques to resolve the 
negotiation problems, these impractical assumptions seem to be unnecessary (Chou et 
al. 2007).  
 
Classical game theory approaches assume that negotiating agents contain unbounded 
computational resources.  They also assume that the agents have complete information 
of the outcome space. Rahwan (2004) stated that, in game-theoretical evaluations, 
researchers generally try to establish the most favourable strategy by analysing the 
communication as a game between equal participants, and looking for its equilibrium 
(Harsanyi 1956; Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994; von Stengel 2002; Ateib 2010).  
 
Rahwan (2004) further stated that the strategy determined by the classic game theory 
approaches can occasionally be made to be most favourable for a participant, specified 
the game rules, the assumed payoffs, and the aim of the participants, and assuming that 
the participants have no knowledge of one another not provided by introspection (Ateib 
2010). It is assumed that participants behave according to the assumptions of rational-
choice theory (Coleman 1990). This approach can then guide the design of the 
interaction method itself, and therefore help such participants to act in certain ways 
(Rahwan 2004).  
 
According to Lopes et al. (2009) the majority models work with abstract problems 
under assumptions and often not succeed to capture the richness of detail that would be 
essential to effectively apply them in realistic domains. He further stated that most game 
theoretical models make the following restrictive assumptions: (i) the agents are 
rational, (ii) the set of candidate solutions is fixed and known by all the agents, and (iii) 
each agent knows either the other agents’ payoffs for all candidate solutions or the other 
 




agents’ potential attitudes toward risk and expected-utility calculations (Lopes et al. 
2009). Classical negotiation models based on operational research methods or 
traditional game-theoretic models need to be further developed to support negotiations 
in realistic situations (Lau et al. 2006). 
 
Despite of these restrictions and assumptions, the traditional game theory may give 
fundamental insights to process and design efficient automated negotiation protocols. 
These protocols have certain desirable properties (Faratin 2000). Some significant 
properties are described in the next section.   
 
2.3.1.1   Advantages of Game Theory 
 
The advantages and the desirable properties of game theory can be used to solve 
problems in automated negotiation in a specific situation. As game-theoretic models 
occasionally offer clear analysis of detailed negotiation situations and specific results 
regarding the optimal strategies negotiators should prefer, i.e., the strategies that 
maximise negotiation outcome (Lopes et al. 2008).  
 
 Pareto efficiency and Nash Equilibrium: Models based on Game theory contain a 
number of vastly popular properties, such as Pareto efficiency and Nash 
Equilibrium (Sandholm 1999). Pareto efficiency occurs if there is no other 
allocation of utility, which can improve one negotiator’s return without detriment to 
another negotiator (Chen et al. 2005; Jiaxing et al. 2007). The idea of an 
equilibrium position is that any negotiator cannot improve his return unless the 
others make a change in their position. Ideally the outcome of negotiation is an 
equilibrium agreement, if it is Pareto efficient. If a negotiation outcome is not 
Pareto efficient, then there is another outcome that will make at least one agent 
happier while keeping everyone else at least as happy (Jennings et al. 2001). The 
protocol should be designed to assist the agents in achieving such result. The Nash 
Equilibrium is a well-known kind of stability. If all agents are provided with 
incentives to behave in a particular way by a protocol, then that protocol is called 
stable. 
 




 Maximising social welfare: A protocol maximises social welfare if it ensures that 
any outcome maximises the sum of the utilities of negotiators. For instance, if the 
utility of an outcome for an agent was basically defined in terms of the performance 
of a service that the agent obtains in the outcome, then a protocol that maximised 
social welfare would maximise the total amount of performance (Jennings et al. 
2001).  
 
 Computational efficiency: An agent can coordinate an agreement with other 
agents, and the refined protocol can increase searching agreement efficiently and 
reduce the computational overhead.  
 
 Simplicity: A protocol is simple when that makes suitable strategy for a negotiation 
agent apparent. On the other hand, a protocol is simple when a negotiating agent 
can without any complexity decide the optimal strategy by using that protocol.  
 
A desirable negotiation protocol could incorporate the above properties. An effective 
automated negotiation model should possess these properties. The proposed negotiation 
model will acquire the advantages of game theory and overcome the difficulties.  
 
2.3.1.2   Limitations of Game Theory 
 
The traditional game theory applies decision trees or extensive forms to explain 
dynamic models in complete information negotiation games. The negotiation becomes 
reasonably complex when multiple issues are involved. Impractical assumptions about 
the negotiating agents get involved in purely game theoretical based negotiation.  
 
According to Rahwan (2004) the first assumption implies that every possible offer is 
evaluated by the agents with unbounded computational resources and it also has all 
preference information needed to execute such evaluation. In many domains, however, 
it may be not practical for the user to guess its complete preference information to the 
agent (Rahwan 2004). 
 
 




The second assumption involves that agents constantly take decisions that optimise their 
utility and lead to equilibrium. Game theory needs this because an agent should first 
reason about the best possible strategy of the opponent before assuming the best 
response to that strategy (Rahwan 2004). But when the game is reasonably complex 
with multiple issues involved in realistic situations, assumptions may lead to no 
equilibrium or multiple equilibriums in the solution. 
 
The traditional game theory solutions are based on some related restrictions and 
assumptions, in order to apply the mathematical process. The mathematical bargaining 
solutions depend on several axioms or a known, assumed environment that is not 
present in realistic cases.  
 
Later heuristic based approaches such as evolutionary game theory came out with some 
solutions to solve several of the restrictions of game theoretical approaches stated 
above. The assumption of unbounded rationality is relaxed by the introduction of 
evolutionary game theory. Instead of calculating optimal strategies, games are played 
repeatedly and strategies are tested through a trial-and-error learning process in which 
players gradually find out that some strategies work better than others. But, other 
assumption, such as the accessibility of a preference valuation function, still exists. The 
representation of bounded rationality by explicitly capturing elements of the process of 
choice, such as limited memory, limited knowledge, approximate preferences etc are 
helping to overcome the limitations of game theory.  The frameworks with these 
improvised concepts are better in describing and predicting the human behaviour in real 
economic and social scenarios (Rahwan 2004). The heuristic approaches are discussed 
in the next section. 
 
2.3.2 Heuristic-based Approaches in Automated Negotiation 
 
According to Brzostowski et al. (2007) the game theories assume the full rationality of 
the players and complete knowledge of situations. Such assumptions are relatively 
unrealistic and as a result the application of game theory for realistic negotiations is 
restricted. The agents bounded information and bounded computational power may be 
 




compensated by the ability of learning (Braun et al. 2006), reasoning and argumentation 
(Sierra et al. 1997; Brzostowski et al. 2007). The computational complexity of agents 
reasoning generates the necessity for heuristic approaches for negotiation decision-
making (Brzostowski et al. 2007). A heuristic approach involve learning mechanisms 
like Bayesian learning (learns negotiation partner’s type), Q learning, Neural Networks 
or Fuzzy reasoning. Evolutionary learning using a genetic algorithm can also be 
considered to be a heuristic approach. Q learning and Evolutionary learning search the 
set of potential strategies (Abedin et al. 2012).  
 
Heuristic models offer general guidelines to assist negotiators and favourable strategies 
for moving toward agreement, such as strategies that guide to good (rather than optimal) 
outcomes (Lopes et al. 2008). Typically, they are based on informal models of 
interaction and negotiation from the social sciences. Heuristic models exhibit the 
following desirable features: (i) they are based on realistic assumptions, and (ii) they 
make use of reasonable computational resources to locate acceptable solutions 
(according to the principles of bounded rationality) (Lopes et al. 2008). Faratin, Sierra 
and Jennings in (Faratin 2000; Sierra et al. 1997) have used number of heuristic 
methods in their negotiation framework. 
 
Brzostowski et al. (2007) evaluated some of the existing heuristic approaches. A 
heuristic based approach is introduced by Faratin et al. (1998) where the agents are 
provided with a concept of tactics and strategies. These tactics and strategies determine 
an offer and counter-offer in each stage of the encounter. In this approach, the 
negotiation agents are constrained by deadlines determining the time given to reach 
agreements. The time-dependent tactics calculate an offer based on the time remaining 
for negotiation which means that it is a function mapping a time point into the offer, 
either in issue space or utility space. This approach also allows for restricted level of 
adaptation to the behaviour of the negotiation partner. Various behavioural tactics are 
used to allow this adaptation. To generate negotiation offers in a more sophisticated 
way, negotiation strategy may be formed with different linearly combined tactics. 
 
 




Faratin’s model is complimented by a range of learning and reasoning approaches. The 
learning approaches include: Bayesian learning (Zeng and Sycara 1996), Q-learning 
(Cardoso and Oliveira 2000) and evolutionary computation (Matos 1998; Oliver 1996). 
Though, these approaches need prior knowledge obtained before entering the 
negotiation and such knowledge may be sometimes difficult to obtain. To overcome 
this, an approach of on-line learning was proposed by Hou (Hou 2000) where the agent 
may learn from the current encounter or it may complement its prior knowledge with 
the knowledge acquired from observing the partner in the current negotiation. The agent 
guesses the shape of the concession curve of the opponent using the regression analysis 
and then gets used to this forecast by making concessions that maximise its utility. Hou 
(2000), considered the opponent using pure tactics according to Faratin’s approach 
(Brzostowski et al. 2007). 
 
2.3.2.1   Limitations of Heuristic Approaches 
 
Rahwan (2004) evaluated the heuristic approaches and mentioned that heuristic 
approaches do certainly overcome a lot of the limitations of game-theoretical 
approaches. Still, they too have a number of shortcomings (Jennings et al. 2001). 
According to Chen et al. (2005), it is not easy to predict in this approach exactly how 
the system and the ingredient agents will act. The outcomes of these models often 
produce sub-optimal outcomes because they assume an approximate notion of 
rationality and they do not explore the full space of possible outcomes. 
 
Rahwan (2004) also stated that these models require more evaluation through 
simulations and empirical analysis. Like most game-theoretic approaches, heuristic 
approaches also assume that agents know what they want. In other words, agents have a 
precise and correct way of calculating the quality of the negotiation outcome (usually 
using numerical utility functions). But, this requirement cannot always be satisfied, in 
which case there is scope of alternative techniques. In most game-theoretic and heuristic 
automated negotiation approaches, it is mostly assumed that agents’ utilities or 
preferences are completely characterised or known prior to the main negotiation. This is 
another restriction of heuristic approaches. 
 




Also game-theoretic and heuristic approaches assume that agents' utilities or preferences 
are fixed. A rational agent would only adjust its preferences upon receipt of new 
information, and traditional automated negotiation mechanisms do not assist the 
exchange of such information.  
 
For traditional game-theoretic and heuristic frameworks, computational agents can not 
benefit from acquiring and modifying their preferences during negotiation like the 
humans do during their negotiations by acquiring information, resolving uncertainties 
and revising preferences which are part of the negotiation process itself. 
 
Generally in the game-theoretic and heuristic models, agents exchange proposals (i.e. 
potential agreements or potential deals). For example, can be a promise to purchase a 
good at a specified price or a value assignment to multiple issues in a multi-dimensional 
auction (Wurman 1999), or an alternate offer in a bargaining encounter (Larson and 
Sandholm 2002). Agents are not allowed to exchange any additional information other 
than what is expressed in the proposal itself. Agents’ preferences over proposals are 
assumed to be proper in the sense that they reflect the true benefit the agent receives 
from satisfying these preferences. Argumentation-based approaches to negotiation are 
introduced to overcome the above limitations by allowing agents to exchange additional 
information, or to argue about their beliefs and other mental attitudes during the 
negotiation process (Rahwan 2004). 
 
2.3.3 Argumentation-based Approaches in Automated Negotiation 
 
Argumentation-based models have the advantage that the negotiating agents can add 
information flexibly during the exchange of offers with the exchange of arguments 
(Jennings 2001). This permits great flexibility since, for instance, it makes possible to 
persuade agents to change their view of an offer during the course of negotiation (Lopes 
et al. 2008). Argumentation-based models allow negotiators to argue about their mental 
attitudes during the negotiation process. Thus, in addition to submitting proposals, 
negotiators can provide arguments either to justify their negotiation stance or to 
persuade other negotiators to change their negotiation stance (Rahwan et al. 2004; 
 




Lopes et al. 2008). An argumentation protocol presents an agent with a communication 
language and the syntax that it uses (McBurney et al. 2003). The negotiating agents in 
the argumentation protocol incorporate a logic-based reasoning mechanism. The 
argumentation approach is used to assist the negotiating agents in reasoning over 
arguments and produce effective arguments in order to reach a satisfactory agreement 
(Abedin et al. 2012; Rahwan et al. 2004).  
 
A number of works in this area have been carried out and they focus on the design of 
the internal mechanism of argumentation; that is how arguments are generated (Sycara 
1990; Rahwan et al. 2003; Reed et al. 2003; Parsons et al. 2002), how arguments are 
selected (Kraus and Sycara 1998; Ramchurn et al. 2002; Amgoud and Maudet 2002) 
and how arguments are evaluated (Parsons et al. 1998; Sierra et al. 1997), and how the 
process of argumentation can resolve conflicts and achieve agreements (Jung et al. 
2001; McBurney et al. 2003). Some researchers in augmentation approaches have been 
more interested in the design of argumentation formalism that involves modelling of the 
vocabulary and syntax rules for communications between participants (McBurney 
2003). 
 
2.3.3.1   Limitations of Argumentation-based Approaches 
 
There are limitations in argumentation-based approaches; for instance Lumuscio et al. 
(2003) and Jenening et al. (2000) discuss two remaining challenges between internal 
elements and external elements. First, the agent is almost hardwired when negotiating 
with others. It needs to be more flexible in the rules of the argumentation protocol. 
Second, it needs to be specific in the transition between the underlying internal elements 
and external elements, for instance when is the right time to make this transition to start 
an argument.  
 
Lomuscio et al. (2003), Jenening et al. (2000), Rahwan et al. (2004) also have similar 
views on the weaknesses of argumentation approaches and suggest improvements in 
developing the sets of rules that are involved in argument generation, argument 
selection, argument assessment, strategy generation, strategy selection and preference 
 




determination. Another difficulty the argumentation-based negotiation has is evaluating 
a large and complex negotiation space in complex scenarios. So there is scope for 
improvements in the above main negotiation approaches regarding search space, 
complexity and preferences determination. 
 
2.4 Negotiation Process 
Research in automated negotiation process to date has been mainly focused on the 
progress of negotiation protocols and strategies (Tamma et al. 2002). For example, 
Jennings considered that automated negotiation process mostly deal with three broad 
topics, they are negotiation protocols, negotiation objects and agents decision-making 
models (Cao et al. 2007; Jennings et al. 2001).  
 
Recent work is mainly focused on how to construct a negotiation model, which has 
ability to control the whole process of negotiation, to balance conflict of interest, not on 
providing support to unilateral negotiator’s decision-making (Cao et al. 2007). Although 
there are many research achievements about protocols and strategies in the field of 
automated negotiation nowadays, realization and real application of automated 
negotiation system still has a long way to go (Resinas et al. 2006; Lin 2008; Cao 2010).  
 
To design an effective automated negotiation model it is necessary to take a number of 
elements into account. Negotiation protocols, negotiation strategies and negotiation 
utilities are the important elements in a negotiation process which have been considered 
to deal with automated negotiation research. According to Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 
(1994) the main components of an automated negotiation model can be classified in 
four main categories, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
 
a) The negotiation protocol. 
b) The negotiation strategy. 
c) The negotiation mechanism (equilibrium). 
d) The information state of agents. 
 
 




Thus, an appropriate combination of negotiation strategy and protocol, regarding the 
information available, forms the negotiation mechanism which automates the 
negotiation process. It should be possible to move towards an optimal agreement (Chen 
et al. 2005) or to maximise social welfare (total utility) from the interactions.   
 
Figure 2.2 The main components of negotiation model (Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994) 
 
2.4.1 Negotiation Protocol 
 
The negotiation protocol determines the flow of messages between the negotiation 
agents and set the rules to govern their interaction (Cranor and Resnick 2000). It defines 
the possible ways the negotiation process can be led and dictates which participant can 
say what, and when, in the negotiation process (Fatima et al. 2004). In other words, the 
negotiation protocol govern how negotiations are performed and should be public, 
transparent, open to the participating agents who must obey it. The protocol can clarify 
the negotiation procedure during the negotiation and offer an opportunity for the 
negotiating agents to explore potential agreement spaces. For instance, the Rubinstein 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged 
version of this thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry 
University.
 




alternating protocol specifies (Osborne and Rubinstein 1990) that agents are allowed to 
send one offer in alternating turns. Basically, the negotiation protocol acts as a 
mechanism for the coordination and regulation of the agents that take part in the 
negotiation process (Sánchez-Anguix et al. 2013). The protocol should be flexible and 
unambiguous so that the agents can set or change essential parameters in order to 
improve the output before the negotiation ends. The protocol could be used for dealing 
with the range of issue from one to multi-issues. In multi-issue negotiation, the 
protocols can negotiate all the issues together or sequentially one after another. If 
negotiation protocols rule the exchange of proposals or arguments between the agents, 
the negotiation strategy is the decision-making model that agents use in order to satisfy 
their goals in accordance with the negotiation protocol. 
 
2.4.2 Negotiation Strategy 
Negotiation strategy is a decision-making apparatus in which a party acts within the 
negotiation protocol in an effort to get the best outcome of negotiation. The individual 
concern in a negotiation is the selection of strategy in the decided framework. By 
contrast with protocol, it's therefore necessarily private. One view of the choice of 
strategy is that the aim is to resolve the conflict between maximising private payoffs and 
enlarging the common benefit (Chen et al. 2005; Jiaxing et al. 2007). The negotiators 
may give appropriate concessions that may increase common marginal utility (Chen et 
al. 2005; Jiaxing et al. 2007) under the constraints they face and reach an agreement.  
 
According to Kraus (2001) a negotiation strategy for each agent tries to guide the 
actions of this agent through each offer sequence by some rules and procedures. This 
strategy helps agents to identify the offer which that agent should propose at specific 
time to a specific agent. Also this strategy helps agents in accepting or rejecting the 
offer proposed by the opponent. The strategies can be classified into two main 
categories: distributive and integrative strategies. The distribution type of negotiation, 
aggressive bargaining, is a zero-sum game, i.e., a gain for one party, is a loss for another 
and generally leads to a low satisfaction level. Distributive bargaining is regarded as 
competitive bargaining and provides the agents with Win-Lose situation. The objectives 
 




of two parties are in fundamental conflict. In this type of negotiation the resources are 
constant and limited and each agent wants to maximise its share (Huang 1996). The 
distributive stage looks for settlements in situations where an advantage for one of the 
parts could be a disadvantage for any other part (Espin et al. 2007). The negotiator in 
this type of negotiation tries to get a higher share of the pie by various methods by equal 
power conditions and temporal constraints between the two participant agents (Brooks 
and Rose 2004). In situations where agents are characterized by high concern for their 
own outcomes combined with low concern for the partner’s outcomes or in reverse case, 
a distributive strategy is the preferred strategy (Ness and Haugland 2005). In contrast to 
distributive bargaining, negotiators cooperate more amicably together in an integrative 
strategy and try to enlarge the available pie. In integrative bargaining all parties share 
goals and outcomes and they achieve benefits simultaneously (Linghua 1996). This type 
of strategy searches for advantageous solutions for both parties in a negotiation process 
(Espin et al. 2007). In other words, both participants look for a solution which could 
maximise their joint share from the pie. In contrary to distributive bargaining (which 
look more for Win-Lose solution), integrative negotiation seek more for Win-Win 
solution (Bahrammirzaee 2011). Four strategic processes for negotiation parties which 
are willing to use an integrative strategy have been proposed by Lewicki and Litterer 
(1985). According to Lewicki and Litterer, they should: 
 
1) Understand the goal and objectives of other participants; 
2) Have an open information exchange; 
3) Highlight the common interests which decrease the importance of actual differences; 
4) Look for solutions which satisfy mutual goals and objectives. 
 
Negotiation parties generally achieve higher satisfaction level in integrative negotiation 
compare to distributive negotiation (Dzeng and Lin 2004). In negotiations where both 
parties pursue joint goals, and the concerns for both their own and the partner‘s 
outcomes are high, integrative strategy will be the preferred strategy (Ness and 
Haugland 2005). Given that the two sides’ interests are not diametrically opposed, the 
atmosphere in integrative negotiations is likely to be less hostile, and less characterized 
by mutual suspicion and distrust, than is typically the case in distributive negotiations 
 




(De Rue et al. 2009). Therefore, in this thesis, I will concentrate on integrative aspects 
of negotiation strategy. 
2.4.3 Negotiation Tactics 
According to the given criteria such as time, resource and behaviour, the tactics are the 
set of utility functions that decide the sequence of offers (Faratin et al. 1998; Faratin 
2000). In other words, tactics provide the negotiators with systematic ways of making 
concessions. A negotiation strategy is formed by incorporating one or more strategic 
tactics mainly time dependent tactics, resource dependent tactics, and behaviour 
dependent tactics (Faratin 2000; Lau et al. 2006). The negotiation tactics are a set of 
functions that determine how to compute the value of each used attribute in negotiation 
(Romanhuki et al. 2008). These tactic functions have their own proper behaviour 
properties (Faratin et al. 1998).  
 
Faratin et al. (1998) define a range of computationally tractable heuristic strategies and 
tactics that negotiating agents can employ to generate initial offers, evaluate proposals 
and offer counter proposals in multi-attribute negotiations (Kebriaei et al. 2011). The 
tactics are simple functions that are used to generate an offer, or counter offer, based on 
different criteria. A strategy is the way in which an agent changes the weights of the 
different tactics over time. In the negotiation model agents propose offers alternatively 
following their strategies. Each agent has a scoring function that is used to rate the 
offers received. If an agent receives an offer that has value greater than the value of the 
counter offer that it is ready to submit in the next step, then it accepts. Otherwise, the 
counter offer is submitted. The negotiation tactics include time-dependent tactics, 
resource-dependent tactics and behaviour-dependent tactics.  
 
In the time-dependent tactics, an agent submits offers that change monotonically from 
the minimum (best) to the maximum (worst) of the deal that it can agree on, and the rate 
of change depends on time (Kebriaei et al. 2011). If an agent has a time deadline by 
which an agreement must be in place, these tactics model the fact that the agent is likely 
to concede more rapidly as the deadline approaches. The shape of the curve of 
concession, a function depending on time, is what differentiates tactics in this set 
(Faratin 2000; Burato 2010). Faratin et al. (1998) distinguish two families of the 
 




changing rate functions, with the rate of change being a polynomial or an exponential 
function of time. By varying the parameters, the functions can model that agent to be 
more of a Boulware or a Conceder. Bargainer is a boulware if it does not concede until 
close to the last moment, and a bargainer is a Conceder if it gives up quickly. Agents are 
capable of adjusting their behaviour during a negotiation; however, currently they do so 
according to time-dependent tactic functions only. Additional tactics were introduced to 
improve the results of the negotiations. Such tactics are behaviour-dependent or 
resource-dependent, taking situational factors into account. For example, an employer’s 
agent might change its behaviour in creating offers depending on the number of 
employees' agents available on the marketplace. If there are many employees' agents, 
then the employer’s agent may be less willing to make concessions quickly because 
other agents are waiting as potential partners if the ongoing negotiation fails (Kurbel 
2004). 
 
The resource-dependent tactics are similar to the time-dependent ones in which time are 
the sole considered resource. The resource-dependent tactics are similarly modelled as 
time-dependent tactics and may use the similar functions. The difference is that the 
resource-dependent tactics either, (i) have dynamic value of the maximum available 
resource, or (ii) make the changing rate function depend on an estimation of the amount 
of a particular resource. 
 
The behaviour-dependent tactics compute the next offer based on the previous attitude 
of the negotiation opponent. These tactics are especially important in cooperative 
problem solving negotiation settings, or integrative negotiations, by allowing agents to 
consider the other agents' behaviour (Faratin et al. 1998). The main difference between 
the tactics in this family is in the type of imitation they perform (Faratin 2000; Kebriaei 
2011). Here imitation entails replication of opponents’ behaviour. One family imitates 
proportionally, another in absolute terms, and the last one computes the average of the 
proportions in a number of previous offers (Faratin et al. 1998; Faratin 2000). In 
situations in which the agent is not under a great deal of pressure to reach an agreement, 
it may choose to use imitative tactics to protect itself from being exploited by other 
agents. In this case, the counter-offer depends on the behaviour of the negotiation 
 




opponent. The imitation of others’ behaviour can thus serve as a default action when an 
agent is uncertain about what to do next. The tactics in this family differ in which aspect 
of their opponent’s behaviour they imitate and to what degree the opponent’s behaviour 
is imitated (Romanhuki et al. 2008). 
 
Negotiators may also use their own defined strategies to analyse the current situation 
during the sequential interactions. Assuming a context in which alternating offers and 
counter offers are made, the strategy must determine those offers and counter offers 
generated during the negotiation process (Chen et al. 2006; Jiaxing et al. 2007). The 
properties of negotiation strategies should be sophisticated enough to instruct 
negotiating agents to make reasonable concessions and counter offers. The negotiation 
deadline has to be involved in the real life cases, so the agents have to deal with strategy 
with time concern (Sandholm and Vulkan 1999). Agents may need to modify their 
negotiation strategies or tactics, when the market situations changes or their 
expectations and criteria on offer evaluations as well as counter-offer generations in 
order to maximise their profits (Ren 2009). 
 
To address the shortcomings of Faratin et al. (1998) strategies, more recent literature 
specifically deals with uncertainty. To this end, (Brzostowski and Kowalczyk 2006) 
propose a strategy that performs on-line prediction of opponent behaviour, by assuming 
that the opponent uses a strategy that is a weighted combination of time and behaviour-
dependent concession. However, their negotiation environment contains no discounting 
factor, and so their solution assumes that the best approach is to reach an agreement at 
the deadline. In negotiations where the opponent is unknown, many existing strategies 
attempt to model the opponent. Commonly, this involves learning either the opponent’s 
preferences (Coehoorn and Jennings 2004; Hindriks and Tykhonov 2008; Robu et al. 
2005) or classifying the opponent (Lin et al. 2008) using techniques such as Bayesian 
updating or kernel density estimation. However, in domains with many issues, this 
approach becomes computationally expensive, and may be unnecessary in automated 
negotiation where time constraints are based on real time rather than the number of 
interactions. Under such constraints, there is no benefit to limiting the number of offers 
 




exchanged; hence it may be possible for automated agents to exchange thousands of 
offers in order to explore the negotiation space. 
2.4.4 Negotiation Utility 
 
The utility function is a mathematical representation of an individual’s preferences with 
respect to the possible outcomes. The utility function is used to determine how good an 
offer or a counter offer is. It provides the essential information for agents to decide 
whether an offer should be accepted or not (Chen et al. 2005). A negotiation may often 
involve multiple issues on which a group of agents need to agree. These issues are 
directly or indirectly interdependent through their complex evaluation or utility 
functions. Due to the complexity of utility functions it is normally infeasible for 
negotiating agents to learn sufficient from their interactions to fully comprehend their 
opponent’s utility function. The preferences are usually determined by the utility 
functions that assigns to each possible result a level of satisfaction achieved from 
consuming a service or purchasing a product (Brzostowski et al. 2007). The requirement 
of utility function is vital because the aim of a negotiation is to get as high utility as 
possible (Keeny and Raiffa 1976; Luce and Raiffa 1957) assuming all other constraints 
such as the deadline and the knowledge about the opponent. The theory of utility 
function has been vastly used in multi-agent interactions for the automated agents who 
negotiate on behalf of their users (Braun et al. 2006; Jennings et al. 2001; Kowalczyk 
2000; Kraus 2001; Rosenschein et al. 1994; Brzostowski et al. 2007). If preferences of 
an agent are rational in a precise sense, then a utility function can be constructed to 
guide the decision-making process of that agent. 
 
During a negotiation with time constraint, a negotiation decision function is usually 
predefined by negotiators to express their expectations on negotiation outcomes in 
different rounds (Ren et al. 2012). Negotiation decision functions can be combined with 
negotiators’ utility functions to generate offers precisely and efficiently to satisfy 
negotiators expectations in each round. 
 
Much work in utility elicitation (Buffett et al. 2004; Chajewska et al. 2000; Haddawy et 
al. 2003) has lately focused on determining utilities of the user on whose behalf the 
 




negotiation agent works. But not much has been done to resolve the opponent’s 
preferences. In Fatima et al. (2004)’s the multi-issue negotiation model the negotiation 
process is divided into several negotiations where several issues are settled together as 
package deal and some separately. The utility determination for those negotiations is 
complex. Fatima et al. (2004), Coehoorn and Jennings (2004) attempt to learn the 
opponent’s preferences and construct counteroffers that are likely to be of interest to the 
opponent. This is done by making trade-offs that do not lower the agent’s utility, but 
match more closely with the opponent’s previous offers. While this method is likely to 
allow the negotiators to come to a deal more quickly, it is a cooperative approach and 
not meant to reveal information about the opponent that can be exploited (Buffett et al. 
2005).  
 
2.4.5 Negotiation Pareto Efficiency and Equilibrium 
 
Two criteria, Pareto efficiency and equilibrium, are used to assess the quality of the 
agreement produced by the negotiation process. Pareto efficiency is a key criterion for 
measuring the degree of agreement or a useful evaluation criterion in a negotiation 
process (Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994; Chen et al. 2002). In this respect, Pareto 
efficiency is achieved by a strategy combination that increases the payoff of one agent 
without reducing the payoff of another agent (Chen et al. 2002). So a solution is said to 
be Pareto efficient if no agent can be better off without sacrificing the other’s utility 
(Jennings et al. 2001). If an agreement meets the requirements of the Pareto efficient 
concept, it means that the solution produced by the participating agents maximises the 
negotiation efficiency. But generating Pareto efficient solution in multi-issue bargaining 
is a computationally complex problem, especially when autonomous agents have 
incomplete information about deadlines, outside options and the opponent's preferences. 
For a multi-issue negotiation setting, the ideal solution is one that is Pareto efficient (Lai 
et al. 2006). An efficient negotiation strategy should thus be able to produce Pareto 
optimal solutions for multi-issue negotiation (Kalady et al. 2008). So, I can say a multi-
issue negotiation model is efficient when agents reach a Pareto efficient agreement in 
the negotiation. If a solution complies with the concept of equilibrium, it indicates the 
solution is a stable one and no agent has a desire to change its decision. The strategies 
 




chosen by all players are said to be in Nash equilibrium if no player can benefit by 
unilaterally changing his strategy. The ultimate goal of developing an effective 
automated negotiation process is to generate a result that complies with the above two 
concepts.  
 
2.5 Limitations in package, separate and simultaneous negotiation 
procedures 
 
There are limitations in package and separate negotiation procedures when multiple 
inter-related issues are involved. Agent negotiation over multiple issues is often seen as 
the process of searching for a solution in a complex and large space. Multiple issues can 
be interdependent in a negotiation scenario. Evaluating the preferences of the agents 
over interdependent multiple issues and the offers in existing simultaneous negotiation 
processes require nonlinear utility functions to carry it out. The search space produced 
by these functions is large and complex. Depending on the negotiation mechanism such 
search space can be dynamic where negotiations often break down and disagreement 
ensues. Raiffa (1982), states that the in-bundle package procedure requires complex 
computations to be carried out and it has not been deeply analysed up to now (Giunta 
and Gatti 2006). Lai et al. (2004) also stated that finding a precise solution to the in-
bundle package procedure is an intractable problem because of its large search space. 
Based on an incomplete information assumption, Fatima et al. (2004) discussed two 
procedures for multiple-issue negotiation: issue-by-issue and package deal. For two-
issue negotiation, they determined the equilibrium strategy for these procedures and 
analysed the optimal agenda and procedure. They concluded that the package deal is the 
procedure that provides agents with optimal utilities for two-issue negotiation. They did 
not address the computational cost with increasing issue size. However, the 
computational cost becomes crucial when more issues are involved (Giunta and Gatti 
2006). The limitations of package, separate and simultaneous procedures in multi-issue 









2.6 Scope in Issue-by-Issue negotiation procedure 
 
Multi-issue automatic negotiation in groups has several aspects. In many cases, different 
group of agents have different preferences in relation to the multiple issues, but the 
same value is accepted by them both. Both sides of the negotiation want to search for a 
concession agreement. Multi-issue automatic group negotiation is significantly more 
complex than single-issue negotiation. To reduce this complexity, the issue-by-issue 
method can be a useful approach. But questions arise as to when or in which situations 
this approach is more efficient than the other procedures. The identified situations are 
stated below (Abedin et al. 2012):  
 
 A negotiation consists of the participants called agents. Each agent or group of 
agents having their own preference or goal. Each agent has an associated amount of 
benefit or gain during the negotiation, called utility. Utility measures the degree of 
satisfaction an agent derives from the conflicting situation. The utility function is a 
mapping of an agent’s choices into a real number. In multi-issue negotiation, the 
preferences of an agent about the multiple issues may be complex. A conventional 
way to deal with this is to characterise the preference with a utility function (a 
mathematical formula) and agents then make decisions based on this utility function. 
However, it is difficult to construct such a utility function about multiple issues, 
especially when one agent’s preference on an issue differs from the preference of 
the other agents. Multi-issue negotiation may get lengthy or in some circumstances 
become intractable. Negotiation delay may occur when there are conflicting 
preferences between the agents (Lai et al. 2004). 
 
 In multi-issue negotiation the solution space is n-dimensional (n>1), but it is 1-
dimensional in single-issue negotiation. The negotiation strategy in multi-issue 
negotiations becomes complex, because the space is n-dimensional. Multiple issues 
normally form a large and complex search space (Abedin et al. 2009). The search 
space to consider the possible outcomes and interactions in order to identify the 
equilibrium solutions grows combinatorial. Uncertainty and different opinions 
among the agents can occur during the negotiation to find an agreement zone, which 
 




delays the negotiation timeline. Issue-by-issue negotiation can make the problem 
much simpler and minimise the search space.  
 
 Resource limitation is one of the reasons to choose an issue-by-issue approach. 
Negotiators and the system are often constrained by: limited computational 
resources; lack of time, and, limited or incomplete information about opponents. 
This situation is usually characterized as one in which the agents have bounded 
rationality (Simon 1982). If negotiating all issues at the same time will not work for 
resource and information limitation reasons it can be expressed as saying that 
bounded rationality is a reason for choosing a sequential issue-by-issue approach. 
Resource limitations make sequential bargaining — where negotiators address the 
various issues in some sequence — a more realistic possibility and such bargaining 
tend to be the norm in practice (Kteily et al. 2013). 
 
 Some of the research work which was mentioned earlier studied the properties of 
issue-by-issue negotiation and the differences between that and simultaneous 
negotiation. But not many have addressed the problem of agenda formation in 
negotiation. Fatima et al. (2003) looks at agenda selection using a mediator. The 
measure of utility is the time taken. Most of the research work of this area has 
focused on designing axioms, e.g. Nash axioms. The review in Lai et al. (2004) 
shows that issue-by-issue is applicable in some conditions where negotiation time is 
valuable, profitable or the probability of breakdown is high and the agents are 
heterogeneous. 
 
 Initially, an initiator prefers an issue-by-issue approach since it has not yet obtained 
much information about the opponent and thus does not have enough confidence to 
deal with the issues in package deal or simultaneously (Soh and Li 2004). 
 
The main current open problem of the issue-by-issue approach relates to the 
determination of the optimal agenda (i.e., the sequence of issues over which the 
bargaining is carried on) (Giunta and Gatti 2006). The negotiation agenda in a group 
negotiation can be important for the issue-by-issue procedure as it has an impact on the 
 




outcomes. The ordering of negotiation by negotiating issues in a pre-defined order or by 
deciding which issues to negotiate one by one, can, in some scenarios, improve the 
utility of the agents. Agenda based negotiation can be added as one of the main 
approaches in automated negotiation if its efficiency and effectiveness can be proved 
(Abedin et al. 2012).  
 
2.7 Related Works in Agenda Based Negotiation  
 
The following researchers have used an agenda approach as a part of their various 
negotiation procedures in different ways and some of their contributions are discussed 
below: 
 
Fershtman (1990) considers a circumstance where two players bargain over two issues 
linearly. In his bargaining procedure the players have time preferences and their utility 
function is additive. Fershtman explained that the players expected bargaining outcome 
depend on the agenda and each player prefers an agenda to bargain the least important 
issue first, if that issue is the most important one for the opponent. The impact of the 
agenda disappears as players become more patient. 
 
Bush and Horstmann (1997) show, if the agreements are implemented sequentially the 
impact of the agenda remains. In their bargaining model the easy issue is bargained first 
while implementing the agreements sequentially. On the other hand the hard issue is 
bargained first when the implementation of agreements is simultaneous.  
 
Inderst (2000) considers a bilateral bargaining agenda which is purely endogenous and 
the issues are bargained simultaneously. The agenda can have an important impact on 
the trade-offs between the issues and this impact remains even if the players become 
very patient. Still multiple equilibriums can arise if at least one uncertain issue appears.  
 
Fatima et al. (2003) have proposed a model where the order in which issues are 
bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously. This allows the 
bargainers to decide which issue they will negotiate next during the process of 
 




negotiation. Negotiation delay may occur when there are conflicting preferences 
between the agents. 
 
In and Serrano’s (2004) work pointed out that strict issue-by-issue negotiation may 
increase inefficiency. Their model considers the effects of agenda restrictions on the 
properties of the equilibrium outcome and the outcome turns out to be Pareto-efficient 
when the agents are not restricted. Otherwise multiple equilibriums and delays can 
occur in the agreement.  
 
Kalady et al. (2008) investigate the impact of a variety of agendas and procedures on the 
negotiation outcome. A negotiation strategy for both package deal and issue-by-issue 
negotiation procedures is defined in their work which is highly abstract as it identifies 
only the actions of the agents without describing either the propose or the concede 
strategies. 
 
Lastly, Tiedemann (2009) explored the importance of the sequential bargaining agenda 
using a bilateral two-issue alternating offer model under complete information settings. 
In their approach the inefficient sequence emerges endogenously only when players are 
relatively patient and their preferences are relatively similar.  
 
These approaches reach a Pareto efficient solution when each agent assumes the 
preferences of the other agents. But they do not deal with the situation where agents can 
manage, without prior assumption, their own and their opponents’ different preferences 
over multiple issues (Abedin et al. 2012).  
 
In most existing issue-by-issue researches, issues have been considered independent and 
their probable effects on each other have been neglected. Multiple issues may belong to 
one of two classes: ordered, and unordered. Ordered issues have an ordering that is 
common to and known by agents, though the agents may have different preferences 
over the issue values. So the common sequence or the order of issues over which the 
bargaining is carried on is called the agenda approach in this research. Conversely, 
unordered issues do not have a common ordering and is basically used in package or 
 




simultaneous procedures. An agenda is necessary to determine the order in which the 
issues will be negotiated in a sequential issue-by-issue procedure. This work has taken 
account of the differing importance of the issues that are significant in agenda setting. 
The importance is considered in terms of requirement for the issue to be settled. 
Different agents may have different opinions regarding the importance of the issues. 
This can lead to an interesting case since this allows for integrative negotiations. 
However, only a limited literature exists on this approach in game theory (Jennings et 
al. 2001). Usually, either the issues are considered of equal importance or the players 
are considered to have identical preferences. In Ponsati and Watson, (1997) it is 
assumed that preferences are additive over issues, implying that the multi-issue 
bargaining problem is equal to the sum of the bargaining problems over the separate 
issues. Fershtman (1990) considers sequential bargaining over two issues. He states that, 
when using Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offers protocol for each issue in a sequential 
order, each player prefers an agenda in which it’s least important issue is the opponent’s 
most important. Particularly, it is shown that the sub game-perfect equilibrium outcome 
for this problem does not need to be Pareto-efficient (Ponsati and Watson 1997).  
 
The above investigation shows that the agent not only depends on its negotiation 
parameters but also can be influenced by the agenda. An agenda which considers 
different preferences over multiple issues can play an important role in automated 
negotiation. Determining such an agenda based negotiation approach is the main aim of 
this research. 
 
2.8 Scope in Agenda Based Negotiation 
 
There is a need for an approach which considers the above factors and implements an 
agenda based sequential issue-by-issue negotiation process. Alternating-offers 
bargaining on multiple issues are considered a hard problem to address (Lai et al. 2004). 
This is mainly due to difficulties in finding computationally tractable negotiation 
mechanisms that produce Pareto efficient agreements. The proposed model considers 
the above factors and allows negotiators to deliver multiple offers to match their 
 




preferences over issues. In this way, negotiators have more chances to reach 
agreements. 
 
In addition to the negotiation elements such as negotiation protocol, strategy and utility; 
a pre-negotiation group decision-making model is proposed in this thesis as an 
important part of the negotiation process since it offers the negotiators the essential 
preference information for making decisions on issues related to service or products. A 
number of exiting negotiation methods worked on issue-by-issue basis, where the utility 
functions can be computed independently for individual issues. However, in some cases 
utility needs to manage a set of interdependent issues, which is not possible in a simple 
issue-by-issue form designed in previous research work. A more complex form of issue-
by-issue negotiation is required to solve the interdependency influence of the issues. For 
these reasons, effective design of negotiation strategy and its contextual protocol is 
required in an issue-by-issue negotiation approach. By employing the proposed 
negotiation strategy and an agreed protocol, the agents are able to maximise their own 
utilities as well as joint welfare. The proposed agenda based approach is one of the 
potential methods for locating equilibrium via issue-by-issue negotiation.  
 
The outcome of single issue negotiation depends mostly on the negotiation strategies of 
the agents. But the outcome of multi-issue negotiation does not only depend on 
strategies. The main goal of this research is to design an effective model for multi-issue 
negotiation to illustrate that beside the strategy and the negotiation procedure, the 
outcome may also depend on the agenda. In this research the term, agenda, refers to the 
set of issues under negotiation and the order in which they are negotiated. An agenda 
can be defined either exogenously or endogenously (Kalady et al. 2008). If the order is 
decided by the agents before the issues are negotiated then the agenda is called 
exogenous. On the other hand, if the agents are allowed to settle on what issue they will 
negotiate next throughout the process of negotiation, then the agenda is called 
endogenous.  
 
A number of researchers used the exogenous and endogenous agenda method to process 
negotiations (e.g.), Busch and Horstman 1997, Fershtman 1990, Inderst 2000, Lang and 
 




Rosenthal 2001. Their methods focus on the selection of issues in sequential or 
simultaneous procedures for the agenda selection problem, which is based on splitting 
the multiple issues into many single issues. Some assumptions were made and simple 
scenarios constructed in order to carry out the mathematical calculations for issue-by-
issue negotiation. Fershtman (1990) utilized the exogenous agenda to extend 
Rubinstein’s (1982) bargaining model with complete information for splitting a single 
pie into multiple pies. His assumption is that both players have identical discounting 
factors and there is no negotiation deadline. Inderst (2000) used an endogenous agenda 
to carry out a similar work in a complete information negotiation. In and Serrano (2004) 
also introduced an endogenous unrestricted agenda to extend Rubinstein’s alternative 
offer game. Fatima et al. (2004) presented a multi-issue endogenous agenda model to 
analyse the effect of deadlines and discounting factors on issue-by-issue negotiation. 
This protocol requires that one of the agents starts by making a combined (all issues) 
offer. The opposite agent can accept or reject part of the offer (one issue or some of the 
issues) or the complete offer. If one issue or part of an issue has been accepted then 
subsequently agents make offers only on the remaining issues. Negotiation ends when 
an agreement is reached on all of the issues or when the deadline is reached. This 
approach provides an effective way of solving conflicted preferences over the agendas 
and ordering negotiation issues. 
 
The disadvantages of both the exogenous agenda and endogenous agenda used for the 
above work are the lack of flexibility and generosity (Busch et al. 1997; Fershtman 
1990; Inderst 2000). The exogenous agenda can be applicable to particular scenarios 
where the order of negotiation issues has been confirmed. On the other hand, it may be 
that neither the exogenous agenda nor endogenous agenda can deal with negotiations 
involving complex multiple issue situations where there is difficulty in determining the 
order of the issues. Fatima’s (2003) endogenous agenda model allows the whole set or a 
subset of negotiation issues to be ordered by a proposed simultaneous procedure. The 
efficiency of this model is not discussed by Fatima but it could be more efficient than an 
exogenous agenda as the negotiation can take place without the delay introduced by pre-
negotiation over the order of the issues. Pre-negotiation stage in an exogenous agenda is 
introduced where the players have different preferences over the ordering of the issues. 
 




According to Flamini (2007) a simultaneous procedure should be the prevailing choice; 
in that it both saves time and makes full use of all valuable trading opportunities across 
all issues. The negotiators, however, cannot deal with multiple issues at the same time 
due to each negotiator having different preferences among the multi-issues. In 
simultaneous procedures the barriers are similar to those of the traditional bargaining 
theory, in that they may need a learning mechanism. However, the limitation of 
Fatima’s et al. (2003) method is the lack of a learning ability that can learn about an 
agent’s beliefs about an opponent’s intentions. Without the learning mechanism, the 
method may not be able to produce efficient and effective negotiating results, and a 
mechanism is required to re-evaluate the quality of their results for further improvement 
(Lau et al. 2006; Abedin et al. 2012). 
 
The agenda based approach specifies how the issues will be settled. Agents can employ 
either an issue-by-issue (one-at-a-time) approach, or a packaged approach in the 
negotiation agenda (Fatima et al. 2004). My model has adopted the former; negotiation 
one issue at a time. The main reason for this is lack of knowledge about the opposing 
agents. As one issue is settled, the agent subsequently negotiates the other pending 
issues. This allows the agent to be cautious and opportunistic at the same time. For a 
multi-issue negotiation under incomplete information settings, the ideal solution is one 
that is Pareto optimal. A solution is said to be Pareto optimal if no agent can be better 
off without sacrificing the other’s utility (Wilkes 2008). So the proposed negotiation 
approach should be able to generate Pareto optimal solutions for multi-issue 
negotiations. The majority of the existing work on multi-issue negotiations focuses on 
the negotiation strategy, assuming the agenda and the procedure to be predetermined 
(Fatima et al. 2004; Lai et al. 2004). Depending on the scenario under which the 
negotiation is taking place a supervised agenda procedure can have a positive impact on 
the outcome of the negotiation when compared to a procedure without the use of an 
agenda.  
 
In the present work, this proposed model consists of issue-by-issue agenda based 
approach for a group of agents in a multi-issue negotiation setting. It shows how an 
agenda affects the outcome and makes it easy for the agents to find a common zone. 
 





The impact of the agenda procedure along with the strategy on the outcome is illustrated 
in a real environment. The agent’s preference order is used as a base case for providing 
the optimal agenda-procedure combination.  
2.9 Summary 
 
To develop an efficient automated negotiation model, selecting and integrating the most 
appropriate negotiation procedure and approach, negotiation elements such as protocol, 
strategies and utility decision functions are mostly required. This selection depends on 
the context of the negotiation. This research aims at improving existing automated 
negotiation approaches in order to facilitate the negotiation process by introducing a 
preference ordering technique in a group decision-making environment. The proposed 
agenda approach is based on mathematical methods to determine the negotiation offers. 
The agenda approach provides a way of using a sequential mechanism to manage the 
complexity of multi-issue negotiation. With such an approach, a part of the protocol is 
the determination of the order in which the issues will be negotiated in the resulting 
issue-by-issue negotiation. For multi-issue negotiations, the search space is typically 
complex and large, and with little a priori information on its structure. This research 
direction is to address this problem using an agenda based negotiation approach 
supported by a group decision-making method. This decision-making method helps to 
order the issues even if different agents have different preferences. It helps to reach a 
consensus when the preferences of the agents are diverse. The agenda based mechanism 
uses the result of the group decision-making method in putting the issues in order. The 
next chapter discusses the multi-issue group decision-making process.  
 
In summary, this chapter deals with the main concepts of automated negotiation and the 
potential problems in the process of negotiation. This chapter also describes the general 
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Chapter 3  
A Multi-Issue Fuzzy Group Decision Making Process 
3.1 Introduction 
Negotiation is a form of interaction among agents in which a group of agents with a 
desire to cooperate but with potentially conflicting interests seek to reach agreement on 
a set of alternatives or services (Soh and Li 2004; Abedin et al. 2012). Automated 
negotiation consists of such a joint decision being automatically decided by the 
autonomous agents. In a multi-issue negotiation process, it can be useful for agents to 
reflect each other’s preferences for their mutual benefit. The information about the 
issues provided by the agents can be of a diverse nature. As every agent has their own 
ideas, attitudes, motivations and personality, it is quite natural to think that different 
agents will provide their preferences in different ways and formats. The proposed 
negotiation approach is regarded as decision-making under uncertainty, based on 
multiple issues of quantitative and qualitative nature, where the imprecise decision-
makers judgements are represented as fuzzy numbers. 
 
Group decision-making processes which resolve conflicts and involve two or more 
parties over multiple issues can be used as a vital part of cooperative negotiations. Not 
many researchers have addressed the activities of group decision-making in the 
negotiation stage. Currently, two schemes are used to model group decision-making: 
one is based on an aggregation-and-ranking procedure (Cheng 1999; Huynh and 
Nakamori 2005), by which the “best” alternative or service is chosen after a ranking 
process. The second one is based on a consensus-reaching orientated solution (Herrera 
1996; Herrera-Viedma 2007). This proposed model is based on both, a consensus 
reaching oriented scheme which involves aggregation and ranking techniques. The 
consensus is also refined in that the degree of consensus is also obtained. The consensus 
is used to evaluate the preference ordering of the issues. The group of agents may prefer 
to negotiate each issue separately according to an agenda because negotiating several 
issues at once can be too complex (Lai 2004). The order in which the issues are 
negotiated in issue-by-issue negotiation is specified by the derived preference ordering. 
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This ordering is called the negotiation agenda. The process of ordering the issues with 
respect to the agents’ group preferences is considered as a multi-issue group decision-
making problem in this research.  
 
A group of agents may have opposing preferences or conflicts over the issues at the 
beginning and then move towards agreement by a process of concession-making (Sierra 
1999; Abedin et al. 2012). It is difficult to reach optimal agreements in multi-issue 
negotiations when the agents’ preferences for the possible issues are not common 
knowledge. Self-interested agents often end up negotiating inefficient agreements in 
such situations (Saha and Sen 2007). The proposed preference ordering method in the 
multi-agent negotiation model can be seen as a group decision-making process which 
takes into account how a group of agent works together in reaching a decision. A multi-
issue negotiation may result in win-win agreements if the agents have mutually non-
exclusive objectives and provide a high degree of information sharing (common 
knowledge) between the agents. In this approach, I assume the common knowledge is 
explicit (e.g. preferences, utilities etc. is disclosed by fully cooperative agents).  A group 
of agents try to learn the preferences over the issues by using a qualitative approach for 
decision-making rather than employ heuristics and learning mechanisms. The proposed 
agenda model is based on a consensus forming scheme which involves preference 
aggregation, negotiation protocols and negotiation strategy. The consensus is also 
refined in that the degree of consensus is also obtained. The consensus degree is used to 
evaluate the preference ordering of the issues. This chapter represents the consensus 
forming scheme which involves the preference ordering process.  
 
3.2 Existing Group Decision-Making Approaches 
In the existing works on multi-issue negotiation research investigations have not used 
any specific mechanism or preference ordering method in an agenda based negotiation 
process to determine and investigate the choice of the issue sequence in a group 
negotiation environment. Multiple attribute decision-making methods are widely used 
for group decision-making including qualitative and quantitative methods, such as, two 
dimensional strategic matrixes, Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Triantaphyllou 
2005), Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) 
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(Chu 2009), VIKOR (VlseKriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje in 
Serbian, means Multi criteria Optimization and Compromise Solution) method 
(Opricovic 1998; Opricovic  and Tzeng 2007), which can be used to make decision. But 
these methods, most of the time, cannot reflect the attitude of the majority of the 
decision-makers during the process of group decision-making (Abedin et al. 2011). On 
the contrary the proposed preference ordering approach is a hybrid method where the 
weight preference matrix of the issues and the aggregated group preference ordering is 
obtained by using Fuzzy Ordered Weighted Averaging Operator (FOWA) operator, 
fuzzy quantifiers and fuzzy linguistic concept under the fuzzy environment where the 
vagueness and subjectivity are handled with linguistic terms parameterized by fuzzy 
numbers (Yager 1988; Zadeh 1983) and introduces a consensus solution which reflects 
the maximum attitude of most decision-maker agents (Abedin et al. 2011). The two 
fuzzy quantifier-guided choice strategies which are applied on the weight preference 
matrix to determine the common sequence and importance of the issues are: quantifier 
guided dominance degree (QGDD) and quantifier guided non-dominance degree 
(QGNDD) (Chiclana 2001; Herrera-Viedma 2007).  
 
One of the differences between the proposed fuzzy approach in the preference ordering 
process and those existing approaches already proposed is the use of linguistic 
preference relations and its application to model users’ preferences and issue weights.  
Uncertainty factors often appear in a group decision process (Lu et al. 2007). The main 
two uncertainty factors involved in a group decision-making process are identified in 
this paper. They are the individual’s preferences for the issues and the weight of the 
issues in the assessment. The proposed approach deals with these uncertainty factors 
and generate a satisfactory group decision. Consensus measurement methods are 
introduced into the approach to measure the degree of consensus. A decision-maker 
agent should express its preferences in terms of the relative importance of the issues, 
and one approach is to introduce issue weights. These weights may not have a clear 
economical significance, but their use provides the opportunity to model aspects of 
decision-making (the preference structure). In this research, the “importance weight” 
which represents the relative importance of an issue is considered as a significant 
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aspect. The proposed preference ordering method resolves the above aspects which 
differ with the other existing works. 
 
The normalized value in these methods does not depend on the evaluation unit of an 
issue function, where the other methods depend on the evaluation unit (Chu 2007). The 
traditional QGDD and QGNDD methods do not take into account the relative 
importance of the issues which is the issue weights and the consensus degree among the 
agents. For this reason the proposed fuzzy approach has been applied which takes 
account the above decision-making issues in a fuzzy environment. Individual 
preferences which are used to derive issue weight and group preference differ, therefore, 
the aim is to settle the differences on various issues preferences and construct a common 
preference ordering of multiple issues by maximising the consensus of group preference 
(Abedin et al. 2011).  
 
One of the most crucial problems in many decision-making methods is the precise 
estimation of the pertinent data. Very often in real life decision-making applications 
data are imprecise and fuzzy. A decision-maker agent may encounter difficulty in 
quantifying and processing such linguistic statements (Carlsson 1996; Cheng 1999). 
Therefore, a fuzzy preference concept along with linguistic terms helps the proposed 
decision-making approach to deal with these problems which uses fuzzy data and 
methods and additionally helps to maximise the consensus degree. Several programs of 
research have been carried out on such problems but with a different perspective. 
 
The main feature of the proposed approach is the integration of a Fuzzy Ordered 
Weighted Averaging (FOWA) method with fuzzy quantifier-guided choice strategies to 
effectively satisfy a group of agents’ requirements. This approach tries to find a solution 
where the gap between the preference utility of the group and that of the individual is 
minimum. The derived common preference ordering sequence will support the agent 
negotiators efficiently to find a negotiation solution in the agenda based issue-by-issue 
negotiation process.  
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3.3 A Fuzzy Group Decision-Making Process  
Even though implementation of real world negotiations is very hard, the use of soft 
computing can be an effective approach to automated multi-issue negotiation because of 
its advantage to investigate, analyse and simulate very complex issues (Sedano 2011). 
Use of soft computing techniques can reduce the complexity of high-dimensional 
negotiation to make it closer to real world negotiation (Sedano 2010). A soft computing 
technique such as the fuzzy approach has been employed to help to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency in the proposed negotiation process. 
 
In dealing with a decision process, the decision-maker is often faced with doubts, 
problems and uncertainties. In other words the use of natural language to express 
perception or judgment is always subjective, uncertain or vague. To resolve the 
vagueness, ambiguity and subjectivity of human judgment, fuzzy sets theory (Zadeh 
1983) was introduced to express the linguistic terms in decision-making (DM) process. 
Bellman and Zadeh (1970) developed fuzzy multi-criteria decision-making (FMCDM) 
methodology to resolve the lack of precision in assigning importance weights of criteria 
and the ratings of alternatives regarding evaluation criteria. For each variable in the 
problem domain, an appropriate linguistic label set is chosen and used by individuals 
who participate in the decision-making process to express their opinions. These setting 
are known as the linguistic settings. Each element in a set is associated with a value 
indicating to what degree the element is a member of the set. This value comes within 
the range [0, 1], where 0 and 1, respectively, indicate the minimum and maximum 
degree of membership, while all the intermediate values indicate degrees of ‘‘partial” 
membership (Bevilacqua 2006). This approach helps decision-makers solve complex 
decision-making problems in a systematic, consistent and productive way (Carlsson 
1996) and has been widely applied to tackle decision-making (DM) problems with 
multiple criteria and alternatives (Wang 2007). In short, fuzzy set theory offers a 
mathematically precise way of modelling vague preferences as for example when it 
comes to setting weights of performance scores on criteria. Simply stated, fuzzy set 
theory makes it possible to mathematically describe a statement like: ‘‘criterion X 
should have a weight of around 0.8”. 
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In this section, some related and extended fuzzy approaches and methods used in the 
proposed model will be briefly described. In the proposed approach, the agents’ 
opinions are described by linguistic terms which can be expressed in fuzzy numbers 
such as those using triangular or trapezoidal membership functions, because of their 
simplicity and solid theoretical basis (Grzegorzewski 2005). A fuzzy quantifier (Yager 
1988) and a Fuzzy Ordered Weighted Averaging (FOWA) operator are applied to 
aggregate the importance weights of different issues, which are later used to determine 
the temporary consensus solution. 
 
 
3.3.1 Different Preference Formats 
  
The proposed model allows the agents to express their preferences in a flexible way by 
using different information formats. Providing different individual preference formats to 
agents to express their individual preferences can reflect agents’ true individual 
preferences more precisely. The information can be represented by means of preference 
orderings, utility functions, linguistic variables, fuzzy selected subset of all the issues 
and fuzzy preference relations. The information has to be made uniform (Abedin et al. 
2009). Fuzzy preference relations is used as the base in my model because the use of 
this concept in decision-making situations to present consumer’s opinion about issues, 
appears to be a useful tool in modelling decision processes (Abedin et al. 2009). 
 
An agent on behalf of the group of agents collects the opinions from the consumers 
where each consumer expresses his/her priorities for the issues. The consumers may 
adjust their initial preferences according to their judgments and then present their 
individual preferences for group decision, which is the major and important part in the 
preference ordering process. The proposed approach provides a mechanism for group 
decision-makers to express their individual preferences in different formats based on 
their own attitude, motivation, personality and background (Herrera-Viedma et al. 2002; 
Abedin et al. 2009). 
 
Some of the preference formats provided to the consumers in the group decision-making 
process is: preference ordering or ordered vector, utility vector, normal preference 
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relation, fuzzy preference relation, fuzzy selected subset, selected subset, multiplicative 
preference relation (Chiclana et al. 1998). In preference ordering or ordered vector the 
issues are ordered from best to worse. Each issue is assigned a numerical value between 
[0, 1] by the consumer in utility vector format. Selected sub-set (Chiclana et al. 1998) is 
one of the individual preference formats where issues are selected from the basic issue 
set and compose a subset. In fuzzy preference relation the consumer’s preference 
relation is described by binary fuzzy relation where the binary relation denotes the 
preference degree of one issue over the other issue. Often the consumers use their 
subjective judgments to express their preferences. Fuzzy linguistic terms that contain 
various degrees of preferences are used to help the consumers to express their opinions 
more accurately when he/she is in complex or fuzzy situation. This kind of preference 
are called vector of linguistic variables (Herrera et al. 1996).  
 
In group decision-making under multiple criteria, there are a set of issues and a set of 









}, l > = 2, be a given finite set of decision-makers. The decision task is to obtain 
the group preference ordering of the issues from issue set. It is assumed that agents 
(consumers and provider) can give their individual preferences directly at this stage. As 
the agents come from different backgrounds and have their own ideas, attitudes, 
motivations, and personalities, decision-makers may provide their individual 
preferences on issues in different formats. The following selected preference formats 
(Chiclana et al. 1998; Nurmi 1981; Orlovski 1978; Tanino 1990; Tsouki`as 1994; Kwok 
et al. 2007) are presented in the proposed model: 
 
1. Ordered vector: Ordinal preference and cardinal preference are commonly used 
formats of individual preferences (Huber 1984; Tanino 1990). Ordinal 
preference can be expressed as ordered vector. The issues are ordered from the 
best to the worst.  
 
2. Utility vector: Cardinal preference can be expressed as numerical utility vector. 
Each alternative is assigned a numerical value in [0, 1]. 
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3. Linguistic term vector: A vector of linguistic terms is used to evaluate the issues. 
Here, each issue is evaluated by using a linguistic term against some criterion 
(Kwok et al. 2007). 
  
4. Selected subset: Selected subset is one of the individual preference formats 
(Tanino 1990). Issues selected from basic issue set compose a subset and there is 
no difference among the issues in the subset. This preference expression method 
allows agents easily to express their individual preferences. 
 
5. Fuzzy selected subset: As agents use their subjective judgments to choose issues, 
situations may often arise where it is difficult for them to simply choose or reject 
the issues. In such uncertain case, the yes/no method could not be sufficient. One 
alternative method is for agents to give belief levels to the selected issues to 
express this kind of uncertainty (Kwok et al. 2002). The belief levels belong to a 
set of fuzzy linguistic terms that contains various degrees of preference required 
by the agents. This kind of preference is called fuzzy selected subset in which 
each selected issue is associated with a belief level (fuzzy linguistic term). It is 
an extension of selected subset. 
  
6. Normal preference relation: A strict preference relationship between any two-
issues. For example, i1 is preferable to i2 (Kwok et al. 2007).  
 
7. Fuzzy preference relation: Fuzzy preference relation is an extension of normal 
preference relation. It is the basic preference of fuzzy group decision-making 
and a binary relation over the set of issues, which reflects the degree to which an 
issue is preferred to another one (Kwok et al. 2007).  
 




, where  .o k  is a permutation function over index set {1,…, n} 
of the n  issues { i1 , i2 ..., in }  for agent D
k
 . The issues are ordered from the best to the 
    n,....,ooO kkk 1
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iu  represents the utility evaluation 
given by agent D
k 
 to n  issues { i1 , i2 ..., in }. 
 
Linguistic term vector: 
Linguistic term vector on i : L  =  (l1,  , ln ) , where li  represents the linguistic evaluation 




, where   ni   iii n
 k
it  1,....1  is a selected issue.  
 
Fuzzy selected subset: 
 
, where   nj   iii n
 k
ij  1,....1  is a selected 




A subset of 
kR     nn ii  ii ......... 11  satisfy certain constraints. 
 
Fuzzy preference relation: 
 
     1,0.........: 11 nnR ii  iik   where 
 







 1,1, . 
 
3.3.2 Preference Uniformity  
 
Preference uniformity is an important part in group decision-making process. The 
proposed approach uses this method in order to aggregate different individual 
preferences to reach a group agreement. Different types of preference information need 
to be made uniform or transformed into a common preference format to reach a group 
    ni   u  ,....,uuU kiknkk  1,1,0,1
  nt i  ,....,iiS kitkik  ,1,1
     nt i  ,bi....... ,biS kitkikikik  ,1, 111
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decision. The fuzzy preference relation has suitable qualities in aggregation and for 
generality (Abedin et al. 2009). That is the reason why the proposed approach uses the 
fuzzy preference relation as the base element of the uniform representation. There are 
various transformation functions which are used to transform preference ordering or 
ordered vector, utility vector, normal preference relation, selected subset and 
multiplicative preference relation into a fuzzy preference relation (Abedin et al. 2009).  
 
Some of the uniformity processes (Kwok et al. 2007) used in this research is as follows: 
 










 (n)). Without loss of 
generality, it is assumed that the smaller the number assigned to an issue in an ordered 
vector, the better the issue is from the viewpoint of the agent, and vice versa. For example, 
an ordered vector O  (3, 1, 4, 2) corresponding to the issues im = {i1, i2 ... in}, means that 
issue i2 is the given 1
st ranking and issue i2 the worst ranking. 
 
Obviously, the number assigned to an issue in an ordered vector reflects the agent’s 
preference with that issue. Therefore, it can be assumed that for a agent D
k
, his/her 
fuzzy preference value of issue im over issue ij , rij
k





( j) . 
 
The following function can be used to transform the ordered vector into fuzzy 
preference relation (Chiclana et al 1998): 
 
  
   





















     (3.1) 
 
Utility vector to fuzzy preference relation: 
 
The following function can be used to transform the utility vector into fuzzy preference 
relation: 





     (3.2) 
 
Fuzzy Selected subset to fuzzy preference relation: 
 
The following function can be used to transform the Fuzzy Selected subset into fuzzy 
preference relation: 
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Fuzzy linguistic terms to fuzzy preference relation: 
 
The following function can be used to transform the Fuzzy linguistic terms into fuzzy 
preference relation: 
 






                       (3.4) 
 
  
3.3.3 Group Preference Order  
 
The agents involved in the group decision-making process may have differing 
importance rating associated with the issues of the alternatives. In this case these 
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quantifier guided aggregation operators help to determine an acceptable group solution. 
To decide the weighting vector of Fuzzy Ordered Weighting Operator (FOWA) 
operator the concept of fuzzy majority is used. Fuzzy majority is a soft majority 
concept, which is influenced by the use of a fuzzy logic based calculus of linguistically 
quantified propositions. Two types of linguistic quantifiers can be distinguished: 
absolute and proportional. Proportional fuzzy linguistic quantifiers, such as “many, 
most, at least half, almost all” are used in this approach (Chiclana 2001). The semantics 
of a fuzzy linguistic quantifier can be captured by using fuzzy subsets of the unit 
interval, [0,1] for its representation (Abedin et al. 2009).  
 
3.3.3.1  The Fuzzy Ordered Weighted Averaging (FOWA) operator 
 
A FOWA operator of dimension m can be defined as a function F as follows: 
 
   1,0→1,0: mF  
 
where the function associates with a weight vector ],...,,[ 21 mwwwW  , such that, 






iw  and  









                        (3.5) 
where ],...,,[ 21 mbbbB  , and each element Bbi∈  is the ith largest value in the 
collection maa ,..,1 . The purpose is to collect the collective fuzzy weight preference 
matrix )( cij
c rR   from the set of individual fuzzy weight preference relations },...{ 1 lRR  
which are obtained from the normalized opinions over the issues given by the  l agents, 
i.e.,  
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3.3.3.2  Fuzzy Qualifiers 
 
Fuzzy quantifier Q  is used to compute the weights of the FOWA operator and the 
weights are obtained as follows:  
 




















-   (3.7) 






With  1,0,,  xba  and )x(Q indicating the degree of which the proportion x  is 
compatible with the meaning of the quantifier it represents. The relative quantifiers 
“most” (0.3, 0.8), “at least half” (0, 0.5) and “as many as possible” (0.5, 1) are used in 
my illustrative example.  
 
Fuzzy QGDD and QGNDD are applied to the aggregated weight preference matrix to 
determine the common sequence of the issues. Both are based on the use of the FOWA 
operators. 
 
3.3.3.2.1 Quantifier guided dominance degree  
 
For an issue, the quantifier-guided dominance degree QGDD is used to quantify the 
dominance that one issue importance has over all the others in a fuzzy majority sense as 
follows: 
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3.3.3.2.2  Quantifier guided non-dominance degree 
 
The quantifier guided non-dominance degree QGNDD  is also calculated according to 





represents the degree to which one issue importance is strictly dominated by the other 
issue. QGNDD  presents the degree in which each issue is not dominated by a fuzzy 
majority of the remaining issues (Abedin et al 2009). 
 
Once the QGDDi  and QNGDDi are calculated then the importance weights for each 
attribute is obtained. These importance weights of attributes are used further to 
determine the final aggregated decision matrix which represents the actual opinions or 
responses from the decision-makers. The temporary solution set for issues is derived by 
using the ranking method. One of them can be applied depends on the agents decision. 
Finally the temporary group ranking or group preference ordering is obtained.   
 
The FOWA operator has the ability to aggregate linguistically expressed opinions which 
is collected from a group of agents. In my proposed approach, I intend to obtain the 
aggregated weight preference matrix of the issues. The FOWA operator along with the 
fuzzy quantifiers calculates the group fuzzy weight preference matrix from a set of 
individual preference relations considering the preferences of the majority without 
ignoring those of the minority. This helps to obtain a satisfactory group solution in a 
complex decision-making problem (Abedin et al. 2009; Abedin et al. 2011).  
 
 
3.3.4 Group Consensus Measure  
 
Group consensus is important in group decision-making. The conventional meaning of 
consensus is a full and common agreement; however, this is not satisfactory in many 
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consensus through all intermediate values, is viewed to be more appropriate. In the 
context of fuzzy preference relations, the concept of fuzzy majority is employed for 
"soft" consensus of group decision-making (Fedrizzi et al.1994; Kacprzyk et al. 1992). 
This soft consensus is used in stage were the temporary consensus solution is 
determined. A process of improving group consensus is proposed to which will help to 
increase the degree of group consensus. 
 
3.3.5 A Process of Improving Group Consensus 
 
In this section, the consensus process is presented which has the following main 
characteristics: 
 
1. It is based on soft consensus criterion: a consensus degree measure. This 
measure evaluates the agreement of the agents (consumers and suppliers) and 
guides the consensus process. The consensus criteria are defined by comparing 
the individual solutions with the group solution using as comparison criterion 
the positions of the issues in each solution (Herrera-Viedma et al. 2002). 
 
2. A consensus improvement process, where the consensus level is evaluated. The 
difficult part of this process is to find a way of making the individual converges 
and therefore help the agent to obtain and agree with a particular solution. To do 
so a consensus level can be fixed in advance. When the consensus measure 
reaches this level, the derived solution is the final one. If the level of consensus 
does not reach the satisfaction level, the process can work as an iterative 
process. The agents’ consensus degree process also supports a feedback 
mechanism, which helps the decision-makers to modify their opinion or 
preferences to get closer to the group consensus (Abedin et al. 2011). It depends 
on the decision of the decision-makers whether they want to change their 
opinions or not. The feedback mechanism will help the decision-makers to know 
the direction of modifying their opinions and help the group consensus level to 
reach a satisfaction level.    
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The process is described in further details in the following subsections: 
 
1. Consensus degree measure: 
Each consensus parameter requires the use of a difference function, d (
kV ,
cV ). To 
obtain the level of agreement between the individual ranking obtained for the agents D
k
, 
 inkk VVV ...1 , where 
k
jV  is the position of issue ij for the k-th agent, and the group 
ranking  cncc VVV ...1 where 
c
jV  is the position of issue ij in that group ranking. 
 
The steps to derive the consensus degree are described below: 
 
a) The group ranking which was obtained in the group preference ordering process 
is used as a temporary solution here 
cV . 
 
b) The individual ranking of the issues for the agent {
kV , k =1...m } are calculated. 
 
c) The consensus degree of each consumer for each issue ck(ij) is calculated by 
comparing the position of the issue in the consumer’s individual solution and the 
group solution. A function       kjcjickjk VVfiVVcic  ,  is used for the 
comparison. I consider f as an increasing function and f(x) = (a.i)
b
 , b ≥ 0, here a 
= 1/(n-1). 
 


























VVfiVVcic  (3.11) 
 
The parameter b is used to control the rigorousness of the consensus process. Values of 
b near to 1 can decrease the rounds to improve the group consensus. Appropriate values 
for b are .5, .7, .9, 1. 
 
The consensus degree of all consumers on each issues xj can be calculated by the 
following equation:  







Although a mean operator is used to aggregate the consensus degree, but other operators 
for example OWA operator with the concept of fuzzy majority can also be used (Abedin 
et al. 2011). 
 
Aggregation of the above consensus degrees on issues will be calculated by using OWA 
OR-LIKE operator defined by Yager and Filev (1994). It is important to do the 
aggregation in such a way that the consensus degree of the solution set of issues has 
more important weight in the aggregation process. This is the reason of using 
LIKE -OR OWAS operator which allows this kind of aggregation. 
  

































Where v is the cardinal of the issue set and γ   [0, 1], is fixed before using the 
aggregation operator. The parameter γ controls the aggregation in such a way that if γ 
tends to 1 then consensus degree tends to the group solution of issues. 
 
2. A consensus improvement process: 
 
If the consensus level is not reached the required level, an improvement process along 
with a feedback mechanism can be applied. The consensus degree of agent’s individual 
solution to group solution i
xI  is calculated by aggregating that agent’s consensus degree 
in the issues. This aggregation is also done using OWA OR-LIKE operator. 
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These values are used to evaluate the agent’s individual opinion. Those agents whose 
individual solution is furthest from the group solution are given feedback by the 
feedback mechanism. They are asked to consider their preferences on the issues. The 
agents may or may not agree to modify their opinions according to some rules given by 
the provider. Those who agree to change their opinions in order to obtain a higher 
degree of consensus can give their changed opinions and the overall group preference 
ordering process is applied again over the issues to get the new group ranking. The 
whole process works as an iterative process until the consensus degree is high enough. 
 
The consensus process depends on the size of the set of issues and the size of the group 
of the agents. Therefore, when the opinions are homogeneous and these sizes are small 
then the convergence process is easier to obtain.  
          
3.4 Summary  
 
This chapter presents an approach to build a pre-negotiation protocol which includes 
preference ordering. This approach gives the decision-makers flexibility to express their 
opinions on the issues in different preference formats. The different preference formats 
are then transformed into a unique format which is fuzzy preference relation. Fuzzy 
concepts are used to aggregate the individual preferences into a group preference 
ordering relation. The uniformed preferences are aggregated into a collective fuzzy 
preference relation by adopting the ordered weighted average (OWA) operator based on 
the concept of fuzzy majority. Then finally to determine the global ranking of the issues, 
two fuzzy quantifier guided selection processes: dominance degree (QGDD) and non-
dominance degree (QGNDD) are applied. An iterative consensus process is built to 
improve the group consensus degree. The fuzzy group decision-making process 
constructs a preference ordering of the issues of a service or product. This preference 










The Proposed Model 
4.1 Introduction 
Multiple issues normally form a large and complex search space in a negotiation 
process. Uncertainty and conflicting preferences between the agents occur during the 
negotiation process which delay the negotiation timeline and expand the search space 
(Faratin et al. 2002). To improve this situation an agenda based negotiation approach 
based on a hybrid fuzzy preference ordering process is proposed. This process will 
direct the negotiating agents' search for prospective solutions that build on the 
individual areas of interest but move the agents towards an agreement on their common 
interest. This issue-by-issue agenda based negotiation can reduce the negotiation delay 
time and the domain of negotiations (search space) to a position that consists of feasible 
solutions that take account of the preferences of the participating agents.  
 
The problem addressed in this research arises in many different contexts, in which a 
group of negotiators have to engage in a sequence of negotiations, where they have 
differing preference importance on different issues. Agents may have opposing 
preferences or conflicts over the issues at the beginning and then move towards 
agreement by a process of concession-making. The proposed model is based on a 
consensus forming scheme which involves preference aggregation, negotiation 
protocols and negotiation strategy. The consensus is also refined in that the degree of 
consensus is also obtained. The consensus degree is used to evaluate the preference 
ordering of the issues.  
 
If the negotiators choose to negotiate sequentially, the order of the issues in which the 
negotiations take place will have a significant impact in the negotiation outcome. This 
ordering is called the negotiation agenda. The proposed negotiation approach introduces 
an agenda setting phase to determine the choice of sequence in issue-by-issue 
negotiation. The choice of sequence to be used in negotiation is based on a hybrid 
preference ordering method. The agenda setting can set the tone and framework for the 
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negotiation outcomes. In this approach the issues have to be negotiated according to the 
order and settings specified in the agenda. The aim of this research is to investigate how 
the agenda-setting can be vital to the automated negotiation process. In this chapter, an 
agenda based negotiation model is proposed. This model incorporates the features 
identified in the previous chapter. The model adopts the group preference ordering 
concepts to solve the problems of issue-by-issue negotiation.  
 
The conceptual framework of this model is presented in the 4.2 section of this chapter. 
Through a description of the components contained in the main structure of the multi-
issue negotiation model, the overall picture of the model can be seen in this section. In 
section 4.3, the details of the agenda approach are described. The negotiation process is 
composed of an effective negotiation protocol and negotiation strategies. This section 
also contains a description of how these negotiation mechanisms in the model have been 
set up, so that the agents’ can achieve favourable negotiation outcomes. The chapter 
concludes with a summary in section 4.4. 
 
4.2 The Conceptual Framework of the Model 
In this section, the conceptual framework of the proposed model is explained. There is 
two phases in the proposed negotiation process: pre-negotiation phase and negotiation 
phase. In the pre-negotiation phase, the parties identify the issue sequence for the 
negotiation agenda by using a preference ordering model. The negotiating parties 
evaluate the conflict preferences in this phase.This accelerates the negotiation process. 
This phase has been described in detail in chapter 3. In the second phase, the details of 
the negotiation process are illustrated.  
 
In the pre-negotiation phase, a systematic approach has been proposed to solve the 
agents’ group decision-making problem within a fuzzy multi-agent multi-issue 
negotiation environment. The group consensus process helps the negotiators resolve 
their heterogeneous opinions or preferences over issues to avoid conflict and delay 
during the negotiation stage. The negotiating agents are "sincerely cooperative" in the 
sense that they willing to effectively look for a compromise, being available, if 
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necessary, to lose something on their private goals in order to reach the model’s goal. 
This is a kind of "game rule" accepted by each agent, entering the group consensus 
process. At times a group of agents aims to gain a common global goal. On the other 
hand, a group of self-interested agents with different individual goals have private goals. 
In the proposed group decision-making process private and global goals do not 
necessarily concur.  
 
When situations of coordination, conflict and/or positive cooperation take place 
between two different agents, a negotiation process is established. The proposed 
negotiation process guides the agents to work towards a global coherent solution. The 
negotiation process involves autonomous agents who may participate on behalf of 
'buyer/consumer' and 'seller/supplier'. Preferences express agent’s interest and plan in 
the negotiation. The natural use of preference ordering suggests a collection of either 
buyers/consumers or sellers/supplier getting together to provide a shared prepared 
position in a negotiation. The primary aspect of the position is the preferred sequence of 
issue negotiation. But this can be split into two by selecting a common ranking of 
importance and a common view on the way in which importance should be reflected in 
the issue's sequence (most important first or least important first). The common position 
can also be established on the negotiation strategy (concede or hard line) although this 
will only applied to cases in which there is negotiation from a group perspective. 
 
It is also possible to consider the scenario in which there is a common population of 
traders who buy and sell to each other. In this case the preferences are set up to allow 
any negotiation between a pair of them to be carried out using an agreed consensus 
protocol. Given the preferred strategy the aim is to carry out this strategy in actual 
negotiations.  
 
It is possible to have a pre-negotiation phase in which the protocol of the negotiation is 
established. There can be several structures for the pre-negotiation phase. (1) Two 
groups have each reached their consensus on issue preference. (2) One group has 
reached the issue consensus the other has not. (3) There is a single group of traders. In 
case (3) there is nothing to be done. In case (1) there can be a meta preference ordering 
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associated with the parameters of the negotiation process. For this meta level the 
population could be assumed to be undivided and a single preference ordering can be 
considered. For case (2) the members of the non-coordinated group will have to carry 
out the pre-negotiation on an individual basis. The scope of the consensus will be 
different in different cases. Each variety of scenarios has their own scope of consensus. 
So the consensus building can be carried out for each of the cases with differing uses in 
the offer-counter-offer stage.  
 
The diagram in Fig. 4.1 represents the current structure and gives an overview of the 
proposed model. Step 1 to step 6 are part of the fuzzy group decision-making process, 
described in chapter 3. On the other hand, step 7 is the agenda based negotiation 
approach. This step will be described in detail in section 4.3. All the steps of the model 
are stated below: 
 
Step 1: Opinion Collection from Multiple Agents over Multiple Issues for Alternative or 
Service. 
 
Step 2: Normalisation of Opinions or Preferences using fuzzy concepts. 
 
Step 3: Group Preference Order. 
 
Step 4: Temporary Issue Sequence Solution using Fuzzy Ordered Weighted Averaging 
Operator (FOWA), Quantifier guided dominance degree (QGDD) and Quantifier guided 
non-dominance degree (QGNDD) concept. 
 
Step 5:  Group Consensus Measurement. 
 
Step 6: Consensus Improvement Process using Feedback. 
 
Step 7: Multi-issue Agenda based Negotiation Approach. 
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Figure 4.1 The Proposed Model 
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The description of each component is as follows: 
 
Step 1: Opinion Collection from Multiple Agents over Multiple Issues for Alternative or 
Service:  
 
Each decision-maker agent of a group is required to express their opinions for the issues 
with respect to the alternatives or services in the initial step. They also provide their 
priorities for the weight of the issues. The decision-makers may adjust their initial 
preferences according to their judgments and then present their individual preferences 
for a group decision which is the major part of the preference ordering process. The 
proposed approach provides a mechanism in chapter 3 for group decision-makers to 
express their individual preferences and the importance weights over various issues for 
the alternatives or services in different formats as well as fuzzy linguistic terms that 
contain various degrees of preference. Section 3.3.1 provides the different preference 
formats to express agents’ opinions. Having information about agents’ importance 
weights over negotiation issues can facilitate agents to produce high quality offers in the 
negotiation process. 
 
Step 2: Normalisation of Opinions or Preferences using fuzzy concepts: 
 
Different types of preference information need to be made uniform or transformed into 
a common preference format. The fuzzy preference relation has suitable qualities in 
aggregation and for generality. That is the reason why the proposed approach uses the 
fuzzy preference relation as the base element of the uniform representation. These 
transformations functions defined in section 3.3.2 from chapter 3 help the decision- 
maker agent to normalise their opinions more accurately when it is in complex. In this 
step appropriate normalisation functions for the importance weight of issues and the 
individual fuzzy preference for each issue must be defined to normalize the opinions. 
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Step 3: Group Preference Order: 
 
Aggregation is an essential process that has to be solved well in a group decision- 
making problem. The aggregation phase, which is one of the steps of the hybrid 
preference ordering method, determines a common group preference order. Once the 
individual preference information on issues is transformed into fuzzy preference relation 
form, then they are aggregated using defuzzification concepts described in section 3.3.3. 
Currently, two schemes are used to model group decision-making: one is based on 
aggregation-and-ranking procedure, by which the “best” alternative is chosen after a 
ranking process. The second one is based on a consensus reaching orientated solution. 
The proposed model is based on both, consensus reaching oriented scheme which 
involves the aggregation and ranking techniques. The degree of consensus is further 
obtained. 
 
Step 4: Temporary Issue Sequence Solution using Fuzzy Ordered Weighted Averaging 
Operator (FOWA), Quantifier guided dominance degree (QGDD) and Quantifier guided 
non-dominance degree (QGNDD) Concept: 
 
Once the group preference ordering is found, the next step is to determine and aggregate 
the importance weight of different issues using the Fuzzy Ordered Weighted Averaging 
Operator (OWA) concept. In a real situation, different group members may have 
different judgements when comparing the relative importance of the issues. Obviously, 
how the issues are used and how the priority of each issue (the weight) is processed will 
directly influence the ranking of these alternatives and the selection of the satisfactory 
group solution. That is the reason why the weights of the issues are determined and 
aggregated in an effective way in this model. In the approach a weight preference 
matrix of the issues is obtained by using this Fuzzy Ordered Weighted Averaging 
Operator (FOWA) operator, a fuzzy quantifier and fuzzy linguistic concept. Two fuzzy 
quantifier-guided choice strategies are applied on the weight preference matrix to 
determine the importance of the issues. The two quantifier guided choice degrees for the 
issues, based on the fuzzy majority concept and OWA are: quantifier guided dominance 
degree and quantifier guided non-dominance degree. Quantifier guided dominance 
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degree (QGDD) is used to quantify the dominance that one issue has over all the others 
in a fuzzy majority sense. On the other hand, quantifier guided non-dominance degree 
(QGNDD) presents degree in which each issue is not dominated by a fuzzy majority of 
the remaining issues. One of the quantifier-guided choice strategies, either QGDD or 
QGNDD, is applied to the set of issues to determine the importance weights. After 
constructing the fuzzy aggregated group decision matrix and the aggregated weight 
preference matrix, the crisp values are computed for each of their elements. The 
temporary consensus solution is derived in this stage using the multi-issue ranking 
index based on the aggregated issue values. The mathematical representation of these 
two strategies is described in 3.3.3.1 and section 3.3.3.2 from the previous chapter. 
 
Step 5:  Group Consensus Measurement:  
 
A soft consensus measure, which is measured in the interval [0, 1] is applied to 
calculate the consensus level. Instead of using complex measurement methods such as 
Euclidean distance, L-1 norm distance, the cosine and sine of the angle between the 
vectors, a simple position comparison approach is applied with the help of OWA 
operators to measure the consensus level. The detail processes of the consensus 
measurement with functions are described in section 3.3.4 and section 3.3.5. 
 
Step 6: Consensus Improvement Process using Feedback: 
 
A process of improving group consensus defined in section 3.3.5 is applied in this 
approach. This consensus process is applied to measure the degree of agreement 
between the group members over the issues. The consensus degree evaluates how far 
the group member’s individual solutions are from the group solution. A feedback 
mechanism is applied when the consensus level is not satisfactory. The proximity 
measures are used to build the feedback mechanism which helps the decision-makers to 
modify their opinions in order to get closer agreement between them. This is a 
convergent process resulting in the group solution, once the consensus degree is high 
enough. The next step is the initialisation of agenda based negotiation stage based on 
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the common preference order. The proposed group decision-making process will 
facilitate the issue-by-issue approach.  
 
Step 7: Multi-issue Agenda based Negotiation Approach: 
 
In the multi-issue negotiation approach, the agents work as negotiators, jointly 
searching in a multi-dimensional space to find a point of agreement over multiple 
issues. The outcome of multi-issue negotiation not only depends on strategies, but is 
also influenced by the procedure by which the issues are negotiated. The proposed 
agenda based negotiation approach is based on the issue-by-issue procedure together 
with the negotiation strategies for the agents involved. The negotiation setting has the 
following components:  
 
1) Issue ordering,  
2) A protocol, 
3) Strategies, for each agent,  
4) Rules that determines when a deal has been struck and what the agreement deal is.  
 
The complexity of utility functions for evaluating multiple negotiation issues is 
frequently difficult to manage as the issues form a large and complex search space. The 
proposed agenda approach provides a way of using a sequential mechanism to manage 
the complexity of multi-issue negotiation. With such an approach, a part of the protocol 
is the determination of the order in which the issues will be negotiated. Various orders 
of the negotiation issues form different agendas. The order will be decided by the agents 
in the approach as part of the bargaining equilibrium. The issues are ordered using the 
preference ordering process based on the agents’ aggregated preferences which were 
derived in the earlier steps. Within a group of agents there is a preference ordering 
process for ranking the importance of the issues for the group.  
 
To avoid having to consider all possible sequences of issues two sequences determined 
by the agents’ preferences can be evaluated. To that the following question should be 
answered: 
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Which issue the agents want to negotiate in the beginning? Is it the most-important-
first, or, the most-important-last? 
 
It will limit to two choices and the search space is much smaller for the agenda 
formation.  
 
4.3 The Proposed Agenda based Approach 
The proposed agenda based approach stated in step 7 in Fig. 4.1 is described in detail in 
this section. The proposed negotiation mechanism consists of an agenda based 
negotiation protocol together with the negotiation strategies for the agents involved. The 
major steps of the negotiation process are shown in Fig. 4.2 which is a part of step 7 of 
the proposed model shown in Fig. 4.1. The essential point in the issue ordering stage is 
the change from agents’ preference sequence to accepting the common sequence. The 
issues are ordered using preference ordering process based on the agents’ aggregated 
preferences.  
 
As noted previously two implementation rules are possible for any protocol. One is 
sequential implementation in which agreement on an issue is implemented as soon as it 
is settled; and the other is simultaneous implementation in which agreement is 
implemented only after all the issues are settled (Fatima et al. 2004). The proposed 
protocol uses the sequential implementation. The main advantage of the proposed 
agenda mechanism is that it minimises the complexity of the negotiation procedure, 
which does not require complex computation. 
 
If each issue can be independently evaluated using the negotiators' utility functions, the 
agenda methods can result in a unique equilibrium solution for each issue. This is the 
main advantage of issue-by-issue agenda negotiation. But as in real life situations the 
interdependency between the issues arises. So in my issue-by-issue negotiation 
approach, the correlation factor between the issues is not ignored. It provides greater 
flexibility for the agents. For example if the price and performance issues of a software 
product are loosely dependent on each other then they can be correlated by quantitative 
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mechanisms which link a pair of issues. This can be beneficial for both agents. The 
agents can also negotiate the issues independently in this way and the complexity will 
also remain simple. More details of the following issue-by-issue negotiation approach 
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4.3.1 Negotiation Parameters Set and the characteristics of the Proposed 
Approach 
 
The negotiation parameters and the main characteristics of the negotiation model are 
shown in Table 4.1.  
 




Protocol category Bilateral 
Distribution type Integrated model (win-win approach) 
Attribute type Multiple issues 
Number of rounds Multiple rounds (Maximum round decided by 
the agents) 
Mediation type Non-mediated 
Access type Closed 
  
Process  
Automation level Communication oriented 
Orientation type Goal oriented 
Negotiation Process Agenda based 
  
Theoretical Basis  
Theoretical approach Analysed by Multi utility theory 
  
Restrictions  
Constraints Correlation between issues handled by 
Constraints 
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4.3.1.1 Negotiation Structure 
 
The proposed negotiation model uses a bilateral protocol in context of e-commerce. The 
cardinality of the negotiation is many-to-one. A group of buyer/consumer or 
seller/supplier can be represented by a combination of one coordinating agent. 
 
The negotiation is done between a pair of agents. The negotiation environment refers to 
the scenario and settings in which the negotiation is carried out. It includes the 
negotiators and the negotiation object. The negotiation environment has a huge 
influence on carrying out the negotiation. 
 
In automated bilateral negotiation the negotiators referred to are the two parties 
represented by autonomous agents. In the context of e-commerce and the negotiation 
scenarios, these agents can be a buyer/seller, consumer/supplier or server/client.    
 
The negotiation object of the model is the set of multiple issues of a service or product 
over which agreement is to be made. For example the issues related to a software 
product can be: price; reliability; performance; quantity; maintenance, and so on. It is 
very difficult and time consuming to negotiate all the issues related to a product or 
service. The agents can agree on a common set of issues to negotiate on.  
 
In a multi-issue negotiation process attaining a win-win solution is essential. This model 
searches for a win-win solution for the participating agents in the negotiation. Solutions 
where all the agents are better off are called win-win situation. And to achieve this, the 
best thing is to find Pareto optimal solution. This model aims to find a Pareto optimal 
solution. A solution is called Pareto optimal when the outcome cannot be further 
improved without sacrificing the agent’s utility. It is hard to get one when the agents do 
not know the preferences of each other’s.  
 
The negotiation access type is based on closed sessions. The environment can be 
dynamic when some variables can change over time depending on its requirements. The 
impact of variations in the issue-by-issue sequence and the variations in the parameters 
of the individual alternate offer processes are explored in a negotiation environment. 
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The utility functions of the negotiation agents are modeled as private in this approach 
(Abedin et al. 2012).  
 
4.3.1.2   Negotiation Process 
 
The process of the model is agenda based, goal and communication oriented. In the 
proposed goal oriented negotiation the agents act on an agreed agenda which is based on 
their goals and objectives. The communication oriented approaches maintain the 
communicative procedures involved in the negotiation.  
4.3.1.3 Theoretical base and restrictions 
 
Theoretical approach 
An Agenda Based negotiation approach is the core base of the model. The Multi-issue 
utility theory is used to compute the total utility whereas the game theoretical properties 
try to evaluate the outcome. These mathematically strong methods helps to find the 
optimal strategy between the agents based on Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium 
conditions. Pareto optimality is the property that the outcome of this model aims to 
achieve.  
 
Negotiation is a sequence of stages for seeking an agreement point for searching an 
agreement for multiple negotiation issues. One agreement point represents a point 
represents a point in the multiple dimensional space, where each dimension represents 
one negotiable issue, such as price, performance, quantity, etc. An agent has a set of 
options in the multidimensional space (Lai 2013). One agreement point will be decided 
by the agents, when the negotiation agreement is successfully made by offers and 
counter-offers.  
 
The preference of an agent is modelled and analysed as a utility function representing its 
options in terms of the negotiation issues. The utility function can have any value from 
zero to one. At the start of the negotiation, the agent’s offer corresponds to a utility that 
is close to 1 and it is expected that their opponent’s offer will correspond to a utility that 
is near to 0. As each round passes the agents’ offers will converge as they try to find a 
solution.  
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The negotiation process continues with a number of offers and counter offers. Each 
offer from the opponent should provide increased utility from the previous offer. Their 
own offers will decrease their own utility to try to accommodate the opponent’s offer. 
Increase in the utility of the opponent’s offer after each negotiation round indicates that 
the negotiation process is converging and the possibility of negotiation process resulting 
in agreement increases. If this trend does not continue and offers are received which 
decrease their own utility function, then an agent may decide to end the negotiation 
process. 
 
A negotiation example is illustrated in Fig. 4.3, with one negotiation issue 
(performance) between the agents. The utility functions for the performance issue for a 
consumer agent and supplier agent are represented by Uc and Us, respectively. Uc is a 
monotonically increasing function, and Us is a monotonically decreasing function. P
*
 is 
an agreement value for the performance issue which belongs to the overlap of the value 
ranges the agent and opponent agent have.  
 
For each issue the consumer and supplier agent have a domain where their maximum 





the maximum performance and minimum performance values for a consumer agent. 







max ) The minimum performance and maximum performance 




max respectively. The supplier will negotiate 




max, (starting from P
s
min). Fig. 
4.3 shows that the agents are able to make a deal agreement at the point P
* 
after number 
of offer-counter-offer. In this case both the consumer and supplier agent will make a 
favourable deal if both the agents submit honest negotiation opinions or preferences. If 
the supplier agent continues to submit low value offers for performance issue or if the 
consumer agent continues with offers of high performance value in the initial period 
then there are chances of no agreement or a delay on reaching the agreement point. If 
both agents do not reach an agreement before the deadline, they receive a utility of zero 
since not reaching an agreement is the worst possible outcome. 
 














Time has huge influence on negotiation. That is why restrictions such as time limit and 
constraints are applied to assist the negotiation convergence towards agreement. 
 
Constraints in the parameters of the issues 
In the proposed model, I am using constraints that help the negotiation agents to decide 
their offers. The set of constraints that define relationships among variables and restrict 
the values that the issue related variable can take. For example, an agent may only 
accept price between [500, 1000] for a product. The limits are 500 and 1000. Not less 
than 500 and no more than 1000 are acceptable. This is called a hard constraint. If an 
agent may accept to pay more than 1000 only if the performance is greater than some 
given limit then this is considered to be a soft constraint. The hard constraints filter the 
offers and soft constraints prioritise the remaining offers. A proposal from another agent 
will not be accepted unless all acceptability constraints are satisfied.  
 
Time  
Time is a very important parameter in this negotiation process. In the proposed 
approach agents will negotiate in rounds and time is completely continuous. The agents 
will offer and counter offer in each negotiation round in continuous time. The agent can 
initiate the negotiation by sending an offer to the opponent agent over a particular issue 
at a particular time round. The opponent agent receives the offer and takes a decision 
whether to accept the offer, propose a counter-offer or withdraw the offer. This offer 
Us 
Figure 4.3  Negotiation between the agents’ which shows an 


























Chapter 4 The Proposed Model 
75 
 
counter-offer takes place in a specific time round. For example, each round (t) of the 
negotiation may have a pair of offers offered by the participating agents. An agent who 
receives an offer can terminate the negotiation by either accepting the offer or by 
withdrawing from the negotiation after evaluating the offer even before the negotiation 
deadline reaches. The deadline is maximum considered time such as tmax. The agents 
usually have their expected utility range. The agents check whether the offers are in 
their expected utility range before they make decision to continue the negotiation by 
accepting the current offer or making a counter-offer. If the negotiation deadline is 
reached and the last offer is not acceptable to the agents then the negotiation will 
terminate or they can withdraw from the negotiation.  The presence of a deadline 
encourages each agent to play a strategy that ensures the best possible agreement before 
the deadline is reached. 
4.3.2  Negotiation Protocol 
The basic negotiation steps of the negotiation protocol are shown in Fig. 4.4 which is 
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Figure 4.4 Negotiation Steps 
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In the first step the agenda is fixed for the agents based on the issue importance. Once 
the agenda is decided the constraints can be specified. The utility functions are 
determined to deal with the offers and counter-offers which are evaluated by the 
requirement criteria. The detailed negotiation process is followed next. 
 
The proposed negotiation protocol is the set of various rules of managing the 
negotiation process. The negotiation protocol includes the negotiation conditions and 
the agents’ behaviour under a specific condition. It specifies the rules of encounter 
between the negotiation participants. That is, the protocol defines the circumstances 
under which the interactions between agents take place: what deals can be made and 
what sequences of offers are allowed. In general, agents must reach agreement on the 
negotiation protocol to use before negotiation proper begins. 
 
The negotiation process is carried out in the context of an agreed preference order for 
issues. An actual negotiation is between a pair of agents of opposite type. With the 
preference order over the issues determined, the allowed ranges for the issues are 
specified using constraints. Each agent has to satisfy the constraints specified by the 
protocol. This is because it is necessary to accept reservation values from the agents in 
such a way that there is always a possibility of some overlap or negotiation. The main 
concern is to avoid a case with no zone of agreement at the start of the negotiation 
process. Each agent has a reservation value for each issue which is the threshold of the 
offers to accept. There are aspects of the way in which information about the reservation 
values is managed. 
 
At each negotiation round one agent proposes an offer first to the opponent agent. The 
opponent agent has three choices: accept the offer; reject the offer or propose a counter-
offer. If one agent accepts the offer of the opponent agent, the negotiation terminates 
with an agreement. If the agent rejects the offer, the negotiation also terminates but with 
disagreement. On the other hand if the agent makes a counter-offer, the negotiation 
continues to another round. The opponent agent can now accept the proposal, reject the 
proposal or make a counter-offer. So the negotiation between agents ends when an 
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agreement is reached or a disagreement occurs and the deadline is reached or one agent 
quits the negotiation. 
 
Fig. 4.5 shows the choices the agents have in the negotiation stage using a protocol. 
This negotiation protocol is also part of step 7(Agenda based negotiation) of Fig. 


















The negotiation protocol adopts an alternating offer protocol. Negotiation between 
agents can end if an agreement is found or deadline is reached. It is assumed that the 
initiator agent makes a series of offers, ),..,2,1(1 niai   and the opponent responds with 
offers ),..,2,1(2 niai   sequentially. In general the offers can have more than one 




iniii aaaa  , etc. but these are not 
considered for the single issue case. Each of the elements satisfies the restrictions. The 

















Figure 4.5 The negotiation protocol 
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To generate a sequence of offers the following actions or rules are considered in the 
protocol: 
 
1. How the agents produce their initial offers. 
 
2. How the agents take action to the offers, i.e. how they generate counter-offers or 
reject offers, and 
 
3. How the agents construe the offers they receive. 
 
The first action is to produce the initial offers where a specific requirement has to be 
fulfilled. The second action, where the agents generate the counter-offers is based on the 
negotiation strategies which will be discussed in the next section. In the third action the 
way the offers are construed is discussed. Suppose maxt  be the deadline for the agents 
1a  
and 2a . The agent 2a  receives an offer from 1a sequentially at time round






iniii aaaa  .What consequences will follow 
after receiving the offer and how any counter-offer will be evaluated are considered in 
this rule. 
4.3.2.1    Agenda based issue-by-issue Negotiation Protocol 
 
The proposed model makes the agenda sequence significant and still retains the issue-
by-issue negotiation by making the constraints used as the starting point of the single 
issue negotiations depend on the results of the previous negotiations. This means that 
some approximate interdependence need to be calculated. Interdependence between 
issues means, an agent’s utility from an issue depend not only on the agreement that it 
reached but also on how the other issues are settled. Some initial constraint ranges for 
each of the negotiators are set first but can be varied after an issue has been negotiated. 
This means that the range of offers used in the negotiation is changed by the previous 
results but the final agreement is not fixed for these later issues. So it is necessary to 
consider the way in which a resulting value in one issue will influence the range of 
values considered for the next.  
 
Chapter 4 The Proposed Model 
79 
 















For example the price agreed is near the bottom of the range for a seller this might 
increase the lower limit of the quantity constraint range (they need to sell more to make 
it worthwhile). For the whole problem it will be necessary to provide quantitative 
mechanisms linking the position of the result relative to the initial constraints to the 
change in the constraints for the other issues. In issue-by-issue negotiation there will be 
two participants and each will have a predetermined set of characteristics consisting of 
the following: 
 
A) The list of issues i=1,2,..,n; 
B) For each issue there is a [min(i),max(i)] initial range of acceptable values; 
C) For each issues there is a relative weight (importance), w(i); 
D) For each pair of issues (i,j) there is an influence that modifies the range of 
acceptable values for issue j depending on the results for issue i.  
 
This takes the form of rules 
if issue i result is below mid value then max(j) is increased/unchanged/decreased, 







Agent 2 Agent 1 
 
Figure 4.6  Iterative process of updating the issue parameters 
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if issue i result is above mid value then max(j) is increased/unchanged/decreased, 
if issue i result is above mid value then min(j) is increased/unchanged/decreased, 
 
There is also an influence in the opposite direction.  
 
if issue j result is below mid value then max(i) is increased/unchanged/decreased, 
if issue j result is below mid value then min(i) is increased/unchanged/decreased, 
if issue j result is above mid value then max(i) is increased/unchanged/decreased, 
if issue i result is above mid value then min(i) is increased/unchanged/decreased, 
 
Given these directions of change there is a single formula to calculate the numerical 
changes in [max,min]. To find the amount by which the maxima and minima are 
changed the following standard calculation can be used. The target value is the mid 
value here. 
 
Let max(i), min(i), targeti ; max(j), min(j), targetj be the initial values and the result be 
R. 
 
If R<targeti then change factor F = (targeti - R)/( targeti - min(i)) 
if R>targeti then change factor F = (R – targeti)/(max(i) – targeti) 
if R= targeti then F = 0. 
 
The amount of increase/decrease for max(j) and/or min(j) values is F*( max(j)  - 
min(j)). 
 
It should be noted that there are combinations of the above rules that will give new 
max(j) < new min(j)  so that the interval of allowed values for issue j is removed and the 
sequence of negotiations comes to an end with no agreement. 
 
E) A value on the concession/hard-line axis that determines the response to offers in a 
time series of offer/counter-offer exchanges; 
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To evaluate the effect of negotiations between two agents, each with values for the 
above set of parameters, a series of alternate offer negotiations is simulated. The above 
parameters are sufficient to determine a utility for each bid and for the outcome of each 
negotiation stage.  
 
Example for interdependencies between three issues: 
 
For three issues (X, Y, Z) there will be six such linking calculations. This will then 
cover all sequences in the agenda and allow a comparison along the lines already 
devised. Each agent will have the maximum and minimum ranges for each issue. For 
example for agent 1a  and agent 2a  the ranges will be, 1a  ranges: X[ax , bx], Y[ay, by], 
Z[az , bz]; 
2a  ranges: X[dx , ex], Y[dy , ey], Z[dz , ez]; The midpoint of each range for each 
agent is assumed as the target value for above. The interdependency factors will be 
considered in the negotiation by deriving linking relations between the relatively 
dependent issues based on the agents’ consensus decisions. So the six linking relations 
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level Y maximum / minimum decrease / increase   target below                            
level Y maximum / minimum decrease / increase   target above :a agent              
level Y maximum / minimum decrease / increase   target below                            
level Y maximum / minimum decrease / increase  target above :a agent    YZ
level X maximum / minimum decrease / increase   target below                            
level X maximum / minimum decrease / increase   target above :a agent              
level X maximum / minimum decrease / increase   target below                            
level X maximum / minimum decrease / increase  target above :a agent    XZ
level  Zmaximum / minimum decrease / increase   target below                            
level  Zmaximum / minimum decrease / increase   target above :a agent              
level  Zmaximum / minimum decrease / increase   target below                            
level  Zmaximum / minimum decrease / increase  target above :a agent    ZY
level X maximum / minimum decrease / increase   target below                            
level X maximum / minimum decrease / increase   target above :a agent              
level X maximum / minimum decrease / increase   target below                            
level X maximum / minimum decrease / increase  target above :a agent    XY
level  Zmaximum / minimum decrease / increase   target below                            
level  Zmaximum / minimum decrease / increase   target above :a agent              
level  Zmaximum / minimum decrease / increase   target below                            
level  Zmaximum / minimum decrease / increase  target above :a agent   ZX
level Y maximum / minimum decrease / increase   target below                            
level Y maximum / minimum decrease / increase   target above :a agent              
level Y maximum / minimum decrease / increase   target below                             







































All the increases and decreases are proportional to the amount by which the agent 
misses their target. The calculations of the outcomes for all six agenda sequences can be 
calculated and the issue values can be used to determine the issue offers. 
4.3.3  Negotiation Strategy 
The proposed negotiation strategy is the specification of the sequence of actions 
(usually offers or responses) the agent plans to make during the negotiation. There will 
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usually be several strategies that are compatible with a particular protocol, each of 
which may produce a very different outcome. Fig. 4.7 shows that after receiving offers 
from the agents the offers are sent to the negotiation strategy process. This process is 
part of step 7(Agenda based negotiation) of Fig. 4.1(The proposed model). 
 
Then the offers are sent to the evaluation block. This does the analysis of the offer and 
calculates the degree of satisfaction of the offer; finally the decision process makes the 

















The main goal of the proposed agenda based negotiation is to move towards possible 
agreements within the common area of interest in order to find the most satisfactory 
agreement for the group of agents. A participating agent must have a proper negotiation 
strategy selection method, which is based on the information available to it, in order to 
achieve its goal. The consequence of a negotiation depends on several factors such as: 
strategies used by the agents; the parameters of the strategy (for example the maximum 
number of rounds the agent will negotiate); the preferences of the agent, etc. The 
selection of the strategy and the parameters depend on the agent’s goal or need (Patel 
and Gupta 2006).  
 
In the past game theory was mainly used in the negotiation process. It treats negotiation 
as a game and the negotiation agents are treated as players of the game. Game theory 
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has two main drawbacks which make it unsuitable for use in the negotiation process. 
First is that it assumes the agent has infinite computational power and secondly it 
assumes all the agents have common knowledge. These limitations of the game theory 
were overcome by the decision functions. The decision functions produce offers based 
on the amount of time remaining, resource remaining or the opponent’s behaviour.  
 
Most common strategies used by the agents are: time dependent; behaviour dependent, 
and, resource dependent strategies (Faratin et al. 1998). The aim of the agent is to 
identify a zone of agreement in a given time limit. Resource and behaviour influence in 
the negotiation outcome are not considered in the proposed strategy as the negotiation is 
essentially time dependent.  
 
A time dependent strategy is used by the agents to decide the amount of concession with 
respect to negotiation deadline. The closer the deadline approaches, the faster an agent 
compromises. By using a parameterised function as the basis of the time varying 
behaviour of an agent it is possible to examine the way in which different tactics 
influence negotiation outcomes. The agents can adopt Boulware, Conceder or linear 
concession tactic to decide how much they want to compromise over time. In the 
Boulware tactics, the agent maintains the offered value most of the time and concedes 
up to the reservation value when approaching the deadline (Faratin et al. 1998). The 
Conceder tactics are the opposite of the Boulware tactics. In this tactic agents concede 
much in the beginning and quickly approach the reservation value to satisfy its 
opponent. On the other hand, an agent with linear concession tactic reduces its offer 
value in an equally spaced manner. For each type of tactic there is corresponding 
negotiation decision function that is used to calculate the value of the next offer (Faratin 
et al. 1998). 
 
In an issue-by-issue situation the decision functions can be considered separately for 
each issue. The negotiation decision function defines the negotiation strategy of the 
agents. The main aim of these strategies is to make the most of the utility under various 
constraints they face. In my negotiation model time is the most important factor, so the 
negotiation decision function modified from (Faratin et al. 1998) is defined as follow: 








 - k-ktF aaa                                 (4.1) 
 
where )(tFa is a function showing the dependence on t, ak is a constant for the agent a 
which determines the value of the issues i  to be offered as the first offer. There will be 
distinct functions for each agent but maxt  is the deadline for both agents. The deadline 
puts the agents under pressure. The agents may have different time preference. Agents 
with different time preference may have different concession rate. The agent’s value for 
a
k is used as the start-up value of the offer and it ranges from [0, 1]. If 
a
k is zero then 
the first offer is the minimum value for that issue. β determines the time dependent 
tactic type and is a concession factor. Depending on the value of β the tactics are 
defined: Conceder (β >1), Boulware (β <1) and Linear (β =1). The speed of the 
concession depends on this parameter. When β =1, it is equality concession strategy, 
which make the same concession range every time. With the Conceder tactic, agents 
make larger concessions in the early rounds and smaller at the later rounds. If the agents 
want to make smaller concessions in the initial rounds and larger concessions in the 
later rounds they can choose the Boulware tactic.  
 
Negotiation strategy are varied by the values of β and
a
k . In is Faratin’s work (2000), 
a
k is an arbitrary value. In this work, the 
a
k is adapted systematically according to the 
sequential issues expected utility. The 
a
k value has been extended as a reference point 
for further exploration. This could also significantly reduce the search space and refine 



















Comparisons between the time dependent tactics are in Table 4.2 depending on their 
concession speed. 
 





Linear Concession uniform in  
remaining time 
Concession is linear in the 
remaining time until the deadline. 
Boulware Slow concession 
(Conservative) 
Initial offer is maintained until 
just before the deadline. 
Conceder Fast concession 
(Aggressive) 
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The agents can use different concession tactics and the expected time limit of the 
negotiation. Provided by the negotiating agent, the concession factor can be used to 
model the eagerness of the agent. The time when the agents want to reach to an 
agreement zone quickly the conceder tactic might be the right choice. 
 
The offer proposed by an agent 1a  to the opponent agent 2a and vice versa can be 
determined by using the following functions: 
 
     )P-(t)(PFPP 11121 aminamaxaamint a a →                (4.2) 
 








minP  and 
2a
maxP are the range of the issues, 
1a  is the one agent and 2a  is 
the opponent agent. Once the agent 2a  receives the offer, the agent evaluates it, makes 
a counter-offer, and replies with a degree of satisfaction with respect to the offer to the 
agent 
1a  and the vice versa happens when 2a  receives the offer .  
 
The degree of satisfaction function provides essential information for the evaluation of 
the result of the offers and counter-offers. A function which adopts a weighting 
technique to indicate the attitude used by the agent in evaluation solutions is used in my 
negotiation strategy. The utility is the total utility accruing to the two agents taking part. 
For example if the negotiated value for issue i is v(i) the raw utility for issue i is U(i) = 
(v(i) - min(i))/(max(i) - min(i)) where the max(i) and min(i) are the initial values for the 
issue, the total utility for an agent is the sum over i=1,2,..,n of w(i)*U(i). Adding 
together the two agent's results gives a utility value for the negotiation. The effort can 
be calculated by counting the number of offer/counter-offer steps that are taken over the 
set of issues in all stages of the issue-by-issue negotiation. The degree of satisfaction of 
both agents is derived from the following two linear functions.  
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The degree of satisfaction is computed as: 
 
       (4.4) 
 





2 →        (4.5) 
 









P ,PP   
 
The overall outcome of the negotiation is defined as an (utility, effort) pair. Since the 
issues are not independent the results of negotiations will depend on the order of issues 
in the sequence of negotiations. The (total utility, total effort) pair for a choice of 
sequence will provide an evaluation of the chosen sequence. The variation in values 
demonstrates the importance of the choice of issue sequence.  
 
The total utility of a set of issues can be calculated as a weighted sum of the values of 
each issue. The total multi-issue utility function is formulated as:  
 
    aa or a a offerUwUtility Total 1221i
n
i
i →→∑                   (4.6) 
Here i  are the issues, iw  are the importance weights for the issues where 1∑ 
n
i
iw .  
The importance weights for the issues are derived in the preference ordering phase. The 
importance weights over the negotiation issues help the agents to generate better quality 
offers. iU  is the degree of satisfaction value for each issue.  
4.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, an overview of the proposed agenda based model has been provided. 
The model is composed of a pre-negotiation protocol, which includes preference 
ordering and agenda based negotiation process. The preference ordering process gives 
the decision-makers flexibility to express their opinions on the issues in different 
preference formats. The different preference formats are then transformed into a unique 
           P-PP-P=aa  offerU 11121 aminamaxamint a a21i →→
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format which is fuzzy preference relation. Fuzzy concepts are used to aggregate the 
individual preferences into a group preference ordering relation. Then finally, to 
determine the global ranking of the issues, two fuzzy quantifier guided selection 
processes: dominance degree and non-dominance degree are applied. An iterative 
consensus process is built to improve the group consensus degree. This preference 
ordering of the issues helps to build up an agenda based negotiation process, which 
leads the agents towards an agreement in a reasonable time with an agenda sequence. So 
the proposed agenda negotiation process is defined by the negotiation space, which 
typically includes the proposed negotiation protocol (the set of the interaction rules 
between the agents), negotiation objectives (the range of issues to negotiate on), the 
agreed issue sequence and negotiation strategies (which are the sequences of actions 
that the agents plan to take in order to achieve their objectives).The agents must reach 
an agreement about the negotiation protocol before the negotiation begins and the 
strategy of the agents might change according to the negotiation protocol. 
 
Effective and efficient multi-issue negotiation requires an agent to have some indication 
of its opponent’s issue preferences. In order to negotiate successfully in a multi-issue 
negotiation environment, agents need to consider each other’s agents preferences over 
issues and generate offers accordingly. Agents may learn about each other’s preferences 
over time and through interactions. As agents learn about each other’s preferences, they 
can provide better-targeted offers and thus enable faster negotiation (Aydoğan and 
Yolum 2009). The proposed agenda model addresses these crucial matters. The model 
specifies in which issue sequence the issues will be discussed between the two agents as 
well as the manner in which issue values will be processed. The proposed negotiation 
strategy guides the agents toward a win-win goal. The performance of the model can be 
evaluated by using the following performance measures: negotiation speed, 
effectiveness, efficiency and simplicity. The negotiation speed is a function which 
represents the number of negotiation rounds required for an agreement.  




Empirical Evaluation of the Model 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to analyse the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed approach, a case 
study with various scenarios is adopted for use in evaluation. The main difference 
between the scenarios is the variation in the dependency of the issues and the changes in 
the parameters.  
 
The problems that need to be investigated through a case study are: the contribution of 
the pre-negotiation phase, the significance of order of issues in negotiation process and 
the necessity of an agenda based negotiation approach in e-commerce. In a multi-issue 
group decision-making problem in e-commerce, multiple decision-makers are involved 
in making a decision. The information from multiple decision-makers can be in 
different formats because they would have different culture and backgrounds, and 
different value systems. Different opinions among the agents can occur during the 
actual negotiation which delays the negotiation timeline. Preference ordering in agenda 
based negotiation can be a technique to minimise the negotiation delay time and the 
search space. In the pre-negotiation phase the decision-making agents can choose their 
preferred formats to express their opinions. Different preference formats are uniformed 
in this process. Each participant agent in the group may have specific preferences and 
priorities as regards the negotiation agenda that conflict with others. They should firstly 
agree on a negotiation agenda and can negotiate the issues of concern sequentially or 
simultaneously. The preference ordering can be used in a pre-negotiation stage to 
overcome these problems.  
 
In the case study, two negotiating agents, representing respectively a consumer and 
supplier, need to negotiate in order to reach a consensus over a number of issues related 
to a product. Each agent and issue plays a specific role in the evaluation of an offer. 
Both consumer and supplier agents participate in a group decision-making process, 
where the consumer agent collectively represents a group of decision-making agents. In 
the pre-negotiation situation, the decision-making agents have different preferences, but 
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are cooperative and need to reach consensus. Each agent is concerned with maximising 
the social welfare of the entire process, even if this does not necessarily maximise its 
own utility. 
 
Later in the actual multi-issue negotiation process, agents have opposed interests, but 
are cooperative and need to reach a compromise agreement. They can reach win-win 
agreement on issues of preference by using the common preference ordering sequence 
derived in the group decision-making process. Both agents want to benefit from the 
agreement by maximising their individual profits or utilities, but they must also try to 
maximise the total social welfare which is the total utility across the agents and also the 
consequence of the mode of agreement. In aiming to maximise their individual utilities, 
the system facilitate them to reach a desirable agreement only when the total utility is 
maximised. 
 
The proposed automated negotiation process could be adapted in many ways. Selecting 
parameters for the process needs to be carried out on the basis of evidence from 
experiments on situations comparable to the complexity of the real world applications 
and current market analysis. The case study scenarios provide such situations and a 
basis for establishing useful settings for the parameters of the proposed process. This 
chapter describes the case study and provides the results after the proposed negotiation 
process is applied with different parameter settings. The results show that the 
negotiation process provides agreement points and gives an acceptable outcome. The 
discussions are supported by the results of a number of sets of experiments. As 
described in previous chapters before the exchange of offers a pre-negotiation process 
takes place. The outcome of the fuzzy group decision-making approach which is an 
integral pre-negotiation part of the overall negotiation process is also illustrated for the 
case study scenario. This employs the preference ordering and uses the consensus 
reaching concepts before making it available in the main negotiation process. Not all 
possible combinations of parameters for the offer exchange phase have been explored 
but those that appear to be the most significant have been investigated.  
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Brief descriptions of the background of the case study are given in section 5.2. The next 
section describes the negotiation process and shows the results of the agreement. The 
scenario involves more complex situations with dependent issues. The aim of the 
experiments is to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed negotiation 
approach within different scenarios and different parameter settings. 
 
5.2 Case Study 
5.2.1 The Consumer’s Background 
Coventry University Computing Services Department (CSV) provides centralised 
computing facilities to all staff and students. The Department aims to provide and 
support a range of information delivery; computing and telecommunications based 
services which will further the aims and objectives of the University and in particular 
enhance the educational environment for students and assist staff at all levels in 
fulfilling their roles and responsibilities.  CSV manages a range of software purchased 
on behalf of the University. They have the responsibilities for providing advice on 
hardware and software maintenance agreements and support facility arrangements. This 
includes the management of services and negotiations with external suppliers. The unit 
also acts in an advisory capacity on the installation and upgrading services of hardware 
and software. 
 
The CSV service is divided into seven distinct sections, each with their own areas of 
responsibility. The sections are: applications service, customer service, infrastructure 
service, local IT developments service, operations service, procurement and admin 
service, publicity and information service. The Applications Section within CSV is 
responsible for the implementation and support of software applications that are used 
across the University. This covers systems in use by staff or students. Most staffs are 
Analyst Programmers, but the section also includes Technical Specialists, Project 
Managers and Development Officers. The latter are responsible for testing, training and 
liaising with users. The majority of staff time goes on new systems. The remainder of 
the time goes on supporting existing applications. The Applications Section provides 
many important services and assistance to both CSV staff and University Schools in 
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purchasing software or service. One of the main tasks is the negotiation with suppliers 
to ensure good deals, get services or software on reasonable price, and meet the 
specified requirements. They negotiated with popular hardware and software suppliers 
to get great educational pricing.  
 
So the case study is about how The Applications Section Service of Computing Services 
department of Coventry University will offer to negotiate and communicate with the 
software suppliers on behalf of academic unit and deal with issues of purchasing 
software for the use of students and staffs.  When purchasing licensed software, the 
software can be either for institutional or personal/individual use. Individual purchase is 
not considered in this case.  
 
In this software purchasing problem, the Analyst Programmers, Technical Specialists, 
Project Managers and Development Officers are the key decision-makers to express 
their preferences over the issues related to the software services. They represent the 
consumer agent collectively. A range of products from software houses such as Adobe, 
Microsoft, SPSS are purchased after going through the deals. The issues related to the 
software services are basically: price, performance, quantity (number of copies), 
reliability, adaptability, compatibility, modifiability, availability, usability, operability, 
risk to break down, setup cost and time. Each decision-maker has his own ideas, 
attitudes, motivations and personality; it is quite natural to think that different decision-
maker could express their preferences in a different way. So there is a necessity to build 
a flexible framework where the agents have freedom to represent their preferences in 
different formats. These different formats need to be uniformed and a consensus process 
needs to be introduced to measure the degree of consensus. 
 
The participants in the negotiation have their own preferences over the negotiated 
issues, and these preferences can be formulated in its most extensive form as a multi-
issue decision-making problem. To improve the decision-making environment, the 
preference feedback is collected from the staff of the Applications Section Service 
department and from the supplier they selected.  
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In multi-issue negotiation, the issues may or may not be correlated. The software 
purchase case study has interdependency between the issues. As the proposed model is 
an issue-by-issue approach, handling the issue dependency is a challenging task. 
 
The preference of two agents may vary, i.e., one agent may prefer one issue over other 
while the other agent may prefer the opposite. Agents with different preferences need to 
cooperate with each other to reach agreement that is beneficial for both the agents. They 
may negotiate on the most important issues or least important issues related to the 
software service that they want to negotiate in the purchasing process. The agenda about 
the issues needs to be determined which will be used to negotiate with the supplier 
during the time of purchasing software.  
5.2.2 The Supplier’s Background 
Coventry University has decided to purchase a large proportion of software produced by 
Microsoft who is a global supplier of educational software. In terms of revenues coming 
from software sales, the software purchase industry is clearly dominated by Microsoft, 
since inception. Microsoft software products are sold in largest number across the globe. 
Microsoft is also wants to sell Microsoft software products to University CSV 
department. The agreement is administered on the University's behalf by CSV. 
Microsoft provides a wide range of educational and retail software products which are 
available at reasonable prices to students and staffs. 
5.2.3 Scenarios in the Negotiation 
There might be different scenarios where the negotiating group of agents might 
negotiate with each other. One possibility is the consumers and supplier agents form a 
group together and express their preferences and come to a consensus. Later the 
interested pair of agents can start negotiating. Another possibility is the consumers’ 
agent which consists of several coordinating agent consumers, derives their common 
preference agenda using the group decision-making process and then negotiates with the 
opponent supplier agent about the issue sequence and values. In this case supplier agent 
does not take part in the group preference order process. My case assumed the first 
scenario where both agents participate in group decision-making process and then one 
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agent (consumer or supplier) that represents his/her group members with a collective 
utility function wants to negotiate a deal with the opponent agent, in order to find the 
best possible deal. 
For this particular case study the following issues are considered to negotiate with the 
supplier.  
 Unit Price: The University wants to purchase software at the lowest possible unit 
price, irrespective of how many copies of the software they require. On the other 
hand the supplier wants to sell the service at a higher price. 
 Performance: Here performance means how fast the software or service 
responds to the user’s request.  
 Quantity: This issue is important for both consumer and supplier in this case, as 
quantity will affect the price and agreement. 
 Maintenance: If there is any bugs or any problems with the software how the 
developers or suppliers will deal with it.  
The following aspects are considered in the software purchasing process.  
Description of Service 
The main purpose is to purchase of software for university use and to negotiation the 
associated issues.  
Groups for Services 
The staffs of the Applications Section Service of Computing Services department of 
Coventry University and the supplier are the groups.  
Dependencies 
Negotiation issues can be divided into two groups: independent issues and dependent 
issues. The dependencies between the issues need to be identified based on the 
correlation between the issues and the negotiated groups’ requirements. Based on that, 
the strongly related issues can be bundled together in negotiations. 




Purchase the software from a preferred supplier with a preferable deal from the 
consumer point of view. Selling the software within an acceptable price along with 
other issues and build a long term business relation is the main output from the 
supplier’s side. 
Disagreement Response 
The aim is to reach to an agreement which is acceptable to all parties. Where a service 
deal fails to meet purchasing agreements they may be renegotiated or terminated and 
alternative recommendations may be given. 
5.3 The Proposed Approach in the Case Study 
 
To accept an offer from a software supplier, the Applications Section of Computing 
Services Department has to consider several issues to match user’s (staffs and students) 
requirements such as: price; performance; quantity; and; maintenance. Since several 
parties are involved in this multi-issue related software purchase process, according to 
my approach it needs to be decided in which order the issues will be negotiated. 
Therefore, each section of staff (Analyst Programmers, Technical Specialists, Project 
Managers and Development Officers) has their own preferences in connection with its 
service constraints and the above issues. The supplier also has its own preferences 
connected to the issues. In fact, each section is referred to as a decision-maker on 
several of the decision criteria. Each decision-maker may have diverse opinion 
regarding the issues. To model this type of preferences and decision, I have used an 
extended multi-issue decision-making method. This method enables the decision-
makers to consider this multi-issue problem at a decision level by evaluating the issues 
and reaching a consensus over the preference ordering of the issues.   
 
Negotiation is the process by which a group facing conflict communicates with one 
another to try and come to a mutually acceptable agreement or decision and so, the 
university and the supplier have to negotiate. The conflict I have to resolve is to find an 
acceptable solution for all the parties and in particular for the university by using a 
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particular protocol. In this context a multi-issue negotiation protocol is the best suitable 
for this type of problem. This type of protocol enables the Applications Section of CSV 
and the supplier to negotiate together. Since the negotiation is on a set of issues related 
to the software, the negotiation also has to deal with multiple issues. Moreover, all 
parties have the same objective which is to make a deal as efficiently as possible and in 
the best conditions. This implies the use of a negotiation protocol which encourages 
them to cooperate. Taking into account these aspects, an automated multi-issue 
negotiation in a multi-agent approach can be a useful method in the case of this 
decision-making process. The Applications Section of CSV is the consumer agent and 
the software supplier is the supplier agent in this particular scenario. Therefore, the 
proposed multi-issue negotiation approach consists:  
 
 A fuzzy group decision-making process where the preferences of the agents 
 regarding the issues are modelled.  
 
 An agenda based multi-issue negotiation process between two protagonists after 
the multi-agent fuzzy process has been carried out.  
 
The proposed automated negotiation approach will be used to negotiate the best value 
for the selected issues and reasonable pricing for both consumer and supplier. In the 
negotiation process the dependencies between the issues are also considered.  
5.3.1 Negotiation Experiment  
In this section a scenario, based on the case study described in section 5.2, is used to 
illustrate the proposed negotiation model shown in Fig. 4.1. The illustration of the 
overall proposed model is provided in two phases. First, the proposed fuzzy group 
decision-making approach for deriving the agents’ common preference ordering of the 
issues related to software product is shown (step 1 to step 6 of Fig. 4.1). Based on the 
preference ordering sequence, the proposed agenda based negotiation process is shown 
in the second phase (step 7 of Fig. 4.1). It should be pointed out that there is more than 
one scenario in which the preference ordering can be used as a preliminary to a 
negotiation. The following case illustrates one of these scenarios. 
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 5.3.1.1 Fuzzy Group Decision-Making Approach  
A negotiation situation is considered where a group of decision-makers who represent 
the consumer agent negotiate over the issues for software product with Microsoft, the 
supplier agent. The decision-making process takes into account the preferences of the 
decision-makers over the multiple issues related to the software product in order to 
evaluate and negotiate.  
 
As mentioned earlier the negotiation protocol is based on agenda based procedure so the 
first aim is to first resolve the conflicting opinions or preferences over the issues and 
generate a common preference sequence.  
Step 1: Opinion Collection from Multiple Agents in Multiple Issues: 
Individual Priority Order in Different Formats 
The Analyst Programmers, Technical Specialists, Project Managers, Development 
Officers of the CSV department and the software supplier Microsoft form a group of 
decision-making agents, D
k
, i = 1, 2.., 5. They are asked to express their preferences or 
opinions on the software issues: quantity (I1), performance (I2), maintenance (I3) and 
price (I4). The supplier offers the consumer group the various preference formats to 
express their opinions. The decision-makers can then use any one of the preference 




 give his/her opinion in preference ordering format: an ordered vector is used by D
1
 
to express her/her preference on issues. These issues are ranked from the most important 
to the least important. In this scenario the issue I2 is the highest rank for D
1
, while issue 




 provides an opinion in terms of a utility vector: a utility value between [0, 1] is 








 use linguistic terms: A set of fuzzy linguistic terms are used by the decision- 
makers which are provided by the supplier. So the decision-maker is asked to select 
their priority from terms “very high”, “high”, “medium”, “low”, or “very low”. Such 
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linguistic values can be represented using fuzzy triangular numbers. The support of the 
fuzzy numbers is a priority from zero to one. The following representations of the 
linguistic terms are used: “very high” (0.8, 1, 1), “high” (0.6, 0.75, 0.9), “medium” (0.3, 




, the supplier agent express his/her preference by a binary fuzzy relation which 
denotes the preference degree of one issue over other. 
 




















: P5 =  0.5 0.6 0.8 0.5 
  0.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 
  0.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 
  0.5 0.7 0.9 0.5 
 
Step 2: Normalisation of Individual Preferences using Fuzzy Concepts: 
Transformation into a Common Preference Format 
In order to aggregate individual preferences to group decision, different preference 
formats are standardized into a common format. Here a fuzzy preference relation is 
selected by the supplier as the common format. Using various transformation functions 
such as equation (3.1), (3.2), (3.4), the preference ordering, utility vector and linguistic 
vector are uniformed into fuzzy preference relation, so I have the following matrixes: 
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P1 =       0.5   0.16    0.33  0.66  
  0.83   0.5  0.66  1   
  0.66   0.33    0.5  0.83  
  0.66    1  0.83  0.5 
 
P2 =  0.5 0.15 0.1 0.2  
  0.84 0.5 0.37 0.57  
  0.9 0.62 0.5 0.69  
  0.8 0.42 0.30 0.5 
 
P3 =  0 0.8 0.94 0.5  
  0.2 0 0.8 0.2   
  0.05 0.2 0 0.05  
  0.5 0.8 0.94 0 
 
P4 =  0 0.2 0.8 0.30  
  0.8 0 0.94 0.64    
  0.2 0.05 0 0.1  
  0.69 0.36 0.9 0 
Step 3: Group Preference Order: 
Collective Preference Relation 
In the aggregation phase a collective preference relation Pd = (pdij) is obtained by means 
of the aggregation of all individual fuzzy preference relations {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5}, which 
specifies the overall preference between every ordered pair of issues. Here pdij [0, 1] 
is the individual value in the matrix, represents the degree to which one issue has over 
another issue. Fuzzy linguistic quantifier that represents the concept of fuzzy majority 
and OWA operator is used to aggregate the decision-makers’ individual opinions. Fuzzy 
majority can be expressed by a fuzzy linguistic quantifier, such as “most”, “at least 
half”, “as many as possible” with the pairs or parameters (0.3, 0.8), (0, 0.5) and (0.5, 1) 
respectively. The corresponding weight vector is calculated from these quantifiers. In 
this scenario the “most” fuzzy quantifier and the corresponding OWA operator with the 
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weighting vector, W = [0, 0.067, 0.33, 0.33, 0.27, 0] is used to obtain the collective 
fuzzy preference relation: 
  pdij 
Pd =  0.5 0.35 0.67 0.39 
  0.54 0.5 0.65 0.38 
  0.22 0.30 0.5 0.12 
  0.56 0.52 0.71 0.5 
 
Equation (3.5), (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8) are used to obtain the group preference matrix. 
Step 4: Determine the choice of sequence of issues by a hybrid Preference 
Ordering Method based on FOWA Operator and Fuzzy Quantifiers: 
Rank the issues using Fuzzy Concept 
The next step is the selection process. In this phase the group preference about the 
issues is transformed into a global ranking. The fuzzy group decision-making approach 
uses two fuzzy quantifier-guided choice strategies to select the issues, based on the 
concept of fuzzy majority and OWA operator. The QGDD and QGNDD are calculated 
for the issues from the collective preference matrix Pd and the weighting vector W = 
[0.067 0.67 0.27], which is generated from the corresponding OWA operator by using 
equation (3.9) and (3.10). The “most” criteria has been chosen here. It may be the best 
choice here. Table 5.1 shows the QGDD and QGNDD of the issues acting over the 
collective fuzzy preference relation supplies the following values: 
 
Table 5.1 


















0.83 0.96 0.51 1 




Here QGDD may be interpreted as the degree to which an issue dominates “most” 
issues when compared against “most” criteria. On the other hand, QGNDD may be 
interpreted as the degree to which an issue is not dominated by “most” issues when 
computed against “most” criteria. QGDD and QGNDD give the preference orders 
respectively: 
 
Price ( I4 ) > Performance( I2 ) > Quantity( I1 ) > Maintenance ( I3 ) 
 
Price ( I4 ) > Performance( I2 ) > Quantity( I1 ) > Maintenance ( I3 ) 
 
When the information is consistent I got the same ordered vector of issues using QGDD 
and QNGDD, which are independent of the linguistic quantifier used. In this example 
both results came out same. On the other hand, when the information is not consistent 
then both can give a different ordered vector of issues. In that situation it depends on the 
consumer’s attitude which sequence is chosen. The QGDD reflects the positive attitude 
of the consumers where reward is given to as many as possible opinions. On the other 
hand QNGDD process is applied if the supplier decides to offend as few people as 
possible. That means fewer people may disagree with it. The supplier has included 
his/her own preference or opinion on the issues which allow the supplier to participate 
in the group consensus. The supplier collects the opinions and then decides the agenda 
which would be offered to the consumers based on the calculations he/she has done. So 
the following collective preference ordering is derived:  
 
Price ( I4 ) > Performance( I2 ) > Quantity( I1 ) > Maintenance ( I3 ) 
 
Step 5: Group Consensus Measurement: 
A hard consensus approach has been applied to measure the consensus level. Distance 
between individual ranking and group ranking is required to measure the consensus. So 
the individual rankings are calculated using the same process as the group ranking. The 
individual orders of the issues are as follows: 






 = {I4, I2, I3, I1} 
 D
2
 = {I4, I1, I2, I3} 
 D
3
 = {I3, I2, I4, I1} 
 D
4
 = {I1, I4, I2, I3} 
 D
5
 = {I2, I4, I1, I3} 
 
The difference between the rankings of the issues in the temporary group consensus 
solution and the individual solutions are calculated using the distance measurement 
function. The consensus degree on issues shown in Table 5.2 is calculated by equation 
(3.11) and (3.12) using the distance values and the dissimilarity function with different 
values of a parameter b (here 1 and 0.5 is used), which is in the range of [1, 0].  
 
Table 5.2 
The aggregated consensus degree of the group on each issue 
 
 I1 I2 I3 I4 
b = 1 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.83 
b = 0.5 0.57 0.61 0.74 0.77 
 
The parameter b controls the rigor of the consensus process, in such a way that values 
close to 1 decrease the rigor and the number of rounds to improve the consensus level.  
The appropriate values are from 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 and 1. These consensus degrees are used to 
calculate the consensus measure over the issues along with the aggregation operator 
OWA. Here γ Є [0, 1] is a parameter which controls the behaviour of the aggregation 
operator and has to be fixed before applying in the operator. Here γ has been fixed to be 
0.8. The total consensus measure is calculated by using equation (3.13) is shown in 
Table 5.3: 
Table 5.3 
The temporary consensus measure 
 Consensus  Measure 
For γ = 0.8 and b = 1 0.87 
For γ = 0.8 and b = 0.5 0.72 




If the required level of consensus is selected 0.75 then using the dissimilarity function, 
with b = 1 value and γ = 0.8 value, the consensus process should stop in a satisfactory 
level because the total consensus level is above 0.75 in this case. So the temporary 
consensus solution will be selected as the final solution. But considering the other case 
where b = 0.5, the process should continue. Because the total consensus level 0.72 has 
not reached the required level yet.  
Step 6: Consensus Improvement Process: 
A consensus improvement process with a simple feedback mechanism has been used to 
improve the consensus level. The decision-makers are ranked according to the 
proximity of their individual solutions to the temporary consensus solution. Equation 
(3.14) is used for improvement process. The ranking is calculated by using the same 
consensus degree and measurement methods used before. For γ = 0.8 and b = 1, 0.5 the 




Proximity values and the ranking of decision-makers 
 γ = 0.8, b = 1 γ = 0.8, b =.5 Rank Rank 
D
1 0.68 0.45 3 3 
D
2 0.70 0.48 2 2 
D
3 0.62 0.39 4 4 
D
4 0.42 0.28 5 5 
D
5 0.95 0.91 1 1 
 
These proximity values show the closeness to the consensus solution. So the higher the 
value is, the nearer the member of the group is from the consensus solution. Based on 










}.The first person to 
get feedback to consider his opinion will be the person with lower ranking, whose 
individual solution is furthest from the temporary consensus solution. A threshold value 
has been decided to measure how many agents will get feedback to consider their 
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opinions regarding the issues. In this process if the proximity value is less than 0.4 Є [0, 
1] then the agents are given feedback to consider their preferences associated to the 




 have values less 
than the threshold value. So they are given feedback to consider their opinions. The new 




  are collected and the consensus process is 
applied again as an iterative process. After repeating all the consensus steps, the new 
consensus measure is calculated as Table 5.5: 
 
Table 5.5 
Updated consensus measure 
 Updated Consensus  Measure 
 
 
For γ = 0.8 and b = 1 0.89 
For γ = 0.8 and b = 0.5 0.78 
 
The result shows that the consensus level is 0.89 and 0.78 respectively. So the 
consensus level has reached the required level and is quite high, so there is no need for 
another stage. A satisfactory consensus solution has been achieved from this convergent 
process. This solution is the basis for agenda based negotiations, by involving the issue 
weights of the agents’ preferences. The numerical result shows the aspects of the 
proposed fuzzy decision-making approach towards multi-issue negotiation process. 
 
5.3.1.2 Step 7: Agenda based Negotiation Approach  
 
Automated agenda based negotiation can use the result of the above preference ordering 
process in order to provide an efficient negotiation. Both the supplier and the consumers 
may have different interests and deals. It is a very difficult and time consuming task to 
find a preferred deal. So a model which helps to search for their prospective deals much 
more quickly can be beneficial for both of them. The following scenario will show how 
an automated negotiation process can accommodate and benefit from agenda sequence.  
 
The supplier initialises an agent in his/her system. This agent is provided with 
information of the supplier’s preferences. The issues and attributes related to the 
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software products are provided to the agents. The consumer agent is provided with 
information about the consumers’ preferences about the multiple issues related to the 
software offered. The negotiation process starts between the pair of the supplier agent 
and the consumer agent when either of them offers a negotiation service. Multiple issues 
are involved in purchasing software not just the price. The issues related to software are 
numerous like price, performance, quantity and maintenance. It would not be practical 
to start negotiating on each and every issue. The agents will have differing opinions on 
which issues to select and in which order. To decide and to obtain a consensus process 
related to the selected issues are the main concerns of this research. Dealing with a 
product like software, both the agents wants to find the best deal regarding their own 
interest. A multi-issue negotiation process operates until a deal has been found or one of 
the parties leaves. If a deal is found satisfying both of the parties, the supplier agent and 
the consumer agent recommend the possible outcomes to their respective users. If the 
deal is suitable the consumer agent can initiate purchase of the software or can negotiate 
further. Both parties can be benefited by this approach since the consumer can save time 
and find their preferred deal and the suppliers may attract more consumers who have 
high probability of buying the software rather those who come to visit only. This 
research is to build a negotiation model which deals with multiple issues related to 
software acquisition. The way these issues are negotiated and how the agents come to a 
possible deal using a proposed agenda negotiation approach are presented with a 
numeric example. 
 
The proposed protocol modelled by using the consumer-supplier scenario described 
above. Each agent has to satisfy the constraints specified by the protocol depending on 
their consensus decisions. This is because to accept reservation values from the agents 
in such a way so that there is always a possibility of some overlap or negotiation and 
also handling the interdependency between the issues if any dependency exists. The 
main concern is to avoid a case with no zone of agreement at the start of the negotiation 
process. Each agent has a reservation value for each issue which is the threshold of the 
offers to accept. For instance, the supplier’s reservation price is the minimum price that 
can be accepted by the supplier. In the other hand the consumer’s reservation price is 
the highest price that can be proposed by the consumer. So when the supplier’s 
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reservation price is lower than the consumer’s reservation price, there is a possible 
negotiation region, which is the zone of agreement area in Fig. 5.1. If the reservation 
price of the consumer is lower than the one of the supplier, than there is no zone of 



















In my negotiation model suppose the agents ca  (consumer) and sa  (supplier) negotiate 
over an issue set i at time t and have respective utility functions U or G. The negotiation 
issues, which are determined by the agents in the pre-negotiation stage, are price (A), 
performance (B) and quantity (C). The maintenance issue is omitted for the actual 
negotiation process for simplicity. Here quantity is the number of copies requested for 
the software product by the agents. For this negotiation case it is assumed that the issues 
are independently negotiated. Selection of the agenda and to evaluate whether the 
selected agenda is optimal, the derived preference ordering process has been applied. 
The collective group ranking or preference order of the issues is also derived in the pre-
Zone of 
agreement 














Figure 5.2 Towards no zone agreement 
Chapter 5 Empirical Evaluation of the Model 
108 
 
negotiation protocol by using a consensus based group decision-making process. The 
derived preference order suggests the following agenda (ABC): price > performance > 
quantity. 
The issues will be negotiated sequentially (issue-by-issue approach) and the sequence 
will be the above ordering. Before describing the process I have established a notation 
that covers all the issues. A negotiation process has been described in 4.3 introducing 
hard constraints [Pmin , Pmax] for each agent and each issue. An alternate offer process 
has been described in 4.3.3 and this is applied separately for each issue. The levels of 
the offers and counter offers are described in equations 4.2 and 4.3. That section also 
describes what are termed raw utilities in equations 4.4 and 4.5. 
  
   
 is an offer received by a consumer from a supplier at max...2,1, ktk . Here i  is the 
issue indicator which in my case can be pr (price), p (performance), or q (quantity). For 
example the first offer which will be received by a consumer will be    
   
 then 
sequentially other values of k and for subsequent issues   
   
  and   
   
respectively. On 
the other hand,   
   
 is an offer received by a supplier sequentially from a consumer
 
at 
times max...2,1, ktk . Both the consumer and supplier have some ranges concerning 
the issues under negotiation such as:  







prpr bca     bca     bca ≤≤≤≤≤≤                               (5.1)             







prpr esd     esd     esd ≤≤≤≤≤≤                (5.2) 
These ranges are determined in the range specification stage of the negotiation process. 
In the equation (5.1) and (5.2) 
qppr aaa ,,  and qppr bbb ,,  are the minimum and 
maximum of price, performance and quantity for a consumer agent, respectively. On the 
other hand 
qppr ddd ,,   and qppr eee ,,  mean the minimum and maximum of price, 




pr ccc  




pr sss  to denote the target values for the agents for the issues. 
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Different points from these intervals are of different value for negotiating agents 
(Kurbel and Loutchko 2005). For convenience the utility values are considered to be in 
the range [0, 1]. The value of negotiation issues is represented by utility functions 
qppr UUU ,, for a consumer and qppr GGG ,, for supplier: 
 
         baU     baU     baU qqqpppprprpr ];1,0[→],[:];1,0[→],[:];1,0[→],[: (5.3) 
       edG     edG     edG qqqpppprprpr ];1,0[→],[:];1,0[→],[:];1,0[→],[:   (5.4) 
 
The higher is the value of a utility function for a certain value of an issue the more 
advantageous is this value for a negotiating agent. Different utility functions adopt 
different strategies, depending on the type of the issue. 
pU  is an increasing function for 
the consumers, whereas the function prU is a monotonic decreasing one. The function 
pG will decrease monotonically and prG will be a monotonic increased function for the 
supplier. 
 
For a specific case it is necessary to link the general values used in equations (5.3), (5.4) 
with the limits specified as hard and soft constraints. These constraints do not 
necessarily need to cover the full range of utility values allowed in (5.3) and (5.4). In 
Fig. 5.3, the values c
minPf  and 
c
optPf  are respectively, the minimal performance level the 
consumer will accept for the software product and the optimal performance level being 
sought by the consumer. The optimal performance level means the highest utility score 
the agent is trying to gain for the performance issue.  
 
The utility function )( kpp cG of a supplier can be of the form presented in Fig. 5.4. 
sPfmax
is the maximal performance level the supplier can provide to the consumer for that 
particular software, s
optPf  is the performance level the supplier considers optimal for the 
software product. 















The utility function )( kprpr sU  of a consumer can be of the form presented in Fig 5.5. 
cPrfmax is the maximal price the consumer can offer to the supplier,  
c
optPrf  is the price 
offer the consumer considers optimal for the software and targeting for. The values 
between this range [ cPrfmax ,
c
optPrf ] are the price offers which are going to be 
negotiated. In Fig. 5.6, the values s
minPrf  and 
s
optPrf  are the minimal price the supplier 


















Figure 5.5  Utility function for price used by a consumer agent 
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The utility functions for other issues such as quantity can also be presented by utility 
graphs as above depending on the situation. 
 
In my scenario each negotiation agent has different importance weights for the issues. 
They might also assign equal importance to each issue in my approach depending on the 
preferences of the agents. To reduce the complexity I have used the collective ordering 






pr www ,,  be the relative importance of price, performance and quantity respectively, 





pr www ,,  the relative importance of the same issues for a 
supplier. I assume that the following normalization relations are suitable for the 
approach: 










pr www                www                            (5.5) 
 
The utility values and relative importance of each issue are used to determine the total 
utility. A multi-issue utility function derived in equation 4.6 is used to generate the total 
utility of a consumer or supplier agent in my approach which is linear and will be used 
later to evaluate the overall outcome of the negotiation:  
 










pr )()()()(      (5.6) 
 
Here )(PU will be the combined utility value for that particular offer. 
0 












On the other hand, the value of qppri cccc ,,  received by a supplier can be evaluated 
by the utility function, 
 










pr )()()()(        (5.7) 
 
5.3.1.2.1    Negotiation Case 1: Boulware time dependent strategy with negotiation 
agenda (most important issue first) for Price => Performance => Quantity 
sequence 
 
The behaviour a single negotiation agent adopts is a prepared protocol and strategy from 
the proposed negotiation approach. The consumer and supplier agents in this software 
purchase scenario also acts upon that. The parameters of the behaviour for this 
negotiation scenario are:  
 
 The list of issues (i = 1, 2,..n) : price, performance, quantity. 
 A [min(i), max(i)] initial range of acceptable values for each issue 
 A relative weight (importance), w(i) for each issue and  
 For each pair of issues (i, j) there is an influence that modifies the range of 
acceptable values for issue j depending on the results for issue i.  
 
Before the series of offers counter-offers among the agents starts, there are number of 
steps that need to be performed to determine the issue parameters based on issue-by-
issue sequence effect. The first step is to set up the maximum and minimum values of 
the issues for both consumer and supplier agent. The second step is to indicate what 
changes need to take place on the initial issue values depending on the sequential 
interdependency between the issues and to modify them according to the rules. Given 
these directions of change there is a need to determine a formula to calculate the 
numerical changes in [max, min]. This is done in step three. 
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Step 1: According to the agenda based model the consumer agent will start negotiating 
with the supplier over the issues related to the software product based on the derived 
preference order from the group decision-making process. The issues will be negotiated 
sequentially. In this negotiation case the most important issue is negotiated first. At first 
the agents will negotiate about the 1
st
 issue, price per copy. To setup the allowed price 
interval for negotiation, which is the difference between the maximum and minimum 
values of the issues given by the agents, I have used two variables; the length of the 
allowed values interval for the agents (σ
a
) and the degree of intersection (α
i
) between 
the intervals of the two agents (consumer and supplier) ranging from 0 to 1. Here, 0 is 
for full overlap, 0.5 is partial overlap and 1 is for almost no overlap. 
 
Now in the negotiation environment the lengths of the intervals (σ
a
) for price issue are 
selected randomly from a range and the degree of intersection is assigned α
pr
 = 0.5 for 
both the agents. For this experiment the consumer range (σ
c
) is selected to be 500 and 
for the supplier (σ
s
)  is chosen as 650 per unit. An initial lower limit of 1000 for the 
consumer offers is taken. The overlap is assumed to be a fraction of the consumer range. 




The maximum and minimum values for the performance and quantity issues can be 
calculated using the same process. For the performance issue consumer range (σ
c
) is 
selected to be 30 and for the supplier (σ
s
)  is chosen as 50 per unit. The degree of 
intersection is assigned α
p










































For the quantity issue, the difference between the agent’s minimum and maximum 








 are 90 and 30 
copies respectively; the degree of intersection is set to α
q







The maintenance issue is not considered in the negotiation phase as it is the least 
important issue for both agents. The consumer and supplier agents have different initial 
maximum and minimum values for price, performance and quantity issue respectively. 
So the initial maximum and minimum value ranges of the three issues for both the 
agents are: 
 
Supplier ranges: Price [1250, 1900], Performance [50, 100], Quantity [10,100] 
Consumer ranges: Price [1000, 1500], Performance [50, 80], Quantity [10, 35] 
 
The initial reservation values (the values for the initial offer in a negotiation) for the 
three interdependent issues (price, performance, quantity) of the software product from 
both supplier and consumer agents are shown in Table 5.6. In some cases the first offer 
will be at the upper end of the range and in other cases the first offer is at the lower end 
of the range. 
Table 5.6  
The initial offer values of the agents for Price, Performance, Quantity for  
Negotiation Case 1 
 Reservation offers 
Supplier agent 1900, 50, 100 
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The interdependency factors will be considered in the negotiation by deriving linking 
relations between the relatively dependent pair of issues based on the agents’ consensus 
decisions for the prior issue. In 4.3.2.1 the way in which the new ranges are to be 
calculated is specified. The midpoint of the range the maximum and minimum for each 
agent is assumed as the target value which is used in the linking constraints relations. So 
the initial target values are:  
                       
Price: supplier target = 1575, consumer target = 1250 
Performance: supplier target = 50, consumer target = 65 
Quantity: supplier target = 55, consumer target = 22 
 
Step 2: Based on section 4.3.2.1, the six relationships between the issues can be derived 
for three issues which consider the sequence of the issues. 
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level  ePerformanc maximum decrease target below                 
level  ePerformanc minimum increase target above       :eller s
level  ePerformanc maximum decrease  target below                  
level  ePerformanc minimum increasetarget above :consumer
  ePerformancQuantity
level Price minimum increase target below                 
level Price minimum decrease target above      :eller s
level Price maximum increase  target below                  
level Price maximum decreasetarget above :consumer
            PriceQuantity
level Quantity maximum decrease target below                 
level Quantity minimum increase target above       :seller
level Quantity maximum decrease  target below                  
level Quantity minimum increasetarget above :consumer
  QuantityePerformanc
level Price maximum decrease target below                 
level Price minimum increase target above       :seller
level Price maximum decrease  target below                  
level Price minimum increasetarget above :consumer
       PriceePerformanc
level Quantity maximum increase  target below                
level Quantity minimum decrease target above      :seller
level Quantity maximum increase  target below                  
level Quantity minimum decreasetarget above  :consumer
              QuantityPrice
level  ePerformanc minimum decrease target below                
level  ePerformanc maximum increase target above      :seller
level  ePerformanc minimum increase  target below                  
level  ePerformanc maximum decreasetarget above :consumer

































According to the above relationships and form of rules, for each pair of issues (i,j) there 
is an influence that modifies the range of acceptable values for issue j depending on the 
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results for issue i. The following two Tables 5.7 and 5.8 derive the effect of changes the 
initial range of values of the both agents will have: 
 
Table 5.7  
The ranges of issues for consumer agent and the cross influences for 
Negotiation Case 1 
Consumer 
  
Price Performance Quantity 
   
High Low High Low High Low 
Price 1500 Max     Stay down Down Up 
 
1000 Min     Up stay Stay Stay 




50 Min Stay Up 
  
Up stay 
Quantity 35 Max Stay Up Stay down 
  
 
10 Min Down Stay Up stay 
  
         The entries in the Price High column in Table 5.7 determine the effect of results above 
the target for Price. The High column also shows that in this circumstance if 
Performance is next its max value goes down and min value stay same. Then next the 
max quantity will stay the same and the minimum Quantity will go down. In the Price 
Low column, the max performance will stay same and the min value will go up. On the 
other hand in the same Price Low column the max quantity will go up and the min will 
stay the same. The High and Low column of Performance and Quantity issues also 
indicates the interlink influences. The numbers on the left of the table are the initial 
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Table 5.8  
The ranges of issues for supplier agent and the cross influences for  
Negotiation Case 1 
Supplier 
  
Price Performance Quantity 
   
High Low High Low High Low 
Price 1900 Max     stay Stay Stay stay 
 
1250 Min     Up down Down up 




50 Min Stay Down 
  
Up stay 
Quantity 100 Max Stay Up stay down 
  
 
50 Min Down Stay Up stay 
  
         Table 5.8 defines the influence the issues have between each other for the supplier 
agent. The High and Low column represents the above target and below target effect. 
For instance if Performance issue comes just after Price issue in sequence order then in 
the High column, max value of Performance issue will go up while min value in Low 
column will go down.   
Step 3: The calculation of the changes in max and min following the results for an issue 
requires a calculation of a change factor, F. This is then applied in the direction 
determined by the tables given above. To find the amount by which the maximum and 
minimum values of the next sequential issues are changed, a standard calculation is 
performed. For instance, for (Price, Performance) ordered pair of issues for consumer 
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Negotiator Consumer: Price => Performance  
Let 1500c
max
Pr , 1000 =c
min





targetPerformance = 65, be the initial max, min , target values of Price and Performance 
issues and the result be R. 
If R<targetPrice then change factor F = (targetPrice - R)/( targetPrice - c
min
Pr ) 
if R>targetPrice then change factor F = (R - targetPrice)/( c
max
Pr  - targetPrice) 
if R= targetPrice then F = 0. 
The amount of increase/decrease for c
max
P  and/or c
min
P  values is F*( c
max




For the next sequence,  
 
Negotiator Consumer: Performance => Quantity 
Let 80c
max
P , 50 =c
min





targetQuantity = 22, be the initial max, min , target values of Performance and 
Quantity issues and the result be R. 




if R>targetPerformance then change factor F = (R - targetPerformance)/( c
max
P  - 
targetPerformance) 
if R= targetPerformance then F = 0. 
The amount of increase/decrease for c
max
Q  and/or c
min
Q  values is F*( c
max
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The result R is calculated using the parameter set defined in Table 5.10 and equation 4.1 
and 4.3. The result R is evaluated using the above rules. After the calculations the 
following values [1400, 59.6, 33] for three issues Price, Performance, Quantity were 
derived.  
 
R(esult) 1400 59.6 33 
 
The following Table 5.9 has the entries that carry out the above calculations for the 
consumer agent for Price => Performance => Quantity sequence. 
 
Table 5.9 
Changes on the ranges of issues for consumer agent  
with the new max, min and target values for Negotiation Case 1 
 
  
Price Performance Quantity 
Consumer Origmax 1500 80 35 
 
Origmin 1000 50 10 
 
Change 0 18 15 
 
Newmax 1500 62 35 
 
Newmin 1000 50 25 
 
t(arget) 1250 56 30 
 
t – min 250 6 5 
 
max – t 250 6 5 
 
F 0.6 0.6 0.6 
In the first column of for the Price values there is no ‘change’ since this is the first issue 
in the sequence. The new target value for Performance and Quantity is calculated from 
the newmin and newmax values of the issues. The ‘change’ value for Performance and 
Quantity is calculated using the changing factor ‘F’ value for Price and Performance 
respectively. The application of the change (‘up’, ‘down’, or, ‘stay’) depends on the 
result of the negotiation in relation to the target.  




The same process is done for the supplier agent also. The Supplier agent calculation for 
its ‘F’ and ‘change’ values is carried out independently for same issue sequence and is 
shown below in Table 5.10.  
 
Table 5.10 
Changes on the ranges of issues for supplier agent  
with the new max, min and target values for Negotiation Case 1 
 
  
Price Performance Quantity 
Supplier Origmax 1900 100 100 
 
Origmin 1250 50 10 
 
Change 0 26.92308 4.536 
 
Newmax 1900 100 95.464 
 
Newmin 1250 23.07692 10 
 
t(arget) 1575 61.53846 52.732 
 
t – min 325 38.46154 42.732 
 
max – t 325 38.46154 42.732 
 
F 0.538462 0.0504 0.461762 
 
Both the consumer and supplier agent have new range of maximum and minimum 
values for the sequential effect on the issues. These ranges of issue values will be used 
for the offer counter-offer negotiation process. 
The parameters of the individual alternate offer processes 
The impact of variations in the issue-by-issue sequence has been explored in this 
research with the help of the variations in the parameters of the individual alternate offer 
processes. For a given pair of ka and β in equation (4.1), an agent has different 
strategies. In the first experiment the agents have adopted Boulware time dependent 
strategy in the proposed model to reach the allowable range swiftly. The parameters are 
specified with the values of   = 0.5, ka = 0.2 and tmax = 10. In this model the initial 
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maximum and minimum parameters of the issues for both agents are changed after the 
interdependency factors are considered. The following Table 5.11 shows the modified 
parameters for the maximum and minimum values of the Performance and Quantity 
issues of a software product. 
 
Table 5.11 
The modified parameters of Pmin, Pmax for Price => Performance => Quantity sequence 
Offer Parameters ka tmax   Pmin Pmax 
Consumer price 0.2 10 0.5 1000 1500 
Supplier Price 0.2 10 0.5 1250 1900 
Consumer Performance 0.2 10 0.5 50 62 
Supplier Performance 0.2 10 0.5 23.07692 100 
Consumer Quantity 0.2 10 0.5 25 35 
Supplier Quantity 0.2 10 0.5 10 95.464 
 
 
Both the supplier and consumer agent are have generated the offers in Fig. 5.7 and Fig. 
5.8 using equation (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) respectively at each round. The parameters of 
Table 5.11 are used to generate these offers and counter-offers for both consumer and 
supplier agents. These figures provide the offer process of the approach of the proposed 
negotiation strategy. The following Table 5.12 shows the generated offers counter-
offers of the agents until the maximum time limit is reached. 
 
Table 5.12 
The sequence of offers counter-offers for consumer and supplier agent for  






Offers Consumer Supplier Consumer Supplier Consumer Supplier 
1 1022.8764 1870.261 50.54903 96.48056 25.45753 91.55379 
2 1047.2332 1838.597 51.1336 92.73336 25.94466 87.39053 
3 1073.4014 1804.578 51.76163 88.70748 26.46803 82.91765 
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4 1101.8576 1767.585 52.44458 84.3296 27.03715 78.05368 
5 1133.3333 1726.667 53.2 79.48718 27.66667 72.6736 
6 1169.0599 1680.222 54.05744 73.99079 28.3812 66.56693 
7 1211.4382 1625.13 55.07452 67.47105 29.22876 59.32329 
8 1266.6667 1553.333 56.4 58.97436 30.33333 49.8832 
9 1400 1380 59.6 38.46154 33 27.0928 
10 1400 1380 59.6 38.46154 33 27.0928 
 
 
Fig. 5.7 and Fig. 5.8 represents the offers the consumer and supplier agent generate for  

























Figure 5.7  Consumer agent’s offer generation for price using the 
Boulware concession strategy, where 













































The consumer gradually increases the price, whereas the supplier gradually decreases its 
price. Both the agents are trying to maximise their own utilities for Price issue. The two 
agents gradually reach to an agreement zone by using Boulware time dependent strategy 
which is showed in Fig. 5.9. So the acceptable price price range is [1400, 1380] for both 







Figure 5.8  Supplier agent’s offer generation for price using the 
Boulware concession strategy, where 







































max tkPrPrPrPr  
 
Next the performance issue is negotiated according to the agreed preference ordering. 
The same negotiation process has been applied to the Performance issue. After 
generating the offers for the supplier and consumer about the performance of the 
software product, they came to an acceptable value of 59 at t=8, shown in Fig. 5.10. The 
final issue in the sequence is the Quantity. Fig, 5.11 shows the acceptable quantity range 
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A calculation of utility for Consumer and Supplier for each issue is carried on for this 
particular issue sequence. For each participant these values are added using their 
weightings that are independent of the issue sequence. According to the proposed 
approach which is described in chapter 4, if the negotiated value for issue i is v(i) the 
raw utility for issue i is U(i) = (v(i) - min(i))/(max(i) - min(i)) where the max(i) and 
min(i) are the initial or modified values for the issue. This equation is used to calculate 
the individual utility for each issue for both supplier and consumer agent. 
 
The total utility for an agent is the sum over i=1,2,..,n of w(i)*U(i). Adding together the 
two agent's results gives a utility value for the negotiation. So the total utility is derived 
for both agents by applying equation (4.6) with different important weights for different 
issues. The importance weights of issues (price, performance, quantity) for the supplier 
agent is wi
s
  = [0.5, 0.1, 0.4] and for the consumer is wi
c
  = [0.5, 0.4, 0.1].  
 


















      Consumer Weight 0.5 0.4 0.1 Total 
 
Utility 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.5 
 
The Supplier utility values are calculated in the same process as Consumers. Using the 
Supplier weights; a Supplier’s total utility is calculated. Finally the total of the 
Consumer and Supplier utility values give a joint utility value. The joint utility for each 
of the issue sequences is also shown. 
 
Supplier Utility 0.230769 0.5252 0.730881 0.460257 
 
Weight 0.5 0.1 0.4 Total 
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The sequence Price-Performance-Quantity is a success as there is no 0 utility for any of 
the issue value. The equation 4.6 determines the above result by using the importance 
weights and individual utility of the issues for the determined agenda sequence.  
 
The total utility gained by the consumer agent for all the issues is 0.5*0.2 + 0.4*0.8 + 
0.1*0.8 = 0.5; 
 
The total utility gained by the supplier agent for all the issues is 0.5*0.23 + 0.1*0.52 + 
0.4*0.73 = 0.46; 
 
So the total utility for the consumer is obtained 0.5 for which the opponent supplier 
gains total 0.46 utility. The overall outcome of the negotiation is defined as an (utility, 
effort) pair. The utility is the total utility accrueing to the two agents taking part. The 
effort can be calulated by counting the number of offer counter-offer steps that are taken 
over the set of issues.  
 
Adding together the two agent's results gives a utility value of 0.96 for the negotiation 
outcome. The total number of offer counter-offer steps that are taken over the set of 
issues to gain this utility is 27. So for the pair of the defined agents the negotiation 
outcomes (utility = 0.96, effort = 27) is derived for the selected agenda. 
 
5.3.1.2.2    Negotiation Case 2: Boulware time dependent strategy with negotiation 
agenda (least important issue first) for Quantity => Performance => Price 
sequence 
 
This experiment is done to show that there can be a range of outcomes in multi-issue 
negotiation and so that the choice of agenda is important. Considering the relationship 
between the issues and the best sequences for the agenda is one of the main 
contributions of this research.  
 
For the pair of defined agents (consumer and supplier) the (utility, effort) outcomes are 
determined. These outcomes are derived from each of the possible agendas. An 
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additional variation could be introduced by changing the target values for the agents on 
the concession/hard-line axis. 
 
Now to evaluate the proposed agenda based negotiation process with a selected 
sequential preference order and to prove the agenda effect, I am comparing the outcome 
of the determined agenda with other possible agendas, which means changing the 
possible sequences of the issues. The main concern is if different agendas give different 
utilities to the agents. Obviously the utility maximising agent wants to know which 
agenda is maximising his own utility values and is approaching to a feasible negotiation 
space. 
 
In this negotiation case the issues will be negotiated is a different sequence then the 
negotiation case 1. The sequence will be Quantity => Performance => Price. At first the 
pair of agents will negotiate about the 1
st
 issue, quantity. According to the preference 
order quantity issue is the least important among all and price is the most important. To 
show that the choice of agenda is important and there is a range of outcomes when the 
sequence varies, the values of the issues are kept the same as case 1. 
 
The initial maximum and minimum values for Quantity, Price and Performance issues 
are same for both agents as case 1. So the initial values of three issues for both the 
agents are: 
 
Supplier ranges: Quantity [100, 10], Performance [50, 100], Price [1250, 1900] 
Consumer ranges: Quantity [35, 10], Performance [50, 80], Price [1000, 1500] 
 
The interdependency factors will be considered in the negotiation by deriving linking 
relations between the relatively dependent pair of issues based on the agents’ consensus 
decisions. Now to consider the interdependency factors between the issues some initial 
constraint ranges of each of negotiators are used. The midpoint of range the maximum 
and minimum for each agent is assumed as the target value which is used in the linking 
constraints relations. So the initial target values are:  
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Quantity: supplier target = 55, consumer target = 22 
Performance: supplier target = 50, consumer target = 65 
Price: supplier target = 1575, consumer target = 1250 
 
Only the interdependency factors which are considered in the previous negotiation case 
by deriving linking relations between the relatively dependent pair of issues based on 
the agents’ consensus decisions are changed.  
 
level Quantity maximum increase  target below                
level Quantity minimum decrease target above      :seller
level Quantity maximum increase  target below                  
level Quantity minimum decreasetarget above  :consumer
              QuantityPrice
level  ePerformanc minimum decrease target below                
level  ePerformanc maximum increase target above      :seller
level  ePerformanc minimum increase  target below                  
level  ePerformanc maximum decreasetarget above :consumer
         ePerformancPrice
level Quantity maximum decrease target below                 
level Quantity minimum increase target above       :seller
level Quantity maximum decrease  target below                  
level Quantity minimum increasetarget above :consumer
  QuantityePerformanc
level Price maximum decrease target below                 
level Price minimum increase target above       :seller
level Price maximum decrease  target below                  
level Price minimum increasetarget above :consumer
       PriceePerformanc
level Price minimum increase target below                 
level Price minimum decrease target above      :eller s
level Price maximum increase  target below                  
level Price maximum decreasetarget above :consumer
            PriceQuantity
level  ePerformanc maximum decrease target below                 
level  ePerformanc minimum increase target above       :eller s
level  ePerformanc maximum decrease  target below                  

































Chapter 5 Empirical Evaluation of the Model 
131 
 
The above six relationships between the issues can be derived again for these three 
issues which consider the order of the issues. The main aim is to determine the (utility, 
effort) outcomes derived from the selected agenda. Among the six relationships, the
  ePerformancQuantity→ and    PriceePerformanc → sequence is used for the 
selected issue sequence. 
The following Tables 5.13 and 5.14 show the effect of changes the initial range of 
values of the both agents will have using the issue interdependency rules. 
 
Table 5.13 
The ranges of issues for consumer agent and the cross influences for 








   
High Low High Low High Low 
Quantity 35 max     stay down stay Up 
 
10 min     up stay down Stay 
Performance 80 max Stay down     down Stay 
 
50 min Up Stay     stay Up 
Price 1500 max Down Up stay down     
 
1000 min Stay Stay up stay     
 
So the entry in the Quantity High column determine the effect of results above the target 
for Quantity thus the max Performance will stay the same and the minimum 
Performance will go up. The column also shows that in the same circumstance if Price 
is next its max will go down and min will stay. 
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Table 5.14  
The ranges of issues for supplier agent and the cross influences for 








   
High Low High Low High Low 
Quantity 100 max     stay down stay Up 
 
10 min     up stay down Stay 
Performance 100 max Stay Down     up Stay 
 
50 min Up Stay     stay Down 
Price 1900 max Stay Stay stay stay     
 
1250 min Down Up Up down     
 
The calculation of the changes in the initial max and min values of the three issues are 
performed in the same way as case 1. The following Tables 5.15 and 5.16 have the 
changed entries that carry out the calculations for the consumer and supplier agent 
respectively for Quantity => Performance => Price sequence. 
 
Table 5.15 
Changes on the ranges of issues for consumer agent  






Consumer Origmax 35 80 1500 
 
Origmin 10 50 1000 
 
Change 0 18 33.33333 
 
Newmax 35 80 1466.667 
 
Newmin 10 68 1033.333 
 
t(arget) 22.5 74 1250 
 
t – min 12.5 6 216.6667 
 
max – t 12.5 6 216.6667 
 
F 0.6 0.066667 0.6 




Changes on the ranges of issues for supplier agent  
with the new max, min and target values for Negotiation Case 2 
 
Supplier Origmax 100 100 1900 
 
Origmin 10 50 1250 
 
Change 0 27.77778 15.6 
 
Newmax 100 100 1900 
 
Newmin 10 50 1234.4 
 
t(arget) 55 75 1567.2 
 
t – min 45 25 332.8 
 
max – t 45 25 332.8 
 
F 0.555556 0.024 0.5625 
 
Both the consumer and supplier agent have new range of maximum and minimum 
values for the sequential effect on the issues. These ranges of issue values will be used 
for the offer counter-offer negotiation process. Table 5.17 shows the modified 
parameters for the maximum and minimum values of the Performance and Price issues 
of a software product. 
 
Table 5.17 
The modified parameters of Pmin, Pmax for Quantity => Performance => Price sequence 
Offer Parameters ka tmax   Pmin Pmax 
Consumer price 0.2 10 .5 1033.333 1466.667 
Supplier Price 0.2 10 .5 1234.4 1900 
Consumer Performance 0.2 10 .5 68 80 
Supplier Performance 0.2 10 .5 50 100 
Consumer Quantity 0.2 10 .5 10 35 
Supplier Quantity 0.2 10 .5 10 100 
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This negotiation scenario also adopts the Boulware time dependent tactic where the 
parameters are specified with the values of   = 0.5 and ka = 0.2. The offers and counter 
offers for both the supplier and consumer agent are  generated in using equation (4.1), 
(4.2) and (4.3) respectively at each round. Table 5.18 shows the offers and counter-
offers for both agents. 
 
Table 5.18 







Offers Consumer Supplier Consumer Supplier Consumer Supplier 
1 11.14382 95.88225 68.54903 97.71236 1053.16 1869.547 
2 12.36166 91.49803 69.1336 95.27668 1074.269 1837.123 
3 13.67007 86.78775 69.76163 92.65986 1096.948 1802.288 
4 15.09288 81.66563 70.44458 89.81424 1121.61 1764.407 
5 16.66667 76 71.2 86.66667 1148.889 1722.507 
6 18.45299 69.56922 72.05744 83.09401 1179.852 1674.947 
7 20.57191 61.94113 73.07452 78.85618 1216.58 1618.533 
8 23.33333 52 74.4 73.33333 1264.444 1545.013 
9 30 28 77.6 60 1380 1367.52 
10 30 28 77.6 60 1380 1367.52 
 
Both the agents are trying to maximise their own utilities for each issue. The consumer 
gradually increases the quantity, whereas the supplier gradually decreases its quantity. 
The two agents gradually reach to an agreement zone on Quantity which is showed in 
Fig. 5.12. So the acceptable quantity for both of the agents at t = 9 is 30. 
 














max tkQQQQ  
 
Next the acceptable range for performance issue is negotiated according to the agenda 
sequence. The last negotiation issue is price. Fig, 5.13 and Fig. 5.14 shows the 


























max tkPPPP  
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For the above accepted offer values for the issues, the individual utility is determined. 
The raw utility for quantity issue is 0.8 for the consumer agent and 0.40 for the supplier 
agent, which is derived from equation 4.4. After applying the same procedure for the 
performance issue the utility of [0.53, 0.1] is gained for both the agents respectively. 
Finally the price issue gets 0.8 utility for consumer agent and 0.5 utility for supplier 
agent respectively. The following results are determined by using the importance 
weights and the individual utility of the issues for the determined agenda sequence. 
 
The total utility gained by the consumer agent for all the issues is 0.1*0.8 + 0.4*0.53+ 
0.5*0.48 = 0.69; 
 
The total utility gained by the supplier agent for all the issues is 0.4*0.77 + 0.1*0.51 + 
0.50*0.78 = 0.75; 
 
So the total utility for the consumer is obtained 0.69 for which the opponent supplier 
gains total 0.75 utility. Adding together the two agent's results gives a utility value of 
1.45 for the negotiation outcome. The total number of offer counter-offer steps that are 
taken over the set of issues to gain this utility is 27. So for the pair of the defined agents 
the negotiation outcomes (utility = 1.45, effort = 27) is derived from the selected agenda 
(Quantity>Performance>Price). The sequence Quantity-Performance-Price is a success 
as there is no 0 utility for any of the issue value. 
 
So it is shown that varying the sequence of the issues may cause different results in a 
multi-issue negotiation process and finding the optimal agenda is very important for an 
effective and successful issue-by-issue negotiation outcome. In both negotiation cases 
the agents have negotiated based on a particular sequence derived from the group of 









The prospect for reaching any agreement between the consumer and the supplier 
depends on there being a certain degree of compatibility between the two negotiator’s 
allowed ranges of values for the issues. An approximate match can be assumed in a 
relatively mature market. The example results shown in detail provide evidence that the 
agenda chosen makes a considerable difference to the outcomes of negotiation. The 
results show there is an agreement for the common preference sequence of the agents 
involved in the process. So an issue-by-issue procedure can achieve agreement if an 
optimal agenda is determined. The difference between the existing work on issue-by-
issue negotiation and ours is the existing models that define the sequence of the issues 
endogenously during the negotiation process and in contrast, my model defines an 
exogenous agenda according to the agents’ preferences. When multiple issues are 
involved in a negotiation then the outcome not only depends on the negotiation 
procedure but also can be influenced by the negotiation agenda. The agenda based 
approach directs the negotiating agents in the process of searching for prospective 
solutions from the individual area of interest towards an agreement from the common 
area of interest. It reduces the domain of negotiation solutions (search space) by 
considering individual issues, each in a simple to manage converging monotonic offer 
exchange and dealing with issues according to the preferences of the participating 
agents.  
 
One of the accepted ways to measure the quality of a model is performance measure 
(Coehoorn and Jennings 2004; Hindriks and Tykhonov 2008). With this method, the 
success of a model is expressed in terms of the negotiation result (Baarslag et al. 2013). 
 
Performance: The negotiation agreement point depends on a large number of factors. 
Once the allowed ranges are chosen the choice of parameters for alternate offer process 
normally have more effect on the rate of reaching agreement than the value of the 
agreement point. For the example case the efficiency of the negotiation process 
increases, because the agreed preference sequence of multiple issues selects an agenda 
combination that leads to an overall agreement. The efficiency of the negotiation 
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process increases, because the agreed preference sequence of multiple issues eliminates 
lots of possible agenda combinations which do not reflect the agents’ common interest.  
This suggests that randomly generated possible agenda combination will increase the 
computational time and may lead to no zone agreement space. For n negotiating issues 
there will be a total of n! scenarios. This n! gives the number of ways that the issues can 
be permuted. The common preference order of the agents minimises the possible ways 
and helps to select the optimal agenda scenario which could shorten the negotiation 
process. For example, consider a scenario where a consumer agent may want to 
negotiate the issues of a software product such as price, performance, reliability etc. 
with a supplier agent. The buyer agent may prefer to follow the sequence {price, 
reliability, performance} during the negotiation process. On the other hand, the 
supplier’s side might prefer the order of {performance, price, reliability}. So the 
negotiators have conflict because the opponent has different preference list, which needs 
to be resolved before the offer-counter offer process starts. For this reason in the pre-
negotiation phase, the group decision-making process minimises the conflict which 
helps to get rid of the non-optimal solutions in the later phase and both the consumer 
and supplier are better off. In several scenarios the joint utility of both the agents can 
improve by negotiating the issues in their common preferred order (Abedin et al. 2011). 
In section 5.3.1.2.1    Negotiation Case 1 and section 5.3.1.2.2 Negotiation Case 2, the 
common preference order sequence derived in the group decision-making process were 
assigned. Both the scenarios have achieved a negotiation success outcome with higher 
joint utility compare to the other issue-by-issue preference sequences. The negotiation 
case 3 described in A1 shows a low joint utility which does not follow a common 
preference agenda of the agents.  
 
Equilibrium: If there is an agreement between agents, a stable equilibrium in the end of 
negotiation should be produced in order to ensure that agents do not deviate from their 
agreements. As the proposed negotiation process is directed with agents’ own chosen 
preferences, there is less chance of diversion from the agreement. The results also show 
the stability even when there are variations in the negotiation parameters. The model 
equilibrium is evaluated on global optimality. In section 5.3.1.2.1 Negotiation Case 1 
and section 5.3.1.2.2 Negotiation Case 2, both negotiation cases showed that 
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agreements have been achieved in a considerable negotiation steps. In these cases the 
preference order derived in the pre negotiation stage helped to reach the equilibrium. 
 
Simplicity in Negotiation Protocol: Negotiation processes that are simple and efficient 
are preferable to complex processes (Kraus 2001). The simplicity increases also the 
amount of efficiency and stability. The proposed negotiation model consists of a 
systematic and explicit negotiation protocol which includes group consensus on agenda 
and detailed negotiation on issue. Therefore, the agents do not have to guess or estimate 
the preferences of their opponent or their utility function. Moreover it is possible to 
compute the proposed simple and feasible strategy in a reasonable amount of time. 
Because, the agent doesn‘t need to take more time and resource to come to optimal 
solution. The agents use less computational and communicational resources to reach 




















Conclusions and Future Research 
6.1  Review of Thesis and Discussion  
The fundamental problem of an automated negotiation is the dilemma faced by any 
negotiator to attain two conflicting goals: maximise agent’s own utility and chance of 
reaching an agreement with an opponent at the same time. In this work on agenda based 
multi-issue negotiation model, the agents try to reach an agreement by resolving these 
conflicts while maximising their own utility. 
The proposed model shows the agenda sequence can be one of the most important 
structural aspects of multi-issue negotiation as well as a significant determinant of 
negotiation power and influence in issue-by-issue negotiation. This research 
investigates a multi-issue preference ordering process in an agenda based multi-agent 
negotiation environment where preference information or opinions on multi-issues 
associated with the alternatives or services are expressed in linguistic formats by the 
agents. The preference ordering process considers the common knowledge between the 
agents to process the choice of sequence over the issues using a hybrid method based on 
Fuzzy Ordered Weighted Averaging operator and fuzzy quantifies. The aim of using 
this method is to investigate the common sequence of the issues and to calculate their 
weightings according to the group of agents’ preferences in such way that a higher 
consensus level is achieved. In addition to this method of finding a first approximation a 
dynamic and iterative group consensus process is used to support and validate the group 
preference ordering process.  
This consensus measure method helps to improve the consensus level of the group. The 
preference ordering impacts the agenda based negotiation process in allowing an 
efficient issue-by-issue procedure. So it is important to decide it before the actual 
negotiation taking place. In order to make an automated negotiation efficient, the agents 
must be able to adequately represent their importance, preferences, and interdependency 
about the issues along with cost functions in the given domain such that they can 
negotiate within a realistic search space. Automated multi-issue negotiation is usually 
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unsupervised and the agents’ final gained utility is uncertain based on a number of 
factors such as bargaining power, utility functions, and cooperative or uncooperative 
level etc. This uncertainty makes it very hard to explore the agents’ preferences. The 
fuzzy preference approach and the significant choice of sequence help to solve this case. 
The agenda based negotiation approach improves the negotiation convergence process 
and minimises the complexity. An efficient negotiation mechanism should also be able 
to produce Pareto optimal solutions for multi-issue negotiation. This model improves 
agent’s total utility by providing an effective equilibrium outcome which is a Pareto 
optimal solution. 
6.2 Contributions Achieved 
This research has achieved theoretical contribution and also contains important practical 
suggestion for difference preferences in group negotiations. The contributions of this 
work can be summarised as follows: 
 
The proposed issue-by-issue negotiation approach in multi-issue negotiation 
process: the simplest negotiation takes place between two agents on a single issue. Two 
agents interact to settle on a value for that single issue. But most negotiation nowadays 
involves multiple issues. The situation becomes more complicated when the negotiators 
deal with multiple issues which have influence on each other. In the multi-issue 
negotiation the importance of the issues may vary for the agents. One agent may prefer 
a particular issue more important whereas the other agent may consider another issue. 
For example, the performance issue of a service may be the most important issue for a 
particular agent while the price of the service may be more important for the other 
agent. Realistically it is also possible to have interdependencies between the issues. In 
this situation, the search space for the acceptable agreement increases, which 
complicates the whole negotiation process. Considering the huge search space created 
by the issues, the most difficult challenge is to design a less complicated negotiation 
model to find a mutually beneficial solution for all the participated agents. Instead of 
blindly searching for agreements in the search space, this model will provide an agenda 
to find a successful consensus result. Consequently, the number of steps to reach an 
agreement is also important. The experimental results of the proposed model shows 
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reasonable number of rounds are required to have an agreement in a negotiation 
situation. 
The proposed pre-negotiation phase in multi-issue negotiation process: the 
proposed multi-issue agenda based negotiation has come with the solutions to deal with 
the above situations. The agents have sufficient knowledge about the negotiator’s 
preferences. The model accepts different formats of preferences. The preferences can be 
represented in qualitative and quantitative ways.  In a group negotiation, the individual 
preferences are transformed and aggregated using soft-computing techniques such as 
fuzzy membership functions, fuzzy preference relations. Considering the opponents’ 
preferences over the issues can determine better-targeted offers counteroffers which 
enables quicker negotiation results. It reduces the search space and leads to more 
efficient negotiation. This process takes place in a pre-negotiation phase which has been 
introduced in this work. The pre-negotiation phase incorporates the fuzzy group 
decision-making process. Experimental results show the process can help the agents to 
gain higher consensus degree over the preferences. So the preference ordering has more 
acceptances among the agents.  
In spite of the attention that negotiations have received as a possibility for resolving 
conflict of interests, both between individuals and groups, there has been very little 
consideration of a crucial stage in the negotiation process: the pre-negotiation phase 
where the preference consensus shows the willingness to actually accept an offer to 
negotiate. The vast majority of negotiations research assumes that two sides are already 
at the negotiating table (Bear 2011; Kteily et al. 2013), and subsequently investigates a 
number of other negotiation factors. If, however, one (or both) of the two opposing 
agents in a preference conflict expresses no willingness to enter into negotiations with 
its opponent, these other factors will matter very little. The pre-negotiation phase helps 
to locate if there is any possibility of reaching a consensus with the conflicting 
preferences over the issues. For example if the supplier realizes that it would not be able 
to satisfy the consumers’ requirement or vice versa in a reasonable time then it is better 
not to waste resources to continue with the actual negotiation.  
The issue-by-issue agenda based negotiation model with the interdependency 
factor: this research examined sequential negotiations, with issues varying in agenda 
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sequence. In such negotiations, the most important issues can be discussed first, or after 
less important issues are discussed depending on the group consensus. Because both 
‘important first’ and ‘important later’ orders specify the discussion of the same issues, 
both agendas may seem to have equal potential to influence the outcome. In contrast to 
other sequential issue-by-issue works, this negotiation approach considers 
interdependencies between the issues. Absence of issue dependencies in sequential 
negotiation has shown the importance of such model. The existing models define the 
sequence of the issues endogenously during the negotiation process and in contrast, the 
presented model defines an exogenous agenda according to the agents’ preferences.  
The proposed issue-by-issue negotiation approach is much simpler in terms of 
computational complexity than the existing package deal or simultaneous negotiations 
even though it considers the interdependency factors during the negotiation process by 
deriving linking relations between the relatively dependent issues. 
Numerous tasks must be carried out by negotiation teams during the pre-negotiation 
stage to avoid unexpected outcomes. These pre-negotiation tasks such as preference 
collection and consensus, understanding the negotiation environment, and selecting a 
proper agenda may have a significant impact on performance during the negotiation, 
which have been largely unexplored by multi-issue multi-agent literature. The proposed 
model demonstrated the negotiation agenda as a crucial aspect of the negotiation 
process. This research initiated another important factor of negotiation which is pre-
negotiation discussions or phase. 
The model shows how the agenda hold the potential to influence outcomes. Moreover, 
unlike other relevant aspects of negotiations, such as involvement of mediator, which 
may be applicable in some contexts but not always, the negotiation agenda can be used 
across the vast majority of negotiations. 
The final negotiation outcomes indicate that the agents which use the proposed model 
not only have more chances to reach agreements but also will be able to find agreements 
with best possible utilities.  
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6.3 Future Research 
Even though the proposed system has overcome a number of problems and made a 
significant contribution to the area, there are aspects which can be improved in the 
future. This research also opens up various lines of possible future work.  
The proposed protocol only allows bilateral negotiation. Bilateral negotiation can be 
extended in the future to support multi-lateral negotiations where each pair of agents has 
similar approach in between them. Auction mechanism in pre-negotiation can be 
introduced. 
The model incorporates the concept of interdependency. It is interesting to note that a 
full analysis of the interdependence (over all the potential issues) relates to the possible 
bundling of issues. A method that will deal with those two elements is something that 
can be looked at and considered as future work. 
Future work may further illuminate modelling dishonest behaviours in degree of 
satisfaction responses. Trust is also required in forming a group of agents. Therefore, 
using trust and reputation mechanisms can solve this problem. These mechanisms assist 
to reduce disagreement by interacting with potential agents with good past experiences. 
Exploring the model with the other strategies such as Conceder time dependent strategy, 
resource strategies and behaviour strategies are considered as future work.   
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Negotiation Case 3:  
Boulware time dependent strategy with negotiation agenda for Price => Quantity 
=> Performance sequence 
The experiments results are shown below for the issue sequence Price => Quantity => 
Performance sequence. The parameters used for this experiment are the same as the 
negotiation case 1 and case 2. This experiment shows that the agenda chosen makes a 
considerable difference to the outcomes of negotiation. 
The parameter settings for both consumer and supplier agent: 
Table A1.1 









Consumer Price Quantity Performance
High Low High Low High Low
Price 1500 max down up stay down
1000 min stay stay up stay
Quantity 35 max stay up stay down
10 min down stay up stay
Performance 80 max down stay stay down
50 min stay up up stay
Supplier Price Quantity Performance
High Low High Low High Low
Price 1900 max stay stay stay stay
1250 min down up up down
Quantity 100 max stay up stay down
10 min down stay up stay
Performance 100 max up stay stay down





The initial parameters of Pmin, Pmax for negotiation sequence for both agents 
Offer Parameters ka tmax   Pmin Pmax 
Consumer price 0.2 10 0.5 1000 1500 
Supplier Price 0.2 10 0.5 1250 1900 
Consumer Performance 0.2 10 0.5 50 80 
Supplier Performance 0.2 10 0.5 50 100 
Consumer Quantity 0.2 10 0.5 10 35 
Supplier Quantity 0.2 10 0.5 10 100 
 
Table A1.4 
Changes on the ranges of issues for consumer agent with the new max, min and target 








Price Quantity  Performance
Consumer origmax 1500 35 80
origmin 1000 10 50
change 0 15 0
newmax 1500 35 80
newmin 1000 0 50
t(arget) 1250 17.5 65
t - min 250 17.5 15
max - t 250 17.5 15





Changes on the ranges of issues for supplier agent with the new max, min and target 




The modified parameters of Pmin, Pmax for Price => Quantity => Performance sequence 
Offer Parameters ka tmax   Pmin Pmax 
Consumer price 0.2 10 0.5 1000 1500 
Supplier Price 0.2 10 0.5 1250 1900 
Consumer Performance 0.2 10 0.5 50 80 
Supplier Performance 0.2 10 0.5 50 43.06667 
Consumer Quantity 0.2 10 0.5 0 35 







Supplier origmax 1900 100 100
origmin 1250 10 50
change 0 48.46154 56.93333
newmax 1900 148.4615 43.06667
newmin 1250 10 50
t(arget) 1575 79.23077 46.53333
t - min 325 69.23077 -3.46667
max - t 325 69.23077 -3.46667





The sequence of offers counter-offers for consumer and supplier agent for 




Figure A1.1 The acceptable price for both agents for Price issue 
Price Quantity Performance
Offers Consumer Supplier Consumer Supplier Consumer Supplier
1 1022.876 1870.261 1.601347 142.1265 51.37258 43.38389
2 1047.233 1838.597 3.306321 135.3816 52.83399 43.72163
3 1073.401 1804.578 5.138096 128.135 54.40408 44.0845
4 1101.858 1767.585 7.130032 120.2548 56.11146 44.47909
5 1133.333 1726.667 9.333333 111.5385 58 44.91556
6 1169.06 1680.222 11.83419 101.645 60.14359 45.41096
7 1211.438 1625.13 14.80067 89.90942 62.68629 45.99861
8 1266.667 1553.333 18.66667 74.61538 66 46.76444
9 1400 1380 28 37.69231 74 48.61333




















Figure A1.2 No agreement for both agents for Quantity issue 
 































The Consumer utility entries are shown together with the total Customer Utility. Fig. 
A1.2 and Fig. A1.3 shows that the agents have not achieved an agreement on Quantity 
and Performance issue in this stage. Thus the following utilities for consumer agent for 
Quantity and Performance issue shows 0. The total consumer utility gains 0.1. 
 
Weight 












      
 
Weight 0.5 0.1 0.4 total 
 
Utility 0.2 0 0 0.1 
 
The Supplier utility values are calculated in the same process as Consumers. Using the 
Supplier weights; a Supplier’s total utility is calculated. Finally the total of the 
Consumer and Supplier utility values give a joint utility value. The joint utility for each 
of the issue sequences is also shown. 
 
Supplier Utility 0.230769 0 0 0.11 
 
Weight 0.5 0.4 0.1 Total 
      




The sequence Price=> Quantity =>Performance is a negotiation failure in this stage as 
there is 0 utility for Quantity and Performance of issue value. The equation 4.6 
determines the above result by using the importance weights and individual utility of the 










Comparison on automated negotiation approaches with my model 













1982 Two players have to reach an 
agreement on the partition of a 
pie of size 1. Each has to make in 
turn, a proposal as to how it 
should be divided. 
No No 
The Importance of 




1990 This paper discusses a multi-issue 
bargaining game in which the 
players set up an agenda and 
negotiate on the issues 












1993 This paper presents non stationary 
complete information bargaining 
model which exhibits delayed 
settlement. 
No No 
Issue by issue 
negotiation: the 
role of information 
and time preference 
Mehmet Bac, 
Horse Raff 
1996 Many bargaining situations 
involve multiple issues, 
incomplete information. Issue by 
issue agenda can solve it and can 
arise from signalling 
considerations.  
Yes No 
A note on Multi-






2000 The note examines different 
bilateral bargaining procedures 









2000 The paper presents a strategic 
model of multi-issue bargaining 
with alternating offers and time 
preferences which allows the 
impact of the agenda to be 









2001 Simple context of Rubinstein type 
offer-counteroffer structure with 
complete (perfect) information 
and where acceptance of an offer 
settles that issue and removes it 










It shows the equilibrium agenda 
can be produced by a 
straightforward algorithm which 
uses only ordinal information on 
how much each bargainers’ 





The Game of 
Negotiations: 








2002 Their two-issue bargaining model 
uncovers the settings in which 
different agenda structures are 
chosen in equilibrium, how the 
order in which issues are 
bargained over matters, and what 












2002 The papers shows that the 
sequential implementation of the 
equilibrium agreement gives 
better outcome than a 
simultaneous implementation 
when agents have like, as well as 











2003 This paper studies the effect of 
combining the exogenous and 
endogenous agendas on the 











2004 This paper presents an agenda-
based model for multi-issue 
negotiation under time constraint 
in an incomplete information 
setting and orders in which issues 















2004 This paper analysed the process 
of bilateral multi-issue 
negotiation by fixing the protocol 










2004 It studies a bilateral multi-issue 
bargaining procedure with 
complete information and 
endogenous agenda. In the 
procedure, proposals must be 
made on only one issue at a time, 
although the proposer can choose 











2006 This paper studied bilateral multi-
issue negotiation settings between 
self-interested agents in a wide 
range of settings. Each player has 
time constraints in the form of 












2006 This paper analysed the 3 key 
procedures for bilateral multi-
issue negotiation between self-
interested agents: Package deal, 








2006 An extended protocol where self 
interested agents are able to 





agreements without reviling its 
complete preferences. 








2007 Shows that delay affects the 
interplay of the forces in the 
bargaining game and solves the 
indeterminacy of equlibria. In 
equilibrium, players discuss the 
most important issue first. 
 
Yes No 







2007 Defines how parties should select 
agendas, it investigated a two-
person alternating-offer model, 
where players differ in terms of 
their time preferences and 
valuations of the issues. 
Yes No 
Optimal Agendas 












2008 The impact of varying agenda and 
procedure on the negotiation 
outcome. This is done under 
incomplete information settings 
with the equilibrium strategies 
defined for issue by issue and 
package deal negotiation 
procedures. 
Yes No 






2009 This paper explored the 
importance of the bargaining 
agenda from two perspectives. 
Firstly, does a certain agenda 
create an efficient outcome? 
Secondly, by applying the ex ante 
perspective, how efficient is this 













2011 This paper analyzes bilateral 
multi-issue negotiation where the 
issues are divisible, there are time 
constraints in the form of 
deadlines and discount factors, 
and the agents have different 
preferences over the issues which 











2011 This paper presents a hyper GA 
system to evolve optimal agendas 













This work concentrates on the 
impact of agenda/procedure on 
the issue-by-issue negotiation 
outcome. The agent’s preference 
order is used as a base case for 
providing the optimal agenda-
procedure combination. 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
